The DOI matches its Crossref record; 64 of the 77 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
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“and that this remarkable capacity has developed quite late (phylo- and ontogenetically, Metzinger, 2003, 2008).”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003
In the citing paper
“which implies that phenomenal transparency-opacity is ‘cognitively impenetrable’”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003
In the citing paper
“In more dramatic cases, inference about precision may itself be compromised and produce abnormal experiences; e.g., in derealization or depersonalization (cf. Metzinger, 2003; Seth et al., 2012) or altered states of consciousness (Millière, 2017).”
From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2003
In the citing paper
“a phenomenal self as subject appears exactly when the organism possesses a phenomenal model of the intentionality relation [6,7,9,21,22]”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]
In the citing paper
“Because this conscious body model is phenomenally transparent because it cannot introspectively be recognized as a model, we fully identify with its representational content and are consciously present as bodily selves (self-identification) [6,7,23,24].”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]
In the citing paper
“In particular, there seems to be a continuum between transparency and opacity, which determines how realistically the content of a body representation is experienced and how strongly the dimension of self-identification is expressed [6,7].”
From Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood (2009) · cites this paper as [7]
Citations
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The Problem of the Essential Indexical
Perry, J. (1979) · Noûs · doi:10.2307/2214792 · Cited by 2,195
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind
Tye, M. (1995) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6712.001.0001 · Cited by 1,718
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Harman, G. (1990) · Philosophical Perspectives · doi:10.2307/2214186 · Cited by 1,409
Consciousness, Color, and Content
Tye, M. (2000) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/2110.001.0001 · Cited by 1,253
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060
Self-citationMinimal self-models and the free energy principle.
Limanowski, J., & Blankenburg, F. (2013) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00547 · Cited by 263
“Presence is hence a structural property of conscious experience (Seth, 2009) that is transparent in the sense that Metzinger (2003) uses the term (Seth et al., 2011).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialArtificial suffering: an argument for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology
Metzinger, T. (2021) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s270507852150003x · Cited by 182
“I think that this is exactly the reason why con¯gurations of this type have only rarely emerged in biological evolution, with phenomenally opaque states beginning to play a major causal role only recently, in the high-level, cognitive self-model of human beings [Metzinger, 2003a].”
Self-citationThe thalamic dynamic core theory of conscious experience
Ward, L. M. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.01.007 · Cited by 176
“It might seem obvious to philosophers of mind because it is closely related to the idea of phenomenal transparency, in which we can access introspectively the content properties of a conscious mental state but not the carrier (vehicle properties) of that content (e.g., Metzinger, 2003; Moore, 1903).”
The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy
Metzinger, T. K. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931 · Cited by 186
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Metzinger, T.
- Affiliations
- Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Metzinger, Thomas
- ORCID
- Metzinger, Thomas
- Venue
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 353-393
- ISSN
- 1568-7759 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-8676
- OpenAlex
- W2142672241
- Semantic Scholar
- 64df353577b671dc812baa22548d381888587871
- Cited by
- 162
- References
- 77
- Citations by year
- 2026: 7 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 13 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 7 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 11 · 2019: 23 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 2 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 3
- FWCI
- 3.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Keywords
- phenomenal transparency, self-reflection, representationalism, first-person perspective, self-model, naturalism
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