Assessing the belief bias effect with ROCs: It's a response bias effect.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983) is observed when subjects accept more valid than invalid arguments and more believable than unbelievable conclusions and show greater overall accuracy in judging arguments with unbelievable conclusions. The effect is measured with a contrast of contrasts, comparing the acceptance rates for valid and invalid arguments with believable and unbelievable conclusions. We show that use of this measure entails the assumption of a threshold model, which predicts linear receiver operating characteristics (ROCs). In 3 experiments, subjects made "valid"/"invalid" responses to syllogisms, followed by confidence ratings that allowed the construction of empirical ROCs; ROCs were also constructed from a base-rate manipulation in one experiment. In all cases, the form of the empirical ROCs was curved and therefore inconsistent with the assumptions of Klauer, Musch, and Naumer's (2000) multinomial model of belief bias. We propose a more appropriate, signal detection-based model of belief bias. We then use that model to develop theoretically sound and empirically justified measures of decision accuracy and response bias; those measures demonstrate that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect. Thus, our data and analyses challenge existing theories of belief bias because those theories predict an accuracy effect that our data suggest is a Type I error. Our results also provide support for processing theories of deduction that assume responses are driven by a graded argument-strength variable, such as the probability heuristic model proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999).
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Cites
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“In the case of unbelievable syllogisms, however, the verification process involves negative hypothesis testing (Klayman & Ha, 1987), in which subjects attempt to integrate the logical negation of the conclusions .”
A comparison of current measures of the accuracy of feeling-of-knowing predictions
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The Probability Heuristics Model of Syllogistic Reasoning
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (1999) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1006/cogp.1998.0696 · Cited by 324 · cited 1×
“Our results also provide support for processing theories of deduction that assume responses are driven by a graded argument-strength variable, such as the probability heuristic model proposed by Chater and Oaksford (1999).”
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“Mental models theory also suffers from the fact that belief bias effects have been obtained with valid problems and one-model problems (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Klauer et al., 2000; Oakhill et al., 1989).”
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Method
Cited by
Jones, M., & Love, B. C. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10003134 · Cited by 533
Dual-process theories of reasoning: Contemporary issues and developmental applications
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2011) · Developmental Review · doi:10.1016/j.dr.2011.07.007 · Cited by 351
Language models, like humans, show content effects on reasoning tasks
Lampinen, A. K., Dasgupta, I., Chan, S. C. Y., Sheahan, H. R., Creswell, A., Kumaran, D., McClelland, J. L., & Hill, F. (2024) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae233 · Cited by 69
Lampinen, A. (2024) · Computational Linguistics · doi:10.1162/coli_a_00525 · Cited by 32
“(Cf . related cognitive arguments, e.g., that belief bias interaction effects are simply response bias effects with nonlinearity; Dube, Rotello, and Heit 2010.)”
Lampinen, A. K. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2210.15303 · Cited by 32
Metadata
- Authors
- Dube, C., Rotello, C. M., & Heit, E.
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2010
- Volume
- 117
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 831-863
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W2125552829
- Cited by
- 116
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 10.88
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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