Blockchains and the economic institutions of capitalism
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 59 of the 59 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Blockchains are a new digital technology that combines peer-to-peer network computing and cryptography to create an immutable decentralised public ledger. Where the ledger records money, a blockchain is a cryptocurrency, such as Bitcoin; but ledger entries can record any data structure, including property titles, identity and certification, contracts, and so on. We argue that the economics of blockchains extend beyond analysis of a new general purpose technology and its disruptive Schumpeterian consequences to the broader idea that blockchains are an institutional technology. We consider several examples of blockchain-based economic coordination and governance. We claim that blockchains are an instance of institutional evolution.
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In the citing paper
“Those institutions-trusted third parties-that exist primarily for the purpose of providing trust to facilitate economic transactions face competition from the blockchain as an institutional technology (Davidson et al., 2018;Berg et al., 2019).”
From Blockchain Technology as Economic Infrastructure: Revisiting the Electronic Markets Hypothesis (2019) · cites this paper as Davidson et al., 2018
In the citing paper
“we re-examine the electronic markets hypothesis in the light of blockchain technology-a technology which economizes on trust (Berg et al., 2017(Berg et al., , 2019;;Davidson et al., 2018;Werbach, 2018).”
From Blockchain Technology as Economic Infrastructure: Revisiting the Electronic Markets Hypothesis (2019) · cites this paper as Davidson et al., 2018
In the citing paper
“Recently, a few authors have attempted to link the commons with blockchain capabilities, either at a general conceptual level (Bollier, 2015;Davidson et al., 2018;O'Dwyer, 2015) or proposing specific theoretical systems (Cila et al., 2020;Ducrée et al., 2020;Pazaitis et al., 2017).”
From When Ostrom Meets Blockchain: Exploring the Potentials of Blockchain for Commons Governance (2021) · cites this paper as Davidson et al., 2018
Citations
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Cited by
Blockchain as a disruptive technology for business: A systematic review
Frizzo-Barker, J., Chow-White, P. A., Adams, P. R., Mentanko, J., Ha, D., & Green, S. (2020) · International Journal of Information Management · doi:10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2019.10.014 · Cited by 573
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Transaction Cost Theory: Past Progress, Current Challenges, and Suggestions for the Future
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Metadata
- Authors
- DAVIDSON, S., DE FILIPPI, P., & POTTS, J.
- Affiliations
- RMIT University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- POTTS, JASON
- Venue
- Journal of Institutional Economics
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2018-01-18
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 639-658
- ISSN
- 1744-1374 (ISSN-L)
- 1744-1382
- OpenAlex
- W2784387076
- Cited by
- 582
- References
- 59
- Citations by year
- 2026: 52 · 2025: 74 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 54 · 2022: 56 · 2021: 65 · 2020: 78 · 2019: 95 · 2018: 38
- FWCI
- 110.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- autopapers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- Journal of Institutional Economics (publishedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- RMIT Research Repository (RMIT University Library) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology Applications and Security
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Blockchain Technology in Education and Learning
- Keywords
- blockchain, cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, institutional technology, institutional evolution, economic coordination, governance, decentralization, capitalism, general purpose technologies, Schumpeterian innovation, economic institutions
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Blockchains and the economic institutions of capitalism. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1017/s1744137417000200
- The paper
- DAVIDSON, S., DE FILIPPI, P., & POTTS, J. (2018). Blockchains and the economic institutions of capitalism. Journal of Institutional Economics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744137417000200
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.