The relative accuracy of self-predictions and judgments by others in psychological assessment.
Abstract
The validity of individuals' self-assessments is compared with other assessment procedures commonly used in psychological evaluation. Comparisons are made in the prediction of all criteria that have been investigated: intellectual achievement, vocational choice, job performance, therapy outcome, adjustment following hospitalization, and peer ratings. Self-assessments are at least as predictive of these criteria as are other assessment methods against which they have been pitted. Limitations of this conclusion and its implications for current psychological evaluation procedures are examined. It is argued that greater attention should be given to self-assessme nts and to the evaluation procedures that may enhance their predictive validity. Steps are outlined for deciding when self-assessment should be used, and suggestions are offered as to how the validity of self-judgments might be maximized. Psychological assessment, whether it is done in clinical, business, or educational settings, typically involves predictions about people's behavior that will aid in decision making. The dominant model for assessment involves a professional assessor gathering information about the person being judged, using a variety of procedures such as interviews, standardized tests, historical data, or systematic observations. These data are interpreted and integrated into a description of the person assessed and possibly used to make predictions about the person's subsequent behavior. The sources and range of information may be minimal or extensive, and the combination of data may be intuitive or actuarial. The presumption implicit in this approach is that the assessor, by virtue of his or her knowledge of psychological principles, of normative responses in standardized assessment situations, and of attributes of the person being judged, is in the best position to make evaluations and predictions about that individual. Self-appraisals by the person being evaluated may be obtained as part of the evaluation, and the extent to which self-reports are relied on may differ as a function of the theoretical approach of
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Cited by (34)
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- Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
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How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The relative accuracy of self-predictions and judgments by others in psychological assessment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0033-2909.90.2.322
- The paper
- Shrauger, J. S., & Osberg, T. M. (1981). The relative accuracy of self-predictions and judgments by others in psychological assessment. Psychological Bulletin. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-2909.90.2.322
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