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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 192 of the 192 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 133 of the 195 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis

Open access
Fleming, Stephen M. · 2024 · Annual Review of Psychology

Abstract

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This review argues that metacognition can be understood as propositional confidence—confidence in one’s own hypothetical decisions or actions—bridging subpersonal uncertainty and personal-level metacognition. It integrates behavioral, computational, and neural findings into a framework with stages including uncertainty representation, propositional confidence formation, global broadcast, and self-model influences.

Key findings

  • Metacognition research is reframed as the study of propositional confidence in one’s own decisions or actions, distinct from world-centered uncertainty, which helps explain why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance.
  • A metacognitive judgment is decomposed into components: representing uncertainty, transforming it into self-centered propositional confidence, globally broadcasting confidence, and incorporating model-based self-models; these are tentatively mapped to early sensory areas for uncertainty, pMFC/vmPFC for propositional confidence, lateral frontopolar cortex for broadcast/private-public mapping, precuneus for metamemory, and frontopolar cortex for metaperception.
  • The review resolves a debate by suggesting confidence can be inherent to the decision process in some constrained scenarios, but in others—such as postdecisional evidence accumulation or multiple model-based cues—a second stage of propositional confidence formation and dedicated readout machinery may be involved, especially when confidence must be broadcast.
  • Domain-generality findings are mixed: individual differences in metacognitive efficiency correlate across domains but often weakly and variably, while metacognitive bias is more robust and linked to personality and mental health; neural evidence also shows domain-specific dissociations, such as precuneus for metamemory and frontopolar cortex for metaperception. No original numerical results are reported.

Methods

  • Design: narrative review and synthesis, not an empirical study.
  • Data or sample: no primary sample; the paper synthesizes prior human and animal behavioral, computational, neuroimaging, lesion, EEG, single-unit, and modeling studies.
  • Main analysis: conceptual integration—defining metacognition and confidence, deconstructing metacognitive judgments into computational components, mapping them to neural systems, revisiting controversies, and proposing future directions.

Limitations

  • The author states that several topics fall outside scope: development of metacognition; comparative research on animal metacognition; links between metacognition, mental health, and ageing (except a sidebar); and interpersonal and intrapersonal functions of metacognition.
  • Evident from the text: the review is selective rather than systematic, with no formal search or inclusion criteria described.
  • Evident from the text: conclusions depend on the cited literature and the author’s synthesis; no original empirical data or quantitative meta-analysis are presented.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1146/annurev-psych-022423-032425

Cites

192 of 192 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

98 Valid · 7 Not valid · 27 Not checked · 53 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 157 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. de Gardelle V, 2014, Psychol. Sci., 11, e0147901
  2. Rouault M, 2018, Pers. Neurosci., 1, e17
  3. Siedlecka M, 2016, Front. Psychol., 7, 218

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Fleming, S. M.
Affiliations
Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
Corresponding author
Fleming, Stephen M.
Venue
Annual Review of Psychology
Published
2024-01-18
Volume
75
Issue
1
Pages
241-268
ISSN
  • 0066-4308 (ISSN-L)
  • 1545-2085
OpenAlex
W4386820332
Cited by
256
References
157
Citations by year
2026: 105 · 2025: 118 · 2024: 29
FWCI
9.57
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Annual Review of Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Canadian Institute for Advanced Research
  • Wellcome Trust (203147/Z/16/Z, Z/17/Z, 203147, 206648/Z/17/Z, 206648, 203147/Z/16/)
  • Leverhulme Trust
  • University College London (203147/Z/16/Z, 206648/Z/17/Z)
  • Max-Planck-Gesellschaft (203147/Z/16/Z, 206648/Z/17/Z)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
metacognition, confidence, uncertainty, performance monitoring, metacognitive judgments, model observer, metacognitive intervention
MeSH terms
Metacognition, Humans, Judgment

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1146/annurev-psych-022423-032425
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Fleming, S. M. (2024). Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis. Annual Review of Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-022423-032425

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.