Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
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Abstract
According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.
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“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [49]
In the citing paper
“Bowers and Davis (2012) warned that many Bayesian models are too flexible to be falsifiable and often rely on post hoc parameter fitting rather than making risky predictions.”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“When closely examined, many “Bayesian brain” models function not as process models—particularly in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry—describing actual neural mechanisms, but as statistical descriptions that characterize behavioral or neural data in Bayesian terms, often retrospectively (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“By adjusting free parameters—such as priors, likelihood functions, noise distributions, or assumed processing levels—Bayesian models—particularly in their loosely specified, post hoc applications—an often be tailored to fit virtually any observed data pattern (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“This is especially true when priors and likelihoods are fitted retroactively, require strong post hoc assumptions to align with the data, or fail to establish any clear neural implementation of Bayesian principles (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
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BackgroundWhy contextual preference reversals maximize expected value.
Howes, A., Warren, P. A., Farmer, G., El‐Deredy, W., & Lewis, R. L. (2016) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0039996 · Cited by 77
“The extent to which rational analysis can inform theories of mechanism has been the subject of a recent debate (Bowers & Davis, 2012; Griffiths, Chater, Norris, & Pouget, 2012; Hahn, 2014; McClelland et al., 2010; Norris & Kinoshita, 2010).”
BackgroundHarris, D., Arthur, T., Broadbent, D. P., Wilson, M., Vine, S. J., & Runswick, O. R. (2022) · Sports Medicine · doi:10.1007/s40279-022-01689-w · Cited by 69
The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?
Hahn, U. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00765 · Cited by 79
Bayesian statistics: relevant for the brain?
Kording, K. P. (2014) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2014.01.003 · Cited by 58
“A central criticism of Bayesian theories is that the degrees of freedom in the models allow a new kind of over-fitting, basically allowing the modeler to achieve any predictions they like [19 ].”
BackgroundThe Science Behind Virtual Reality Displays
Scarfe, P., & Glennerster, A. (2019) · Annual Review of Vision Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-vision-091718-014942 · Cited by 66
Bayesian Learning Models of Pain: A Call to Action
Tabor, A., & Burr, C. (2019) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.10.006 · Cited by 57
Thomson, R., Lebiere, C. J., Anderson, J. R., & Staszewski, J. J. (2014) · Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.06.002 · Cited by 71
“Furthermore, this same degrees of freedom argument can and has been applied to probabilistic models (Bowers & Davis, 2012).”
BackgroundThe predictive mind and the experience of visual art work
Kesner, L. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01417 · Cited by 64
Flavor binding: Its nature and cause
Stevenson, R. J. (2014) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0033473 · Cited by 52
Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception
Seth, A. K. (2015) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2015.1026888 · Cited by 53
“…(approximations to) Bayesian inference, and weaker claims that Bayesian concepts provide a useful interpretative and operational framework (Bowers & Davis, 2012; Kording, 2014; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013), although perhaps searching for a “bright line” distinction is misguided.1…”
BackgroundSensorimotor Grounding of Musical Embodiment and the Role of Prediction: A Review
Maes, P. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00308 · Cited by 67
“Although the concept of the “Bayesian brain” is promising, we should be aware that many issues are left to be resolved (Eberhardt and Danks, 2011; Jones and Love, 2011; Bowers and Davis, 2012; Marcus and Davis, 2013; Orlandi, 2014b).”
BackgroundCan expectation suppression be explained by reduced attention to predictable stimuli?
Alink, A., & Blank, H. (2021) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2021.117824 · Cited by 63
Probabilistic representations in perception: Are there any, and what would they be?
Gross, S. (2020) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12280 · Cited by 49
Delusions and theories of belief
Connors, M. H., & Halligan, P. W. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.102935 · Cited by 60
Formation and representation of temporal reference information
Bausenhart, K. M., Bratzke, D., & Ulrich, R. (2016) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.01.007 · Cited by 52
Computational neuroscience: beyond the local circuit
Sompolinsky, H. (2014) · Current Opinion in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.conb.2014.02.002 · Cited by 57
“Recently, Bayesian optimality theories have been developed for cognition and behavior [6] (see also [7]), but at present, their neuronal correlates are unclear [8].”
BackgroundGriffiths, T. L. (2024) · doi:10.21428/e2759450.7b420317 · Cited by 53
People’s conditional probability judgments follow probability theory (plus noise)
Costello, F., & Watts, P. (2016) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2016.06.006 · Cited by 59
“Apart from the various problems with this assumption that other prior probabilities underlie probability estimation (see, e.g. Bowers and Davis, 2012, Marcus and Davis, 2013, Eberhardt and Danks, 2011, Jones and Love, 2011, Endress, 2013), it seems to us that this Bayesian approach would make…”
BackgroundA detailed comparison of optimality and simplicity in perceptual decision making.
Shen, S., & Ma, W. J. (2016) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/rev0000028 · Cited by 46
“This is, however, rarely done (Bowers & Davis, 2012), placing claims of near-optimality and Bayesian reasoning in such tasks on shaky ground.”
BackgroundPerception and Reality: Why a Wholly Empirical Paradigm is Needed to Understand Vision
Purves, D., Morgenstern, Y., & Wojtach, W. T. (2015) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2015.00156 · Cited by 51
“Indeed, any model based on recovering or estimating real-world parameters, statistically or otherwise, will fail as a canonical explanation of visual perception (see also Jones and Love, 2011; Bowers and Davis, 2012).”
BackgroundThirty Years After Marr'sVision: Levels of Analysis in Cognitive Science
Peebles, D., & Cooper, R. (2015) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12137 · Cited by 55
“…with Bayes’ theorem have been the focus of much recent work (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2008; Oaksford & Chater, 2007), this approach has itself also been a target of much recent criticism (e.g., Bowers & C. J. Davis, 2012; Eberhardt & Danks, 2011; Jones & Love, 2011; Marcus & E. Davis, 2013).”
ResultBella-Fernández, M., Suñe, M. S., & de Liaño, B. G.-G. (2021) · Psychological Research · doi:10.1007/s00426-021-01499-1 · Cited by 59
Bayes' rule and bias roles in the evolution of decision making
Castellano, S. (2014) · Behavioral Ecology · doi:10.1093/beheco/aru188 · Cited by 41
Explanations for adaptations, just‐so stories, and limitations on evidence in evolutionary biology
Smith, R. J. (2016) · Evolutionary Anthropology Issues News and Reviews · doi:10.1002/evan.21495 · Cited by 46
Grandmother cells and localist representations: a review of current thinking
Bowers, J. S. (2017) · Language Cognition and Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/23273798.2016.1267782 · Cited by 45
“…psychology are often further removed from neuroscience, as these theories tend to be developed at a computational level of analysis that specify the goals and problems that people face with little consideration algorithmic, let alone the neural, underpinnings of behaviour (Bowers & Davis, 2012).”
BackgroundSelf-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Bristol (GB)
- Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bowers, Jeffrey S.
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 389-414
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2147565549
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 208
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 28.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Explore Bristol Research (submittedVersion)
- Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- just-so stories, Optimality Theory, unfalsifiability, utility functions, prediction accuracy, neuronal populations, rational analysis, cognitive science methodology
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Brain, Biological Evolution, Humans, Mental Processes, Models, Psychological, Motor Skills, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.