Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right.
Abstract
Drawing on samples of professional observers of world politics, this article explores the interrelations among cognitive style, theoretical outlook, and reactions to close-call counterfactuals. Study 1 demon-strated that experts (especially high scorers on a composite measure of need for closure and simplic-ity) rejected close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals undermined a preferred framework for understanding the past (the "I-was-not-almost-wrong " defense). Study 2 demonstrated that experts (especially high scorers on need for closure and simplicity) embraced close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals protected conditional forecasts from refutation (the predicted outcome nearly occurred—so " I was almost right"). The article concludes by considering the radically different normative value spins that can be placed on willingness to entertain close-call counterfactuals, Many scholars have commented on a curious asymmetry: People often display far greater confidence in their explanations of the past than they do in their predictions of the future (cf. Fischhoff, 1975; Tetlock & Belkin, 1996). One influential expla-nation holds that people engage in retrospective data fitting when
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Cited by (9)
- Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- The Affect HeuristicSlovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theoryMercier, Hugo, Sperber, Dan · 2011 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- The Functional Theory of Counterfactual ThinkingEpstude, Kai, Roese, Neal J. · 2008 · Personality and Social Psychology Review
- Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of AbilityDunning, David, Meyerowitz, Judith A., Holzberg, Amy D. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0022-3514.75.3.639
- The paper
- Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.75.3.639
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.