The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corruption and Rent-Seeking
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Citations
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Cited by
How Corruption Affects Productivity
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Metadata
- Authors
- Lambsdorff, J. G.
- Venue
- Public Choice
- Published
- 2002-10
- Volume
- 113
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 97-125
- ISSN
- 0048-5829 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-7101
- OpenAlex
- W2103257904
- Cited by
- 284
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 16.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.