The DOI matches its Crossref record; 192 of the 192 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 133 of the 195 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis
Open accessAbstract
Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This review argues that metacognition can be understood as propositional confidence—confidence in one’s own hypothetical decisions or actions—bridging subpersonal uncertainty and personal-level metacognition. It integrates behavioral, computational, and neural findings into a framework with stages including uncertainty representation, propositional confidence formation, global broadcast, and self-model influences.
Key findings
- Metacognition research is reframed as the study of propositional confidence in one’s own decisions or actions, distinct from world-centered uncertainty, which helps explain why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance.
- A metacognitive judgment is decomposed into components: representing uncertainty, transforming it into self-centered propositional confidence, globally broadcasting confidence, and incorporating model-based self-models; these are tentatively mapped to early sensory areas for uncertainty, pMFC/vmPFC for propositional confidence, lateral frontopolar cortex for broadcast/private-public mapping, precuneus for metamemory, and frontopolar cortex for metaperception.
- The review resolves a debate by suggesting confidence can be inherent to the decision process in some constrained scenarios, but in others—such as postdecisional evidence accumulation or multiple model-based cues—a second stage of propositional confidence formation and dedicated readout machinery may be involved, especially when confidence must be broadcast.
- Domain-generality findings are mixed: individual differences in metacognitive efficiency correlate across domains but often weakly and variably, while metacognitive bias is more robust and linked to personality and mental health; neural evidence also shows domain-specific dissociations, such as precuneus for metamemory and frontopolar cortex for metaperception. No original numerical results are reported.
Methods
- Design: narrative review and synthesis, not an empirical study.
- Data or sample: no primary sample; the paper synthesizes prior human and animal behavioral, computational, neuroimaging, lesion, EEG, single-unit, and modeling studies.
- Main analysis: conceptual integration—defining metacognition and confidence, deconstructing metacognitive judgments into computational components, mapping them to neural systems, revisiting controversies, and proposing future directions.
Limitations
- The author states that several topics fall outside scope: development of metacognition; comparative research on animal metacognition; links between metacognition, mental health, and ageing (except a sidebar); and interpersonal and intrapersonal functions of metacognition.
- Evident from the text: the review is selective rather than systematic, with no formal search or inclusion criteria described.
- Evident from the text: conclusions depend on the cited literature and the author’s synthesis; no original empirical data or quantitative meta-analysis are presented.
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Claims the paper makes
98 Valid · 7 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 53 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Individual differences in perceptual metacognitive sensitivity have been similarly linked to variation in the structure and function of human anterior prefrontal cortex (Allen et al. 2017, Baird et al. 2013, Fleming et al. 2010, McCurdy et al. 2013).”
§ Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis > MEASUREMENT OF METACOGNITION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Allen et al. 2017 source
The Introduction states that individual differences in metacognitive sensitivity are related to anterior prefrontal cortex morphology and function. It also reports this paper's finding that right anterior prefrontal myeloarchitecture correlates positively with perceptual metacognitive ability. Page numbers are not available in the supplied passages. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Supportedcites Baird et al. 2013 source
The Discussion reports that individual differences in perceptual metacognitive accuracy were associated with functional connectivity involving lateral anterior prefrontal cortex. It also reports findings that gray matter volume in that region correlates with perceptual metacognitive ability. The paper therefore supports the sentence’s broad reference to both functional and structural variation, although its own analysis examined connectivity. (LLM, conf=0.91)
- Partly supportedcites Fleming et al. 2010 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The results passage (section labeled Abstract; page unavailable) links individual differences in perceptual metacognitive sensitivity to anterior prefrontal gray-matter volume, and the abstract also reports an association with connected white-matter microstructure. The paper discusses a functional role for prefrontal cortex, but its own analysis measured brain structure, not individual variation in prefrontal function. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The accuracy of such reflective judgments shares variance with other forms of metacognitive sensitivity rather than variance in IQ (Mazancieux et al. 2020, Rouault et al. 2018a).”
§ Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis > 2. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Mazancieux et al. 2020 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results (Metacognitive Efficiency; page unavailable) report covariance in metacognitive efficiency across five of six task pairings, supporting shared variance in the accuracy of retrospective confidence judgments. The paper says this covariance is unlikely to be an artifact of first-order task performance, but our copy does not report an IQ comparison; that part of the claim is unsupported. (LLM, conf=0.89)
- Not matchedcites Rouault et al. 2018a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“and confidence-related behavior is impaired following inactivation of orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in rodents (Lak et al. 2014).”
§ Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis > MEASUREMENT OF METACOGNITION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Lak et al. 2014 source
The Results section, “Inactivation of Orbitofrontal Cortex Impairs Confidence-Based Waiting Times but Not Choice Accuracy,” reports that OFC inactivation significantly reduced the confidence-reporting index in rats. The Discussion states that ventrolateral OFC inactivation disrupted confidence-dependent waiting times without changing decision accuracy or mean waiting time. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Changes in confidence formation and metacognition (but not first-order task performance) are observed following temporary disruption or lesions to rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (Brodmann areas 46 and 10) in humans and monkeys (Fleming et al. 2014;Kwok et al. 2019;Miyamoto et al. 2017Miyamoto et al. , 2018;;Shekhar & Rahnev 2018)”
§ Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis > MEASUREMENT OF METACOGNITION
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites Fleming et al. 2014
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Partly supportedcites Kwok et al. 2019 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion reports that superior dorsolateral prefrontal lesions impaired macaques’ spatial metamemory without impairing first-order spatial recognition. The Materials and Methods specify lesions involving lateral area 9 and dorsal portions of areas 46 and 9/46, but explicitly excluding area 10. This study therefore supports the macaque lesion finding, not the sentence’s broader framing around areas 46 and 10 in humans and monkeys. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Miyamoto et al. 2017 source
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, the assumption that meta-d ′ /d ′ is fully independent of metacognitive bias and performance has been challenged (Guggenmos 2021, Xue et al. 2021).”
§ Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis > MEASUREMENT OF METACOGNITION
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Guggenmos 2021 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results section reports that meta-dʹ/dʹ (Mratio) is largely stable across type 1 performance levels but varies at some levels of metacognitive noise and type 1 performance, challenging full performance independence. The paper does not establish that Mratio depends on metacognitive bias; its Introduction discusses bias insensitivity for a different measure, AUROC2. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Supportedcites Xue et al. 2021 source
The Methods (Analyses; page unavailable) identify meta-d′/d′ as the measure of metacognitive efficiency. The Results (Within-subject analyses using new recoding technique; page unavailable) find that changing simulated confidence changes its estimate, challenging independence from metacognitive bias. The same section notes that small d′ values can produce extreme ratios, qualifying claims of full independence from task performance. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
91 more claims · 47 with their cited sources checked
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Several areas of the human prefrontal cortex have been linked to metacognition and confidence in addition to goal maintenance,7”
From Two prefrontal-subcortical circuits estimate controllability and reflect its impact on learning (2026) · cites this paper as [7]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“In previous studies, dmPFC has been linked to confidence and the sense of agency.7”
From Two prefrontal-subcortical circuits estimate controllability and reflect its impact on learning (2026) · cites this paper as [7]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Citations
Cites
An Integrative Theory of Prefrontal Cortex Function
Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D. (2001) · Annual Review of Neuroscience · doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167 · Cited by 12,803 · cited 1×
“For instance, in Miller & Cohen (2001)’s classic model of cognitive control, prefrontal cortex provides contextual signals to bias or route sensory information to establish the right mapping between inputs, internal states and outputs.”
Metacognition and cognitive monitoring: A new area of cognitive–developmental inquiry
Flavell, J. H. (1979) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.34.10.906 · Cited by 11,282 · cited 1×
“As such, metacognitive dysfunction has been highlighted as a key source of maladaptive behaviour in educational, clinical and societal contexts (Flavell, 1979, Hoven et al., 2019, Rollwage et al., 2018).”
Humans integrate visual and haptic information in a statistically optimal fashion
Ernst, M. O., & Banks, M. S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415429a · Cited by 4,844 · cited 1×
“If subjects are asked to combine information across two sensory modalities, the weights they put on the two sources of information is inversely proportional to their uncertainty, and approaches the predictions of an ideal Bayesian observer (e.g., Ernst & Banks, 2002).”
