Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Reputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players’ past decisions, reputations in real life are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. We found that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputations are not taken into account by subjects for orienting their choices. Reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights about the characteristics of reputation and about the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners, and also when knowing that they will be selected.
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Cites
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“The role of reputation on cooperative behaviors in social dilemmas is well-established (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Nax, Perc, Szolnoki & Helbing, 2015), but less is known on the consequences of reputation format and presence or absence of Figure 4: Percentage of…”
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“Theories on the evolution of cooperation via indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004) emphasize the role of reputation in avoiding cheaters and supporting cooperation, and experimental studies using dynamic networks indeed suggest that human subjects tend to break…”
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Dynamic social networks promote cooperation in experiments with humans
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Cited by
Wu, J., Balliet, D., Peperkoorn, L. S., Romano, A., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2020) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02956 · Cited by 156
The evolution of trust and trustworthiness
Kumar, A., Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0491 · Cited by 148
Self-citationIncreasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & de Pol, I. V. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4 · Cited by 135
Self-citationNetworks of reliable reputations and cooperation: a review
Takács, K., Gross, J., Testori, M., Letina, S., Kenny, A. R., Power, E. A., & Wittek, R. P. M. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0297 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Capraro, V., Giardini, F., Vilone, D., & Paolucci, M.
- Venue
- Judgment and Decision Making
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 2016-11
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 589-600
- ISSN
- 1930-2975 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2528544976
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 15.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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