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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 55 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

The Measurement Problem of Consciousness

Open access
Browning, Heather, Veit, Walter, University of Arkansas Press · 2020 · Philosophical Topics

Abstract

This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases—what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences between conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. nonconscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency to the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to nonhuman animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid causing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyze and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper argues that the most pressing challenge for consciousness science is the measurement problem of consciousness: how to determine the presence and properties of consciousness. It distinguishes the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem, arguing that current human-derived indicators cannot be confidently applied to nonhuman animals and especially machines, and recommends a precautionary principle under uncertainty.

Key findings

  • The paper identifies three related problems within the measurement problem of consciousness: (i) the indicator validity problem, (ii) the extrapolation problem, and (iii) the moral problem.
  • Indicator validity is especially problematic because current indicators are validated on the conscious/unconscious distinction in humans, but are then used to detect the conscious/non-conscious distinction in other entities; the paper argues this background assumption lacks sufficient justification and is likely incorrect.
  • Extrapolation to nonhuman animals may be partly supported by biological analogy and shared evolutionary history, but these justifications do not apply to machines, which lack shared history and analogous anatomical or physiological structures; the paper describes an “n=1 problem” because all known consciousness cases come from Earth-based evolved life.
  • The paper cites an informal survey indicating about 78% of experts and non-experts think there is progress in consciousness science, while noting a complete lack of consensus on how consciousness can and should be measured; it advocates a precautionary principle and pluralistic robustness analysis using multiple independent lines of evidence.

Methods

  • Conceptual and philosophical analysis, combined with a literature review of consciousness measurement methods, including objective measures, subjective self-report, masking, trace conditioning, multisensory learning, neural correlates of consciousness, and Integrated Information Theory’s Φ.
  • No new empirical data are collected; the paper uses examples and arguments about humans, nonhuman animals, and artificial systems to analyze the measurement problem.
  • The paper proposes a precautionary principle for uncertain cases and a robustness/pluralistic approach in which results invariant across different experiments, models, and independent background assumptions are considered more strongly supported.

Limitations

  • The paper states that it is not its primary aim to solve the measurement problem of consciousness and that no single paper could do so; it aims instead to clarify how the problem manifests for nonhuman consciousness.
  • The paper acknowledges a pessimistic reading: the indicator validity problem may suggest we cannot validate any indicator measures of consciousness because consciousness cannot be directly accessed or measured, and it cites Michel (2019) as concluding we should remain agnostic about fish consciousness.
  • Evident from the text: the analysis is conceptual rather than empirical, offers no new experimental validation of indicators, and its proposals for machine consciousness remain provisional and dependent on theoretical commitments such as Integrated Information Theory.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.5840/philtopics20204815

Cites

74 of 74 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims the paper makes

11 Valid · 5 Not valid · 34 Not checked · 109 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 69 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Block, N. (1995). Some concepts of consciousness. Sciences, 18 (2), 1-28.
  2. Jacquet, J., Franks, B., Godfrey-Smith, P. and Sánchez-Suárez, W. (2019). The case against octopus farming. Issues in Science and Technology, 35 (2), 37-44.
  3. Van Gulick, R. (2018). Consciousness. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition ed.).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Browning, H., Veit, W., & University of Arkansas Press
Venue
Philosophical Topics
Published
2020
Volume
48
Issue
1
Pages
85-108
ISSN
0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3134558418
Cited by
78
References
69
Citations by year
2026: 19 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 1
FWCI
5.80
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Philosophical Topics (publishedVersion)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
  • Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
  • ePrints Soton (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • European Commission (851145)
  • Australian Research Council (FL170100160)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
Keywords
consciousness assessment, artificial consciousness, precautionary principle, moral status of animals

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Measurement Problem of Consciousness. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5840/philtopics20204815
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Browning, H., Veit, W., & University of Arkansas Press. (2020). The Measurement Problem of Consciousness. Philosophical Topics. https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20204815

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