The DOI matches its Crossref record; 110 of the 110 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Abstract
Strategies for hypothesis testing in scientific investigation and everyday reasoning have interested both psychologists and philosophers. A number of these scholars stress the importance of disconnrmation in reasoning and suggest that people are instead prone to a general deleterious "confirmation bias." In particular, it is suggested that people tend to test those cases that have the best chance of verifying current beliefs rather than those that have the best chance of falsifying them. We show, however; that many phenomena labeled "confirmation bias" are better understood in terms of a general positive test strategy. With this strategy, there is a tendency to test cases that are expected (or known) to have the property of interest rather than those expected (or known) to lack that property. This strategy is not equivalent to confirmation bias in the first sense; we show that the positive test strategy can be a very good heuristic for determining the truth or falsity of a hypothesis under realistic conditions. It can, however, lead to systematic errors or inefficiencies. The appropriateness of human hypothesis-testing strategies and prescriptions about optimal strategies must be understood in terms of the interaction between the strategy and the task at hand.
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In the citing paper
“A hypothesis can create bias as it often entails confirmation and other biases that generate evidence, confirming that hypothesis while ignoring (or dismissing) conflicting evidence (Baldwin, 1993; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Wagenaar et al., 1993).”
From Biased and biasing: the hidden bias cascade and bias snowball effects (2025) · cites this paper as Klayman & Ha, 1987
In the citing paper
“In this sense,selection of evidence based on relevance is related to the confirmation bias in cognitive science, where learners have been observed to (arguably maladaptively) select data which they believe to be true (i.e. they fail to attempt to falsify their hypotheses) [133].”
From Evolution and impact of bias in human and machine learning algorithm interaction (2020) · cites this paper as [133]
Citations
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Cited by
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Strategic assets and organizational rent
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.4250140105 · Cited by 8,425
The case for motivated reasoning.
Kunda, Z. (1990) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480 · Cited by 9,022
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 4,481
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T. D., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. J. (2004) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,583
Metadata
- Authors
- Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W.
- Affiliations
- University of Chicago (US)
- ORCID
- Klayman, Joshua
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 1987-04
- Volume
- 94
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 211-228
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2124371667
- Cited by
- 2,094
- References
- 107
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 53 · 2023: 51 · 2022: 44 · 2021: 71 · 2020: 60 · 2019: 60 · 2018: 70 · 2017: 72 · 2016: 47 · 2015: 57 · 2014: 53 · 2013: 61 · 2012: 71
- FWCI
- 22.99
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (8309586)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- hypothesis testing, confirmation bias, disconfirmation, falsification, heuristics, scientific reasoning, everyday reasoning
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