Cited by 635Academic and Historical Perspectives in PsychologyCognitive Science and Education ResearchCognitive Abilities and Testing

Human problem solving: The state of the theory in 1970.

Simon, Herbert A., Newell, Allen·1971·American Psychologist

Abstract

WHEN the magician pulls the rabbit from the hat, the spectator can respond either with mystification or with curiosity. He can enjoy the surprise and the wonder of the unexplained (and perhaps inexplicable), or he can search for an explanation. Suppose curiosity is his main response—that he adopts a scientist's attitude toward the mystery. What questions should a scientific theory of magic answer? First, it should predict the performance of a magician handling specified tasks—producing a rabbit from a hat, say. It should explain how the production takes place, what processes are used, and what mechanisms perform those processes. It should predict the incidental phenomena that accompany the magic—the magician's patter and his pretty assistant—and the relation of these to the mystification process. It should show how changes in the attendant conditions—both changes "inside" the members of the audience and changes in the feat of magic—alter the magician's behavior. It should explain how specific and general magician's skills are learned, and what the magician "has" when he has learned them.

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Crossref · 10.1037/h0030806

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15 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Cognitive science has developed task-performing computational models that decompose cognition into functional components.

    “Cognitive science has developed computational models that decompose cognition into functional components.”

    From Cognitive computational neuroscience (2018) · cites this paper as [4]

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Authors
Simon, H. A., & Newell, A.
Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Venue
American Psychologist
Published
1971-02
Volume
26
Issue
2
Pages
145-159
ISSN
  • 0003-066X (ISSN-L)
  • 1935-990X
OpenAlex
W2078451758
Cited by
635
References
15
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 58 · 2024: 40 · 2023: 48 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 37 · 2018: 28 · 2017: 27 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 18 · 2014: 24 · 2013: 13 · 2012: 9
FWCI
40.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
American Psychologist (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › General Psychology › Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Cognitive Abilities and Testing
Keywords
human problem solving, magic, mystification, prediction

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