The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Much of the ‘economics of property rights’ devalues property and legal rights
Open accessAbstract
Legal theorists and other commentators have long established a distinction between property and possession. According to this usage adopted here, possession refers to control of a resource, but property involves legally sanctioned rights. Strikingly, prominent foundational accounts of the ‘economics of property rights’ concentrate on possession, downplaying the issue of legitimate legal rights (Alchian, 1965, 1977; Barzel, 1994, 1997, 2002; von Mises, 1981). Some authors in this genre make a distinction between ‘economic rights’ and ‘legal rights’ where the former are more to do with possession or the capacity to control. They argue that ‘economic rights’ are primary and more relevant for understanding behaviour. But it is argued here that legal factors – involving recognition of authority and perceived justice or morality – have also to be brought into the picture to understand human motivation in modern societies, even in the economic sphere. As other authors including Hernando De Soto (2000) have pointed out, the neglect of the legal infrastructure that buttresses property has deleterious implications, including a failure to understand the role of property in supporting collateralized loans for innovation and economic development.
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Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
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Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
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“This evolutionary argument is supported by evidence from primates (De Waal, 1996, 2006) and modern evolutionary theory with a careful rehabilitation of the concept of group selection (Henrich, 2004, Hodgson, 2013a, 2014; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2010; Sober and Wilson, 1998).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- HODGSON, G. M.
- Venue
- Journal of Institutional Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2015-02-09
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 683-709
- ISSN
- 1744-1374 (ISSN-L)
- 1744-1382
- OpenAlex
- W2162090494
- Cited by
- 203
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 32.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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