The DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 55 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The Measurement Problem of Consciousness
Open accessAbstract
This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases—what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences between conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. nonconscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency to the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to nonhuman animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid causing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyze and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper argues that the most pressing challenge for consciousness science is the measurement problem of consciousness: how to determine the presence and properties of consciousness. It distinguishes the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem, arguing that current human-derived indicators cannot be confidently applied to nonhuman animals and especially machines, and recommends a precautionary principle under uncertainty.
Key findings
- The paper identifies three related problems within the measurement problem of consciousness: (i) the indicator validity problem, (ii) the extrapolation problem, and (iii) the moral problem.
- Indicator validity is especially problematic because current indicators are validated on the conscious/unconscious distinction in humans, but are then used to detect the conscious/non-conscious distinction in other entities; the paper argues this background assumption lacks sufficient justification and is likely incorrect.
- Extrapolation to nonhuman animals may be partly supported by biological analogy and shared evolutionary history, but these justifications do not apply to machines, which lack shared history and analogous anatomical or physiological structures; the paper describes an “n=1 problem” because all known consciousness cases come from Earth-based evolved life.
- The paper cites an informal survey indicating about 78% of experts and non-experts think there is progress in consciousness science, while noting a complete lack of consensus on how consciousness can and should be measured; it advocates a precautionary principle and pluralistic robustness analysis using multiple independent lines of evidence.
Methods
- Conceptual and philosophical analysis, combined with a literature review of consciousness measurement methods, including objective measures, subjective self-report, masking, trace conditioning, multisensory learning, neural correlates of consciousness, and Integrated Information Theory’s Φ.
- No new empirical data are collected; the paper uses examples and arguments about humans, nonhuman animals, and artificial systems to analyze the measurement problem.
- The paper proposes a precautionary principle for uncertain cases and a robustness/pluralistic approach in which results invariant across different experiments, models, and independent background assumptions are considered more strongly supported.
Limitations
- The paper states that it is not its primary aim to solve the measurement problem of consciousness and that no single paper could do so; it aims instead to clarify how the problem manifests for nonhuman consciousness.
- The paper acknowledges a pessimistic reading: the indicator validity problem may suggest we cannot validate any indicator measures of consciousness because consciousness cannot be directly accessed or measured, and it cites Michel (2019) as concluding we should remain agnostic about fish consciousness.
- Evident from the text: the analysis is conceptual rather than empirical, offers no new experimental validation of indicators, and its proposals for machine consciousness remain provisional and dependent on theoretical commitments such as Integrated Information Theory.
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Claims the paper makes
11 Valid · 5 Not valid · 34 Not checked · 109 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Indeed, many of the perceptual and cognitive processes in the human brain occur without consciousness (Dehaene et al. 2017).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Dehaene et al. 2017 source
The “C2: Self-monitoring” section (p. 3) explicitly says that complex computations, including face and speech recognition, sentence parsing, and meaning extraction, occur unconsciously in the human brain. The sections on unconscious perceptual processing and decision-making (p. 3) provide further examples. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, when the conditioned stimulus is masked from conscious perception (e.g. through short presentation time, or immediate 'masking' with another stimulus), then the process does not result in learning in any subjects (Knight et al. 2006; Esteves et al. 1994).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Knight et al. 2006 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results report no significant differential skin-conductance response on unperceived trace-conditioning trials, supporting the narrower finding that learning was not detected under this study’s conditions. The Conditioned and Unconditioned Stimuli section says perception was varied using perithreshold tone volumes, not immediate masking, and the Discussion cautions that a shorter trace interval might support conditioning without awareness. The paper therefore does not establish that masking prevents learning in every subject or under all trace-conditioning procedures. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Esteves et al. 1994 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, we don't see the problems we have presented as fatal for the measurement of consciousness”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Veit and Huebner 2020 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In the Website section (page not provided), the paper rejects the idea that failure to draw a boundary leaves nothing to say about animal sentience and calls for empirical investigation of what animals feel. That supports the view that these difficulties are not fatal to studying sentience, but the passage does not specifically address measuring consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.78)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and we do not know whether these are the same in living organisms as in machines.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The reason for this lower status awarded to consciousness studies is thus more likely conceptual in nature, relating to the particular ways in which we understand consciousness; a fact which deserves proper philosophical attention.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
74 more claims
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“One problem is that in building AI systems we are likely to discover new ways to achieve behavioral capabilities, which may not involve consciousness, since biological constraints do not app ly [ 21,39].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [21]
Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Symonds, P. M. (1954) · Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0051901 · Cited by 4,875
Psychology as the behaviorist views it
Watson, J. B. (1913) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0074428 · Cited by 3,230
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 3×
“One possible marker of consciousness that does not rely on biological assumptions or tests using the conscious/unconscious distinction, comes from Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Tononi 2004).”
