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Cited by 221Paranormal Experiences and BeliefsDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsPsychology of Social Influence

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 165 of the 165 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Believing what we do not believe: acquiescence to superstitious beliefs and other powerful intuitions

Risen, Jane L.·2016·Psychological Review
DOI 10.1037/rev0000017
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Abstract

Traditionally, research on superstition and magical thinking has focused on people's cognitive shortcomings, but superstitions are not limited to individuals with mental deficits. Even smart, educated, emotionally stable adults have superstitions that are not rational. Dual process models--such as the corrective model advocated by Kahneman and Frederick (2002, 2005), which suggests that System 1 generates intuitive answers that may or may not be corrected by System 2--are useful for illustrating why superstitious thinking is widespread, why particular beliefs arise, and why they are maintained even though they are not true. However, to understand why superstitious beliefs are maintained even when people know they are not true requires that the model be refined. It must allow for the possibility that people can recognize--in the moment--that their belief does not make sense, but act on it nevertheless. People can detect an error, but choose not to correct it, a process I refer to as acquiescence. The first part of the article will use a dual process model to understand the psychology underlying magical thinking, highlighting features of System 1 that generate magical intuitions and features of the person or situation that prompt System 2 to correct them. The second part of the article will suggest that we can improve the model by decoupling the detection of errors from their correction and recognizing acquiescence as a possible System 2 response. I suggest that refining the theory will prove useful for understanding phenomena outside of the context of magical thinking.

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Metadata

Authors
Risen, J. L.
Affiliations
University of Chicago (US)
Corresponding author
Risen, Jane L.
ORCID
Risen, Jane L.
Venue
Psychological Review
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
2016-03
Volume
123
Issue
2
Pages
182-207
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
DOI
10.1037/rev0000017
OpenAlex
W1774007993
Cited by
221
References
165
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 24 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 23 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 6
FWCI
27.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Psychology of Social Influence
Keywords
superstition, magical thinking, acquiescence, dual-process models, System 1, System 2, intuitive thinking, error detection, belief maintenance, cognitive biases
MeSH terms
Humans, Magic, Models, Psychological, Superstitions, Thinking, Intuition

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