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Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.

Bowers, Jeffrey S., Davis, Colin J. · 2012 · Psychological Bulletin

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 210 of the 210 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1037/a0026450

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Metadata

Authors
Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J.
Affiliations
  • University of Bristol (GB)
  • Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
Corresponding author
Bowers, Jeffrey S.
Venue
Psychological Bulletin
Published
2012
Volume
138
Issue
3
Pages
389-414
ISSN
  • 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1455
OpenAlex
W2147565549
Cited by
436
References
208
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 4
FWCI
28.59
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
  • Explore Bristol Research (submittedVersion)
  • Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
Keywords
just-so stories, Optimality Theory, unfalsifiability, utility functions, prediction accuracy, neuronal populations, rational analysis, cognitive science methodology
MeSH terms
Bayes Theorem, Brain, Biological Evolution, Humans, Mental Processes, Models, Psychological, Motor Skills, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology

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