The DOI matches its Crossref record; 99 of the 99 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Reasoning Is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation
Open accessAbstract
Theoreticians of deliberative democracy have sometimes found it hard to relate to the seemingly contradictory experimental results produced by psychologists and political scientists. We suggest that this problem may be alleviated by inserting a layer of psychological theory between the empirical results and the normative political theory. In particular, we expose the argumentative theory of reasoning that makes the observed pattern of findings more coherent. According to this theory, individual reasoning mechanisms work best when used to produce and evaluate arguments during a public deliberation. It predicts that when diverse opinions are discussed, group reasoning will outperform individual reasoning. It also predicts that individuals have a strong confirmation bias. When people reason either alone or with like‐minded peers, this confirmation bias leads them to reinforce their initial attitudes, explaining individual and group polarization. We suggest that the failures of reasoning are most likely to be remedied at the collective than at the individual level.
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Cites
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Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
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Self-citationGroups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers
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Cited by
Chater, N., & Loewenstein, G. (2023) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x22002023 · Cited by 710
Connecting deliberative mini‐publics to representative decision making
Setälä, M. (2017) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12207 · Cited by 160
Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy
Herzog, L. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197681718.001.0001 · Cited by 80
Nordbrandt, M. (2022) · Frontiers in Political Science · doi:10.3389/fpos.2022.921188 · Cited by 5
“This type of more effortful processing of information where individuals take both new and old as well as pro and con arguments into consideration, is here referred to as deliberative information processing (Mercier and Landemore, 2012).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Mercier, H., & Landemore, H.
- Venue
- Political Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-03-27
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 243-258
- ISSN
- 0162-895X (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9221
- OpenAlex
- W2148482341
- Cited by
- 289
- References
- 99
- FWCI
- 83.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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