The DOI matches its Crossref record; 26 of the 26 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing
Open accessAbstract
Market discipline is an article of faith among financial economists, and the use of market discipline as a regulatory tool is gaining credibility. Effective market discipline involves two distinct components: security holders' ability to accurately assess the condition of a firm (monitoring) and their ability to cause subsequent managerial actions to reflect those assessments (influence). Substantial evidence supports the existence of market monitoring. However, the existing evidence about market influence involves relatively rare events such as management turnover. This paper seeks evidence that U.S. bank holding companies' security price changes reliably influence subsequent managerial actions. Although we identify some patterns consistent with beneficial market influences, our methodology does not provide strong evidence that stock or (especially) bond investors regularly influence managerial actions. Day-to-day market influence remains, for the moment, more a matter of faith than of empirical evidence. JEL classification codes: G21, G38, G14
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Cites
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Cited by
Ownership structure, risk and performance in the European banking industry
Iannotta, G., Nocera, G., & Sironi, A. (2007) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2006.07.013 · Cited by 984
Accounting discretion, loan loss provisioning, and discipline of Banks’ risk-taking
Bushman, R. M., & Williams, C. D. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2012.04.002 · Cited by 784
Market discipline, disclosure and moral hazard in banking
Nier, E., & Baumann, U. (2006) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2006.03.001 · Cited by 695
Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks
Barry, T. A., Lepetit, L., & Tarazi, A. (2011) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.10.004 · Cited by 426
What Caused the Bank Capital Build-up of the 1990s?
Flannery, M. J., & Rangan, K. P. (2008) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfm007 · Cited by 401
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Bliss, R. R., & Flannery, M. J.
- Venue
- Review of Finance
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-12-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 361-396
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-3097
- 1573-692X
- OpenAlex
- W3023883240
- Cited by
- 293
- References
- 26
- FWCI
- 25.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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