The DOI matches its Crossref record; 218 of the 218 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Risk as feelings.
Abstract
Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Much evidence demonstrates the significant role of affect in human judgment (Lerner et al., 2015; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2007).”
From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Loewenstein et al., 2001
In the citing paper
“Under the alternative risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 2001;Slovic et al. 2004), affective responses to vivid outcome representations drive decision behavior by increasing motivational engagement.”
From Limits of Interventions in AI-Assisted Decision Making (2026) · cites this paper as Loewenstein et al. 2001
In the citing paper
“Under an attentional reframing account, consequence framing shifts the decision-maker's frame from responding to a recommendation to predicting an outcome, preserving independent judgment without requiring additional cognitive effort (Loewenstein et al. 2001;Lerner and Keltner 2001).”
From Limits of Interventions in AI-Assisted Decision Making (2026) · cites this paper as Loewenstein et al. 2001
In the citing paper
“Just as recent work demonstrating that individuals' anticipation of loss may shift their choices (38), it appears that participants in our study similarly anticipated their responses to gains and losses and chose accordingly (39).”
From Thinking like a trader selectively reduces individuals' loss aversion (2009) · cites this paper as [39]
Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk
Kahneman, D. J., & Tversky, A. (1988) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609220.014 · Cited by 32,720
(1980) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 25,810
The Handbook of Social Psychology
Gravatt, A. E., Lindzey, G. E., & Aronson, F. (1969) · The Family Coordinator · doi:10.2307/582242 · Cited by 12,518
(1994) · DigitalGeorgetown (Georgetown University Library) · Cited by 10,542
DESCARTES' ERROR: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain
Marg, E. (1995) · Optometry and Vision Science · doi:10.1002/j.1538-9235.1995.tb03988.x · Cited by 8,178
Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no inferences.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.35.2.151 · Cited by 8,094
DeLamater, J., & Ward, A. (2013) · Handbooks of sociology and social research · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6772-0 · Cited by 7,590
The Cognitive Structure of Emotions
Ortony, A., Clore, G. L., & Collins, A. (1988) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511571299 · Cited by 6,208
(1999) · Cited by 6,104
Research works printed but not linked: 25
- Ajzen, 1980, Understanding attitudes and predictingbehavior.
- 10.1037/0735-7044.109.2.246 · DOI
- Bajtelsmit, 1997, Gender differences in pension investment allocationdecisions., The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 16, 135
- Bouton, 1994, Conditioning, remembering, andforgetting., Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20, 219
- Brody, 1993, On understanding gender differences in the expression ofemotion., 87
- Chaiken, 1999, Dual process theories in socialpsychology.
- Cottle, 1974, The present of things future.
- Elster, 1992, Utility from memory and anticipation., 213
- Eysenck, 1992, Anxiety: The cognitiveperspective.
- Fischhoff, 1981, Acceptable risk.
- Frijda, 1986, The emotions.
- Gladwell, 1999, Is the Belgian Coca-Cola hysteria the realthing?, New Yorker (New York, N.Y. : 1925), 24
- Gregory, 1995, Technological stigma., American Scientist, 83, 220
- Gwee, 1968, Koro: Its origin and nature as a diseaseentity., Singapore Medical Journal, 9, 3
- Kunreuther, 1976, Limited knowledge and insurance protection., Public Policy, 24, 227
- Kunreuther, 1978, Disaster insurance protection: Public policylessons.
- 10.1037/0003-066X.50.5.372 · DOI
- 10.1037/0278-7393.23.2.384 · DOI
- MacCrimmon, 1986, Taking risks: The management ofuncertainty.
- Markowitz, 1959, Portfolio selection.
- Mossin, 1969, A note on uncertainty and preferences in a temporalcontext., The American Economic Review, 59, 172
- Ness, 1994, Risk perception by patients with anxietydisorders., The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 182, 466
- Nisbett, 1980, Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings ofsocial judgment.
- 10.1037/0021-843X.102.1.121 · DOI
- Pavlov, 1927, Conditioned reflexes.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322655392 · Cited by 5,377
Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response
Bavel, J. J. V., Baicker, K., Boggio, P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A., Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M., Druckman, J. N., et al. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z · Cited by 4,964
Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts about Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality
Slovic, P., Finucane, M. L., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2004) · Risk Analysis · doi:10.1111/j.0272-4332.2004.00433.x · Cited by 3,885
Metadata
- Authors
- Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N.
- Affiliations
- Carnegie Mellon University (US)
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2001
- Volume
- 127
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 267-286
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W3124896223
- Cited by
- 5,955
- References
- 218
- Citations by year
- 2026: 287 · 2025: 261 · 2024: 276 · 2023: 260 · 2022: 330 · 2021: 393 · 2020: 316 · 2019: 313 · 2018: 264 · 2017: 257 · 2016: 265 · 2015: 283 · 2014: 303 · 2013: 277 · 2012: 304
- FWCI
- 56.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Risk Perception and Management
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Leadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies
- Keywords
- risk perception, decision making under risk, uncertainty, emotional decision-making
- MeSH terms
- Cognition, Decision Making, Emotions, Humans, Models, Psychological, Risk-Taking
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
