The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
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Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
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In the citing paper
“Several techniques, such as sanctioning defectors 187 or rewarding cooperators 188 , tend to increase cooperative behaviour in laboratory experiments using economic games.”
From Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response (2020) · cites this paper as [187]
Citations
Cites
The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.
Sufrin, S. C., & Olson, M. (1966) · Industrial and Labor Relations Review · doi:10.2307/2521228 · Cited by 11,518
Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming: Critique, Synthesis, and Suggestions for the Future
Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.28.020177.002051 · Cited by 779
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1979) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226937 · Cited by 742
Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations
Oliver, P. (1980) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/227168 · Cited by 551
Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas.
Messick, D. M., Wilke, H., Brewer, M. B., Kramer, R. M., Zemke, P. E., & Lui, L. (1983) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.44.2.294 · Cited by 408
The lobster fiefs: Economic and ecological effects of territoriality in the maine lobster industry
Acheson, J. M. (1975) · Human Ecology · doi:10.1007/bf01531640 · Cited by 295
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1980) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/227094 · Cited by 277
Motivational bases of the public goods problem.
Yamagishi, T., & Sato, K. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.50.1.67 · Cited by 240
Self-citationCooperation and Group Size in the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma
Bonacich, P., Shure, G. H., Kahan, J. P., & Meeker, R. J. (1976) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200277602000406 · Cited by 183
Individual and structural solutions to resource dilemmas in two cultures.
Samuelson, C. D., Messick, D. M., Rutte, C., & Wilke, H. (1984) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037//0022-3514.47.1.94 · Cited by 167
Cited by
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response
Bavel, J. J. V., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., et al. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z · Cited by 4,964
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems
Ostrom, E. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.3.641 · Cited by 4,529
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02043 · Cited by 3,475
Metadata
- Authors
- Yamagishi, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Washington (US)
- Corresponding author
- Yamagishi, Toshio
- ORCID
- Yamagishi, Toshio
- Venue
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Published
- 1986
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 110-116
- ISSN
- 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1315
- OpenAlex
- W2047022086
- Cited by
- 1,359
- References
- 27
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 33 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 54 · 2021: 54 · 2020: 57 · 2019: 83 · 2018: 59 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 51 · 2015: 83 · 2014: 89 · 2013: 63 · 2012: 73
- FWCI
- 24.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Keywords
- sanctioning system, public goods, social control, punishment
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110
- The paper
- Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.