InfluentialAffective consciousness: core emotional feelings in animals and humans.
Panksepp, J. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.004 · Cited by 1,217 · cited 2×
“There are multiple proposed types of consciousness, such as phenomenal and access consciousness (Block 1995), self- awareness (Carruthers 2003), and cognitive and affective consciousness (Panksepp 2005).”
BackgroundClassical conditioning and brain systems: the role of awareness
Clark, R. E., & Squire, L. R. (1998) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.280.5360.77 · Cited by 1,138
Blake, R., & Logothetis, N. K. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn701 · Cited by 1,027
Consciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine
Merker, B. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000891 · Cited by 868 · cited 1×
“Though work by Merker (2007) disputes that the neocortex is necessary for consciousness.”
What is consciousness, and could machines have it?
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aan8871 · Cited by 855 · cited 1×
“Indeed, many of the perceptual and cognitive processes in the human brain occur without consciousness (Dehaene et al. 2017).”
Deep homology and the origins of evolutionary novelty
Shubin, N., Tabin, C., & Carroll, S. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07891 · Cited by 842 · cited 1×
“Think of the evolution of animal eyes: once thought of as separate events of convergent evolution, but now understood as a result of deep homology at the level of the PAX6 gene (Shubin et al. 2009).”
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Block, N. (1995). Some concepts of consciousness. Sciences, 18 (2), 1-28.
- Jacquet, J., Franks, B., Godfrey-Smith, P. and Sánchez-Suárez, W. (2019). The case against octopus farming. Issues in Science and Technology, 35 (2), 37-44.
- Van Gulick, R. (2018). Consciousness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition ed.).
Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Browning, H., & Birch, J. (2022) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12822 · Cited by 217
“Scientists in this area often take it for granted that, in studying welfare, the goal is to access (albeit indirectly) experienced affective states (e.g. Browning, 2020; Duncan, 2002; Kirkwood, 2006; Mellor et al., 2020).”
Self-citationHow Should We Study Animal Consciousness Scientifically?
Birch, J., Broom, D. M., Browning, H., Crump, A., Ginsburg, S., Halina, M., Harrison, D., Jablonka, E., Lee, A. Y., Kammerer, F., et al. (2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.29.3.008 · Cited by 81
“Use of these indicators relies on possibly problematic background assumptions about the shared functions of consciousness between humans and other animals (Browning and Veit, 2020) and can’t tell us about the type of experience an animal has — the what it”
BackgroundSelf-citationWhat Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience
Mason, G. J., & Lavery, J. M. (2022) · Frontiers in Veterinary Science · doi:10.3389/fvets.2022.788289 · Cited by 81
The sentience shift in animal research
Browning, H., & Veit, W. (2022) · The New Bioethics · doi:10.1080/20502877.2022.2077681 · Cited by 62
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Browning, H., Veit, W., & University of Arkansas Press
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 85-108
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3134558418
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 5.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- Philosophical Topics (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- ePrints Soton (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- European Commission (851145)
- Australian Research Council (FL170100160)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- consciousness assessment, artificial consciousness, precautionary principle, moral status of animals
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