Distributional versus singular approaches to probability and errors in probabilistic reasoning.

Reeves, Tim, Lockhart, Robert S.·1993·Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Abstract

Four experiments examined differences in probabilistic reasoning as a function of whether problems were presented in a frequentist or case-specific form. The experiments demonstrated that these different forms influence the likelihood of Ss committing the conjunction and disjunction fallacies. The authors contend that these 2 forms elicit different approaches to probability. Frequency problems, it is argued, elicit a distributional approach in which probabilities are equated with relative frequencies, whereas case-specific problems elicit a singular approach in which probabilities are equated with the propensities or causal forces operating in an individual case

Cites (4)

  1. The Intuitive Psychologist And His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process
    Ross, Lee · 1977 · Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
  2. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
    Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1983 · Psychological Review
  3. Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery
    Holland, John H., Holyoak, Keith J., Nisbett, Richard E., Thagard, Paul R., Smoliar, Stephen W. · 1987 · IEEE Expert
  4. Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence
    Gigerenzer, Gerd, Hoffrage, Ulrich, Kleinbölting, Heinz · 1991 · Psychological Review

Show all 4 references

Cited by (22)

  1. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
    Bottom, William P., Gilovich, Thomas, Griffin, Dale, Kahneman, Daniel · 2004 · The Academy of Management Review
  2. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
    Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
  3. The Affect Heuristic
    Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
  4. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
    2002 · Cambridge University Press eBooks
  5. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.
    Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage · 1995 · Psychological Review

See all 121

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Distributional versus singular approaches to probability and errors in probabilistic reasoning. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0096-3445.122.2.207
The paper
Reeves, T., & Lockhart, R. S. (1993). Distributional versus singular approaches to probability and errors in probabilistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. https://doi.org/10.1037//0096-3445.122.2.207

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.