“When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument”
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 45 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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“If the costs or payoffs of false positives (detecting a signal in the environment where there is none) and false negatives (failing to detect a signal that is present in the environment) are asymmetric, natural selection will tend to promote beliefs that yield the highest payoffs or incur the least costs (Stephens, 2001).”
From Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification (2011) · cites this paper as Stephens, 2001
Citations
Cites
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1975) · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-1834-0_8 · Cited by 22,650
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
(1982) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477 · Cited by 8,240
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism
Millikan, R. G. (1984) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4124.001.0001 · Cited by 4,758
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 4,269
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
Quine, W. V. (1969) · doi:10.7312/quin92204 · Cited by 3,593 · cited 3×
“1 Quine (1969), Ruse (1986), Sober (1980), Dennett (1978, 1987), Fodor (1981), Millikan (1984, 1987), Goldman (1986), Lycan (1988), Sorensen (1992), Nozick (1993) and Papineau (1987, 1993) all defend various claims linking evolution with true belief or rationality.”
BackgroundPsychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind
Fodor, J. A. (1987) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5684.001.0001 · Cited by 2,756
Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior
(1999) · Ethology · doi:10.1046/j.1439-0310.1999.00372.x · Cited by 2,545
How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species
Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990) · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226218526.001.0001 · Cited by 2,268
Plantinga, A. (1993) · doi:10.1093/0195078640.001.0001 · Cited by 1,703
Research works printed but not linked: 9
- Cherniak, C. (1986): Minimal Rationality, Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
- Dennett, D. (1978): Brainstorms, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
- Fodor, J.A. (1981): “Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes,” in Representations, Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
- Fodor, J.A. (1999): “Is Science Biologically Possible?” in In Critical Condition, Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
- Gould, S. and Lewontin, R. (1978): “The Spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian Paradigm,” in E. Sober (1994) (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary Biology, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
- Jeffery, R. (1983): The Logic of Decision, second edition, The University of Chicago Press.
- Millikan, R. (1987): Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.
- Sorensen, R. (1992): Thought Experiments, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Sterelny, K. (1999): “The Evolution of Agency,” in Valerie Gray Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays,Cambridge,MA, MIT Press.
Cited by
Sober, E. (2002) · The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy · doi:10.1002/9780470996362.ch12 · Cited by 671
In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity
Cowie, C. (2014) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0510-6 · Cited by 131
“And having true beliefs won’t always be of help in fulfilling goals (Stephens 2001).”
BackgroundBiological function and epistemic normativity
Sullivan‐Bissett, E. (2017) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869795.2017.1287296 · Cited by 70
Still no lie detector for language models: probing empirical and conceptual roadblocks
Levinstein, B. A., & Herrmann, D. A. (2025) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-023-02094-3 · Cited by 50
“For example, God-frey-Smith (1991, 1998), Sober (1994), Stephens (2001), and Smead (2015) have all developed models that characterize when an agent should (be expected to) learn from its environment and then select actions based on what it learned, and when it should not.”
Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From
Cruz, H. D. (2014) · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.1080/00048402.2014.967792 · Cited by 61
Metadata
- Authors
- Stephens, C. L.
- Affiliations
- University of Oklahoma (US)
- Corresponding author
- Stephens, Christopher L.
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2001-08
- Volume
- 105
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 161-189
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W2160622530
- Cited by
- 35
- References
- 44
- Citations by year
- 2024: 3 · 2023: 2 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2015: 2 · 2014: 3 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (tdm)
- www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/text-and-data-mining (vor)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- natural selection, belief formation, phenotypic plasticity, epistemic rationality, epistemic justification
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: “When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument”. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1023/a:1010358100423
- The paper
- Stephens, C. L. (2001). “When is it Selectively Advantageous to Have True Beliefs? Sandwiching the Better Safe than Sorry Argument”. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1023/a%3A1010358100423
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.