Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference.

Oaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick, Larkin, Joanne·2000·Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition

Abstract

A probabilistic computational level model of conditional inference is proposed that can explain polarity biases in conditional inference (e.g., J. St. B. T. Evans, 1993). These biases are observed when J. St. B. T. Evans's (1972) negations paradigm is used in the conditional inference task. The model assumes that negations define higher probability categories than their affirmative counterparts (M. Oaksford & K. Stenning, 1992); for example, P(not-dog) > P(dog). This identification suggests that polarity biases are really a rational effect of high-probability categories. Three experiments revealed that, consistent with this probabilistic account, when high-probability categories are used instead of negations, a high-probability conclusion effect is observed. The relationships between the probabilistic model and other phenomena and other theories in conditional reasoning are discussed.

Cites (2)

  1. Reasoning about a Rule
    Wason, P. C. · 1968 · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
  2. The Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic Reasoning
    Chater, Nick, Oaksford, Mike · 1999 · Cognitive Psychology

Show all 2 references

Cited by (8)

  1. Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
    Mercier, Hugo, Sperber, Dan · 2011 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  2. Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.
    Evans, Jonathan St. B. T. · 2002 · Psychological Bulletin
  3. Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight
    Friston, Karl J., Lin, Marco, Frith, Christopher D., Pezzulo, Giovanni, Hobson, J. Allan, Ondobaka, Sasha · 2017 · Neural Computation
  4. Précis of Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning
    Oaksford, Mike, Chater, Nick · 2009 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  5. Conditionals and conditional probability.
    Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., Handley, Simon J., Over, David E. · 2003 · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition

See all 219

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0278-7393.26.4.883
The paper
Oaksford, M., Chater, N., & Larkin, J. (2000). Probabilities and polarity biases in conditional inference. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.26.4.883

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.