The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy
Open accessAbstract
Demand for healthy, safe, and environmentally friendly food products has been increasing. In response, producers are marketing organic and other quality-differentiated foods, sometimes claiming to have followed sound environmental and animal welfare practices. These products frequently have unobservable quality attributes. If the profit-maximizing producer is able to deceive the consumer with a false claim, then he or she will enjoy a higher price with lower production costs (compared to the full disclosure outcome). The analysis described in this paper shows that repeat-purchase relationships and third-party monitoring are required for high-quality credence goods to be available. Policy implications of this analysis for national organic food standards are discussed.
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Cited by
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- McCluskey, J. J.
- Venue
- Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2000-04
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-9
- ISSN
- 1068-2805 (ISSN-L)
- 2372-2614
- OpenAlex
- W2156380610
- Cited by
- 266
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 12.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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