Bayesian just-so stories in psychology and neuroscience.
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 209 of the 209 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to Bayesian theories in psychology and neuroscience, minds and brains are (near) optimal in solving a wide range of tasks. We challenge this view and argue that more traditional, non-Bayesian approaches are more promising. We make 3 main arguments. First, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in psychology is weak. This weakness relates to the many arbitrary ways that priors, likelihoods, and utility functions can be altered in order to account for the data that are obtained, making the models unfalsifiable. It further relates to the fact that Bayesian theories are rarely better at predicting data compared with alternative (and simpler) non-Bayesian theories. Second, we show that the empirical evidence for Bayesian theories in neuroscience is weaker still. There are impressive mathematical analyses showing how populations of neurons could compute in a Bayesian manner but little or no evidence that they do. Third, we challenge the general scientific approach that characterizes Bayesian theorizing in cognitive science. A common premise is that theories in psychology should largely be constrained by a rational analysis of what the mind ought to do. We question this claim and argue that many of the important constraints come from biological, evolutionary, and processing (algorithmic) considerations that have no adaptive relevance to the problem per se. In our view, these factors have contributed to the development of many Bayesian "just so" stories in psychology and neuroscience; that is, mathematical analyses of cognition that can be used to explain almost any behavior as optimal.
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In the citing paper
“However, the meaningfulness of a Bayes-optimal result is questionable [48] and the use of Bayesian modelling is disputed [49–53].”
From A model of cue integration as vector summation in the insect brain (2023) · cites this paper as [49]
In the citing paper
“Bowers and Davis (2012) warned that many Bayesian models are too flexible to be falsifiable and often rely on post hoc parameter fitting rather than making risky predictions.”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“When closely examined, many “Bayesian brain” models function not as process models—particularly in cognitive neuroscience and psychiatry—describing actual neural mechanisms, but as statistical descriptions that characterize behavioral or neural data in Bayesian terms, often retrospectively (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“By adjusting free parameters—such as priors, likelihood functions, noise distributions, or assumed processing levels—Bayesian models—particularly in their loosely specified, post hoc applications—an often be tailored to fit virtually any observed data pattern (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
In the citing paper
“This is especially true when priors and likelihoods are fitted retroactively, require strong post hoc assumptions to align with the data, or fail to establish any clear neural implementation of Bayesian principles (Bowers and Davis 2012; Jones and Love 2011).”
From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Bowers and Davis 2012
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Citations
Cites
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“One of his examples is the so-called framing effect in which logically equivalent descriptions of a problem lead to very different decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).”
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Bartlett, F. C., & Burt, C. (1933) · British Journal of Educational Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8279.1933.tb02913.x · Cited by 7,475 · cited 3×
“This work extended previous findings of Huttenlocher, Hedges, and Vevea (2000) and provided a formal replication of the classic work of Bartlett (1932). Xu and Griffiths (2010) provided a rational analysis account of this pattern of results.”
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Simon, H. A. (1956) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0042769 · Cited by 5,919 · cited 3×
“Weiss, Simonceilli, and Adelson (2002) developed a Bayesian model of motion perception that accounts for an illusion of speed: Objects appear to move more slowly under reduced or lowcontrast conditions.”
BackgroundJudgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Shafer, G. R., Kahnerman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1984) · Journal of the American Statistical Association · doi:10.2307/2288362 · Cited by 5,657
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322655392 · Cited by 5,377 · cited 1×
“This is particularly important in the current context given that a wide range of findings in the field of behavioral economics suggest that human judgment and decision making are often quite poor (cf. Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996).”
BackgroundMcClelland, J. L., McNaughton, B. L., & O'Reilly, R. C. (1995) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.102.3.419 · Cited by 5,256 · cited 2×
“These phenomena have been modeled in non-Bayesian models that derive their predictions from processing constraints at the algorithmic level (e.g., Ellis & Lambon Ralph, 2000; McClelland, 2006; McClelland et al., 1995).”
BackgroundMcClelland, J. L., & Rumelhart, D. E. (1981) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.88.5.375 · Cited by 4,889 · cited 1×
“For example, the original model assumed the same coding scheme used in the original interactive activation model (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981), but this prevented the model from accounting for a number of key priming results, including the masked priming obtained between primes and targets that…”
Method
Cited by
Active inference: a process theory
Friston, K., FitzGerald, T., Rigoli, F., Schwartenbeck, P., & Pezzulo, G. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00912 · Cited by 1,156
Probabilistic brains: knowns and unknowns
Pouget, A., Beck, J. M., Ma, W. J., & Latham, P. E. (2013) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.3495 · Cited by 615
“Experimentally, this is a potential pitfall of the probabilistic approach: many data sets can be used to support the claim that humans are optimal, as long as one uses the appropriate cost function (or prior distribution) 85 .”
BackgroundGriffiths, T. L., Lieder, F., & Goodman, N. D. (2015) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/tops.12142 · Cited by 397
“There are several interesting features of this program — not least that there is no stopping criterion, which would concern critics of rational models (Bowers & Davis, 2012; Jones & Love, 2011) — but our focus here will be on Step 3.”
BackgroundA Bayesian observer model constrained by efficient coding can explain 'anti-Bayesian' percepts
Wei, X.-X., & Stocker, A. A. (2015) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.4105 · Cited by 397
“By rewriting equation (14) in terms of this expansion, we find that”
BackgroundFrom cognitivism to autopoiesis: towards a computational framework for the embodied mind
Allen, M., & Friston, K. J. (2018) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1288-5 · Cited by 386
“…(interoceptive or otherwise) are subject to a variety of critiques; which charge for example that they constitute circular/tautological reasoning (Bowers and Davis 2012), are unfalsifiable (Wiese 2014), and are merely convenient post-hoc or ‘just-so’ explanations (see Jones and Love 2011 for…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowers, J. S., & Davis, C. J.
- Affiliations
- University of Bristol (GB)
- Royal Holloway University of London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Bowers, Jeffrey S.
- Venue
- Psychological Bulletin
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 138
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 389-414
- ISSN
- 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1455
- OpenAlex
- W2147565549
- Cited by
- 436
- References
- 208
- Citations by year
- 2026: 22 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 43 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 46 · 2018: 39 · 2017: 31 · 2016: 36 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 33 · 2013: 23 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 28.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Royal Holloway Digital Repository (Royal Holloway University of London) (submittedVersion)
- Explore Bristol Research (submittedVersion)
- Bristol Research (University of Bristol) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Keywords
- just-so stories, Optimality Theory, unfalsifiability, utility functions, prediction accuracy, neuronal populations, rational analysis, cognitive science methodology
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Brain, Biological Evolution, Humans, Mental Processes, Models, Psychological, Motor Skills, Neurosciences, Psychological Theory, Psychology
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