The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Metacognition of agency.
Abstract
The feeling that we are agents, intentionally making things happen by our own actions, is foundational to our understanding of ourselves as humans. People's metacognitions of agency were investigated in 4 experiments. Participants played a game in which they tried to touch downward scrolling Xs and avoid touching Os. Variables that affected accuracy included speed of the scroll, density of the targets, and feedback. Of central interest were variables directed not only at accuracy but also at people's control: the turbulence of the cursor and how close the cursor had to come to the target for a hit (i.e., "magic"). After each trial, people made judgments of agency or judgments of performance. People were selectively sensitive to the variables to which they should be responsive in agency monitoring--whether the cursor moved in close synchrony to their movements and whether targets disappeared by magic. People knew, separably from their objective or judged performance, when they were in control and when they were not. These results indicate that people can sensitively monitor their own agency.
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Cites
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Monitoring one’s own knowledge during study: A cue-utilization approach to judgments of learning
Koriat, A. (1997) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: General · doi:10.1037/0096-3445.126.4.349 · Cited by 1,363
The mind's best trick: how we experience conscious will
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Koriat, A., & Bjork, R. A. (2005) · Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.31.2.187 · Cited by 362 · cited 1×
“In the study of other metacognitions (including people’s judgments of learning, Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Koriat, 1997; Koriat & Bjork, 2005; Metcalfe & Kornell, 2005; Son, 2004; Thiede, 1999; Thiede & Dunlosky, 1999; their feelings of knowing, Metcalfe, 1993; Nelson &…”
Cited by
Efklides, A. (2011) · Educational Psychologist · doi:10.1080/00461520.2011.538645 · Cited by 1,211
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610
Ketelaar, E., Beijaard, D., Boshuizen, H. P. A., & Den Brok, P. J. (2012) · Teaching and Teacher Education · doi:10.1016/j.tate.2011.10.004 · Cited by 266
How the Design of YouTube Influences User Sense of Agency
Lukoff, K., Lyngs, U., Zade, H., Liao, J. V., Choi, J., Fan, K., Munson, S. A., & Hiniker, A. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3411764.3445467 · Cited by 190
Dissociating neural correlates of action monitoring and metacognition of agency
Miele, D. B., Wager, T. D., Mitchell, J. P., & Metcalfe, J. (2011) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00052 · Cited by 120
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Metcalfe, J., & Greene, M. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Published
- 2007
- Volume
- 136
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 184-199
- ISSN
- 0096-3445 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-2222
- OpenAlex
- W2110448374
- Cited by
- 228
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 1.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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