Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right.

Tetlock, Philip E.·1998·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Abstract

Drawing on samples of professional observers of world politics, this article explores the interrelations among cognitive style, theoretical outlook, and reactions to close-call counterfactuals. Study 1 demon-strated that experts (especially high scorers on a composite measure of need for closure and simplic-ity) rejected close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals undermined a preferred framework for understanding the past (the "I-was-not-almost-wrong " defense). Study 2 demonstrated that experts (especially high scorers on need for closure and simplicity) embraced close-call counterfactuals that redirected history when these counterfactuals protected conditional forecasts from refutation (the predicted outcome nearly occurred—so " I was almost right"). The article concludes by considering the radically different normative value spins that can be placed on willingness to entertain close-call counterfactuals, Many scholars have commented on a curious asymmetry: People often display far greater confidence in their explanations of the past than they do in their predictions of the future (cf. Fischhoff, 1975; Tetlock & Belkin, 1996). One influential expla-nation holds that people engage in retrospective data fitting when

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  3. Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
    Mercier, Hugo, Sperber, Dan · 2011 · Behavioral and Brain Sciences
  4. The Functional Theory of Counterfactual Thinking
    Epstude, Kai, Roese, Neal J. · 2008 · Personality and Social Psychology Review
  5. Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyncratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Assessments of Ability
    Dunning, David, Meyerowitz, Judith A., Holzberg, Amy D. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases

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How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0022-3514.75.3.639
The paper
Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Close-call counterfactuals and belief-system defenses: I was not almost wrong but I was almost right. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.75.3.639

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.