Cited by 133Psychology of Moral and Emotional JudgmentDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsEthics in Business and Education

Reasoning supports utilitarian resolutions to moral dilemmas across diverse measures.

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Patil, Indrajeet, Zucchelli, Micaela Maria, Kool, Wouter, Campbell, Stephanie, Fornasier, Federico, Calò, Marta, Silani, Giorgia, Cikara, Mina +1 more·2021·Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Published version of a preprint

Abstract

Sacrificial moral dilemmas elicit a strong conflict between the motive to not personally harm someone and the competing motive to achieving the greater good, which is often described as the "utilitarian" response. Some prior research suggests that reasoning abilities and deliberative cognitive style are associated with endorsement of utilitarian solutions, but, as has more recently been emphasized, both conceptual and methodological issues leave open the possibility that utilitarian responses are due instead to a reduced emotional response to harm. Across 8 studies, using self-report, behavioral performance, and neuroanatomical measures, we show that individual differences in reasoning ability and cognitive style of thinking are positively associated with a preference for utilitarian solutions, but bear no relationship to harm-relevant concerns. These findings support the dual-process model of moral decision making and highlight the utility of process dissociation methods. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

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Authors
Patil, I., Zucchelli, M. M., Kool, W., Campbell, S., Fornasier, F., Calò, M., Silani, G., Cikara, M., & Cushman, F.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • University of Bologna (IT)
  • University of Vienna (AT)
Venue
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Published
2021-02
Volume
120
Issue
2
Pages
443-460
ISSN
  • 0022-3514 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1315
OpenAlex
W2905711692
Cited by
133
References
159
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 20 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 18 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 1
FWCI
9.81
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Archivio istituzionale della ricerca (Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • The Pershing Square Venture Fund for Research on the Foundations of Human Behavior
  • John Templeton Foundation (61061)
  • Dean’s Competitive Fund for Promising Scholarship at Harvard
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Information Systems and Management › Ethics in Business and Education
Keywords
utilitarianism, ethical dilemmas, sacrificial dilemmas, reasoning skills, cognitive style, dual-process models, ethical decision-making, harm aversion, process dissociation, individual differences
MeSH terms
Adult, Decision Making, Female, Humans, Individuality, Judgment, Male, Morals, Motivation, Personality, Problem Solving, Thinking, Ethical Theory, Young Adult

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