Attitude prototypes as determinants of attitude-behavior consistency.

Abstract

This article addresses the questions of when we can predict from an individual's attitude toward a social group to the individual's behavior toward a specific member of that group. One possibility is that individuals determine their attitudes toward a social group by assessing their reactions to an imagined group representative who embodies the defining or central group characteristics--the prototypical group member. When they encounter a specific group member whose characteristics match well those of the "attitude prototype", individuals display attitude-behavior consistency; when the match is poor, they display attitude-behavior inconsistency. This proposition was tested in two experiments, and in each the attitude-behavior relationship was greater in relation to prototypical than to unprototypical group members. In addition, knowledge of an unprototypical group member had little or no effect on attitude prototypes. Rather, the unprototypical group member was dismissed as atypical, leaving the prototype intact to influence future social behavior. The implications for attitude change, and possible applications to more abstract attitudes, are discussed.

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