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Cited by 120Free Will and AgencyNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesMotor Control and Adaptation

Dissociating neural correlates of action monitoring and metacognition of agency

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Miele, David B., Wager, Tor D., Mitchell, Jason P., Metcalfe, Janet·2011·Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
DOI 10.1162/jocn_a_00052
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Abstract

Judgments of agency refer to people's self-reflective assessments concerning their own control: their assessments of the extent to which they themselves are responsible for an action. These self-reflective metacognitive judgments can be distinguished from action monitoring, which involves the detection of the divergence (or lack of divergence) between observed states and expected states. Presumably, people form judgments of agency by metacognitively reflecting on the output of their action monitoring and then consciously inferring the extent to which they caused the action in question. Although a number of previous imaging studies have been directed at action monitoring, none have assessed judgments of agency as a potentially separate process. The present fMRI study used an agency paradigm that not only allowed us to examine the brain activity associated with action monitoring but that also enabled us to investigate those regions associated with metacognition of agency. Regarding action monitoring, we found that being “out of control” during the task (i.e., detection of a discrepancy between observed and expected states) was associated with increased brain activity in the right TPJ, whereas being “in control” was associated with increased activity in the pre-SMA, rostral cingulate zone, and dorsal striatum (regions linked to self-initiated action). In contrast, when participants made self-reflective metacognitive judgments about the extent of their own control (i.e., judgments of agency) compared with when they made judgments that were not about control (i.e., judgments of performance), increased activity was observed in the anterior PFC, a region associated with self-reflective processing. These results indicate that action monitoring is dissociable from people's conscious self-attributions of control.

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  • The judgment of agency has been linked with activation in the anterior prefrontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex, and the fronto-median cortex.

    “The judgment of agency has been linked with activation in the anterior prefrontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex, the fronto-median cortex (Spengler et al., 2009; Miele et al., 2011; Zito et al., 2020), indicating that this process requires high-order, conceptual mechanisms.”

    From The Forward Model: A Unifying Theory for the Role of the Cerebellum in Motor Control and Sense of Agency (2021) · cites this paper as Miele et al., 2011

    The fMRI Results (p. 11) report greater activation in the left anterior prefrontal cortex and a right orbitofrontal cluster during judgments of agency than during judgments of performance. The discussion (p. 14) describes these areas as cortical midline structures, but does not report a separate finding of fronto-median cortex activation for agency judgments. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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  • The DLPFC is associated with metacognition, conscious judgments about the self, and action-selection processes.

    “and it was associated with metacognition (Dienes & Perner, 2007), conscious judgments about the self (Miele et al., 2011) and action-selection processes (Haggard, 2017; Perri et al., 2016, 2017).”

    From Alteration of hypnotic experience following transcranial electrical stimulation of the left prefrontal cortex (2023) · cites this paper as Miele et al., 2011

    The Introduction (p. 3) and “Metacognitive Judgments of Agency: Self-reflective Processing” (p. 14) associate self-reflective judgments with anterior PFC and orbitofrontal cortex activity, but do not establish the claimed association with the DLPFC. The citing sentence attributes metacognition and action-selection processes to other sources, so those are not assessed here. (LLM, conf=0.85)

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Research works printed but not linked: 13

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  6. Metcalfe, J., & Greene, M. J. (2007). Metacognition of agency. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 136, 184 -199.
  7. Mulliken, G. H., Musallam, S., & Andersen, R. A. (2008). Forward estimation of movement state in posterior parietal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A., 105, 8170 -8177.
  8. Pacherie, E. (in press). Sense of agency: Many facets, multiple sources. In H. S. Terrace & J. Metcalfe (Eds.), Agency and joint attention . Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
  9. Powell, L. J., Macrae, C. N., Cloutier, J., Metcalfe, J., & Mitchell, J. P. (2009). Dissociable neural substrates for agentic versus conceptual representations of self. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22, 2186 -2197.
  10. Schmitz, T. W., & Johnson, S. C. (2007). Relevance to self: A brief review and framework of neural systems underlying appraisal. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 31, 585 -596.
  11. van der Meer, L., Costafreda, S., Aleman, A., & David, A. (2010). Self-reflection and the brain: A theoretical review and metaanalysis of neuroimaging studies with implications for schizophrenia. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 34, 935 -946.
  12. Wegner, D. M. (2002). The illusion of conscious will . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  13. Wegner, D. M., Sparrow, B., & Winerman, L. (2004). Vicarious agency: Experiencing control over the movements of others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 86, 838 -848.

Cited by

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Authors
Miele, D. B., Wager, T. D., Mitchell, J. P., & Metcalfe, J.
Affiliations
  • Columbia University (US)
  • University of Colorado System (US)
  • Harvard University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Publisher
MIT Press
Published
2011-11-01
Volume
23
Issue
11
Pages
3620-3636
ISSN
  • 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-8898
DOI
10.1162/jocn_a_00052
OpenAlex
W2144001056
Cited by
120
References
6
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 9
FWCI
5.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University)
Funders
  • James S. McDonnell Foundation (220020166)
  • University College London
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Free Will and Agency
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Motor Control and Adaptation
Keywords
action monitoring, perceived control, right temporoparietal junction, pre-supplementary motor area, dorsal striatum, anterior prefrontal cortex, self-initiated action, discrepancy detection
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Analysis of Variance, Brain, Brain Mapping, Cognition, Female, Humans, Image Processing, Computer-Assisted, Judgment, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Movement, Neuropsychological Tests, Oxygen, Pain Measurement, Reaction Time, Meta-Analysis as Topic, Young Adult

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