The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
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“and that this remarkable capacity has developed quite late (phylo- and ontogenetically, Metzinger, 2003, 2008).”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003
In the citing paper
“which implies that phenomenal transparency-opacity is ‘cognitively impenetrable’”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003
In the citing paper
“In more dramatic cases, inference about precision may itself be compromised and produce abnormal experiences; e.g., in derealization or depersonalization (cf. Metzinger, 2003; Seth et al., 2012) or altered states of consciousness (Millière, 2017).”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003
In the citing paper
“a phenomenal self as subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation [6,7,9,21,22]”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]
In the citing paper
“Because this conscious body model is phenomenally transparent because it cannot introspectively be recognized as a model, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves (self-identification) [6,7,23,24].”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]
In the citing paper
“In particular, there seems to be a continuum between transparency and opacity, which determines how realistically the content of a body representation is experienced and how strongly the dimension of self-identification is expressed [6,7].”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]
Citations
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Tye, M. (2000) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2110.001.0001 · Cited by 1,253
Flagged first, then by citations
13 of the 77 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.
Research works printed but not linked: 15
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“Social interactions can therefore be seen as being mediated through mental representations of self and other (Brown et al., 2016), including representations of their interrelations (Metzinger, 2003).”
Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues
Peters, F. (2014) · Axiomathes · doi:10.1007/s10516-014-9232-0 · Cited by 1
Reuter, K. (2010) · Philosophia · doi:10.1007/s11406-010-9275-4 · Cited by 1
“Second, the phenomenological tradition (Husserl 1965, see also Metzinger 2003 ) speaks of the bracketing of the existence of objects (or of the ‘taking back the existence assumption’) in order to introspectively describe phenomena.”
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Kiklewicz, A. (2019) · Przegląd Rusycystyczny · doi:10.31261/pr.7326 · Cited by 1
Kukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0003 · Cited by 1
Cognitive Bootstrapping: A Survey of Bootstrap Mechanisms for Emergent Cognition
Windridge, D. (2005) · Surrey Research Insight Open Access (The University of Surrey) · Cited by 1
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A generative model of body ownership and minimal selfhood
Limanowski, J. (2015) · Universitätsbibliothek der FU Berlin Hochschulschriftenstelle u. Dokumentenserver · doi:10.17169/refubium-5038
Trafford, J. (2011) · Kritike An Online Journal of Philosophy · doi:10.25138/5.2.a.12
Boffi, L. (2019) · Advances in intelligent systems and computing · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-20216-3_59
Гаспарян, Д. Э. (2019) · Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences · doi:10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-5-97-123
“Metzinger 2003 – Metzinger T. Phenomenal Transparency and Cognitive Self-Reference // Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.”
MethodKukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0010
Kukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0011
Kukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0015
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Intertextual Precision Expectations
Kukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0009
Kukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0001
Kukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0013
Kukkonen, K. (2019) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.003.0004
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“Nach Metzinger (1996; 2003) ist die Einheit des Selbst eine repräsentative Fiktion.”
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THE UNDERLYING BIOMECHANICS OF OUR BRAIN
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Young, J. H. (2023) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781119767398.ch3
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The experience of memory: it's unconscious origins
Brouillet, D. (2024) · Frontiers in Cognition · doi:10.3389/fcogn.2024.1358396
“However, as fluency is phenomenologically transparent to its own causal source (Metzinger, 2003), in the sense that it does not represent such a source - it is just a subjective feeling - identifying the source relies on an attribution process based on inference: if fluency is experienced, its origin…”
Kukkonen, K. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.002.0005
Kukkonen, K. (2020) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190050955.002.0008
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Antoine Lutz, A., Abdoun, O., Dor‐Ziderman, Y., Trautwein, F., Sandved-Smith, L., Bogotá, J. D., Kiverstein, J. D., & Berkovich‐Ohana, A. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-443-29258-3.00046-x
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“As stated in the introduction, place illusion corresponds to the subjective-phenomenal experience of “now being there” in reality [58].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Metzinger, T.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Metzinger, Thomas
- ORCID
- Metzinger, Thomas
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 353-393
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2142672241
- Semantic Scholar
- 64df353577b671dc812baa22548d381888587871
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 3.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- phenomenal transparency, self-reflection, representationalism, first-person perspective, self-model, naturalism
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