On the reality of cognitive illusions.

Kahneman, Daniel, Tversky, Amos·1996·Psychological Review

Abstract

The study of heuristics and biases in judgement has been criticized in several publications by G. Gigerenzer, who argues that "biases are not biases" and "heuristics are meant to explain what does not exist" (1991, p. 102). The article responds to Gigerenzer's critique and shows that it misrepresents the authors' theoretical position and ignores critical evidence. Contrary to Gigerenzer's central empirical claim, judgments of frequency--not only subjective probabilities--are susceptible to large and systematic biases. A postscript responds to Gigerenzer's (1996) reply.

Cites (54)

  1. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
    Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1975 · Utility, Probability, and Human Decision Making
  2. Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability
    Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1973 · Cognitive Psychology
  3. On the psychology of prediction.
    Kahneman, Daniel, Tversky, Amos · 1973 · Psychological Review
  4. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
    Shafer, Glenn R., Kahnerman, Daniel, Slovic, Paul, Tversky, Amos · 1984 · Journal of the American Statistical Association
  5. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
    Tversky, Amos, Kahneman, Daniel · 1983 · Psychological Review
  6. How to improve Bayesian reasoning without instruction: Frequency formats.
    Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage · 1995 · Psychological Review
  7. Calibration of probabilities: the state of the art to 1980
    Lichtenstein, Sarah, Fischhoff, Baruch, Phillips, Lawrence D. · 1982 · Judgment under Uncertainty
  8. The Character of Physical Law
    Feynman, Richard · 2017 · The MIT Press eBooks
  9. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
    2017 · Macat Library eBooks
  10. The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
    Griffin, Dale, Tversky, Amos · 1992 · Cognitive Psychology

Show all 54 references

Cited by (93)

  1. Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
    Evans, Jonathan St. B. T., Stanovich, Keith E. · 2013 · Perspectives on Psychological Science
  2. Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
    Bottom, William P., Gilovich, Thomas, Griffin, Dale, Kahneman, Daniel · 2004 · The Academy of Management Review
  3. Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
    Kahneman, Daniel, Frederick, Shane · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases
  4. Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing
    2001 · The Journal of Finance
  5. The Affect Heuristic
    Slovic, Paul, Finucane, Melissa, Peters, Ellen, MacGregor, Donald G. · 2002 · Heuristics and Biases

See all 1,464

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: On the reality of cognitive illusions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1037//0033-295x.103.3.582
The paper
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1996). On the reality of cognitive illusions. Psychological Review. https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295x.103.3.582

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.