Attention to Action: Willed and Automatic Control of Behavior
Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986) · Consciousness and Self-Regulation · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-0629-1_1 · Cited by 4,455
(1988) · Cited by 3,656
Metamemory: A Theoretical Framework and New Findings
Nelson, T. O. (1990) · Psychology of Learning and Motivation · doi:10.1016/s0079-7421(08)60053-5 · Cited by 2,583 · cited 3×
“…fluency at encoding and retrieval, and response time – leading to the broad proposal (that we will return to below) that metacognitive judgments are inferential in nature, and draw on a range of helpful and unhelpful cues to performance (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994, Nelson & Narens, 1990).”
Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation
Alter, A. L., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868309341564 · Cited by 1,995 · cited 1×
“This renders metacognition susceptible to illusions and distortions – metacognitive analogues of perceptual illusions (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009).”
Uncertainty, Neuromodulation, and Attention
Yu, A. J., & Dayan, P. (2005) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2005.04.026 · Cited by 1,774 · cited 1×
“…schemes include sampling-based accounts, in which samples from a distribution are accumulated over time in the form of spikes, and summary-statistic accounts, in which neuromodulators or other aspects of brain activity carry uncertainty-related information (Fiser et al., 2010, Yu & Dayan, 2005).”
Metacognition: Knowing about Knowing
(1994) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4561.001.0001 · Cited by 1,720
Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit, V. (1997) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.6.1245 · Cited by 1,581 · cited 1×
“Differences between cultures in how these beliefs are acquired may account for findings of cultural differences in confidence and metacognition (Yates et al., 1998, van der Plas et al., 2022), and how people process self-related feedback (Kitayama et al., 1997).”
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- de Gardelle V, 2014, Psychol. Sci., 11, e0147901
- Rouault M, 2018, Pers. Neurosci., 1, e17
- Siedlecka M, 2016, Front. Psychol., 7, 218
Cited by
The Metacognitive Demands and Opportunities of Generative AI
Tankelevitch, L., Kewenig, V., Simkute, A., Scott, A. E., Sarkar, A., Sellen, A., & Rintel, S. (2024) · Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3613904.3642902 · Cited by 493
Unpacking the complexities of consciousness: Theories and reflections
Mudrik, L., Boly, M., Dehaene, S., Fleming, S. M., Lamme, V., Seth, A., & Melloni, L. (2025) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106053 · Cited by 81
“HOTs are also often linked to metacognition – the ability to reflect on and monitor other aspects of cognition and perception (Fleming, 2024).”
Self-citationSubjective cognitive decline: Memory complaints, cognitive awareness, and metacognition
Cappa, S. F., Ribaldi, F., Chicherio, C., & Frisoni, G. B. (2024) · Alzheimer s & Dementia · doi:10.1002/alz.13905 · Cited by 86
AI makes you smarter but none the wiser: The disconnect between performance and metacognition
Fernandes, D., Villa, S., Nicholls, S., Haavisto, O., Buschek, D., Schmidt, A., Kosch, T., Shen, C., & Welsch, R. (2025) · Computers in Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.chb.2025.108779 · Cited by 183
Cognition in elite soccer players: a general model
Habekost, T., Ovesen, J., & Madsen, J. B. (2024) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2024.1477262 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- Fleming, S. M.
- Affiliations
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Fleming, Stephen M.
- ORCID
- Fleming, Stephen M.
- Venue
- Annual Review of Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2024-01-18
- Volume
- 75
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 241-268
- ISSN
- 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
- 1545-2085
- OpenAlex
- W4386820332
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 157
- Citations by year
- 2026: 105 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 29
- FWCI
- 9.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
- Wellcome Trust (203147/Z/16/Z, Z/17/Z, 203147, 206648/Z/17/Z, 206648, 203147/Z/16/)
- Leverhulme Trust
- University College London (203147/Z/16/Z, 206648/Z/17/Z)
- Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (203147/Z/16/Z, 206648/Z/17/Z)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- metacognition, confidence, uncertainty, performance monitoring, metacognitive judgments, model observer, metacognitive intervention
- MeSH terms
- Metacognition, Humans, Judgment
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