Hypothesis generation and confidence in judgment.
Abstract
Ss asked to generate their own hypotheses expressed less confidence that they were true than did other Ss who were presented with the same hypotheses for evaluation. This finding holds across domains varying from prediction and social inference to general knowledge questions. Furthermore, Ss who generated their own hypotheses appeared to be more sensitive to their accuracy than were Ss who evaluated the hypotheses. The results are interpreted as evidence that the hypothesis generation task leads Ss to consider more alternative hypotheses than Ss who are asked to evaluate a prespecified hypothesis. This interpretation is supported by experiments demonstrating that the difference between generation and evaluation disappears if a closed set of alternatives is specified or if a delay is inserted between hypothesis generation and confidence assessment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Cites (6)
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Cited by (27)
- Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive JudgmentBottom, William P., Gilovich, Thomas, Griffin, Dale, Kahneman, Daniel · 2004 · The Academy of Management Review
- Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- The Affect HeuristicSlovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
- Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment2002 · Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective probabilityTversky, Amos, Koehler, Derek J. · 1994 · Psychological Review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Hypothesis generation and confidence in judgment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0278-7393.20.2.461
- The paper
- Koehler, D. J. (1994). Hypothesis generation and confidence in judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.20.2.461
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