Talking the talk, not walking the walk: The coevolution of overconfidence and loss aversion
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 159 of the 162 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 9 of the 35 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
A puzzle for evolutionary theory is the existence of two seemingly offsetting behavioral "biases," overconfidence and loss aversion. Overconfidence is a call to action, while loss aversion curbs initiative. The most prominent evolutionary explanation of overconfidence, proposed by Trivers (1976), is that self-deceit arises to better deceive others. Missing from this account is why sincere messages are believed, especially given the widespread prevalence of self-deception. Moreover, if overconfidence is adaptive, why is it at least partially canceled by loss aversion? We propose a signaling theory according to which the role of self-deception is to better inform others. Since the decision error associated with high self-belief is less burdensome for the more able, and the benefit of being perceived as able increases with ability, hardwired overconfidence is a credible signal of true ability. Evidence supports this interpretation. A further implication of signaling is that loss aversion is part of the equilibrium. It partially ameliorates the decision costs of overconfidence, but as it is usually hidden, it does not eliminate its signaling role. "Biases" are thus symbiotic-the payoff to agents from an integrated set of biases is higher than would be the case in their absence. From this perspective, Kahneman's advice that individuals eliminate both overconfidence and loss aversion is poorly founded. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).
Overview
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TL;DR
The paper proposes that overconfidence and loss aversion coevolve as a symbiotic signaling equilibrium: overconfidence credibly signals ability because decision-error costs are lower for more able individuals, while hidden loss aversion partially offsets those costs without destroying the signal. It argues against eliminating both biases, since their integrated payoff can exceed the no-bias benchmark.
Key findings
- The model yields a separating equilibrium in which all types except the lowest are overconfident, and hidden loss aversion is part of that equilibrium; visible loss aversion would be pointless, and no single loss-aversion parameter can completely offset the aggregate decision-error cost of overconfidence (Lemma 1).
- In the worked example (Table 1), equilibrium choices are γ: a = 0.1, b = 0.1, λ = 1.0, C = 0.00; β: a = 0.2, b = 0.4, λ = 2.2, C = 0.01; α: a = 0.6, b = 0.6, λ = 1.0, C = 0.00. A γ-type mimicking β at b = 0.4 incurs C = 3.23, and a β-type deviating to b = 0.6 incurs C = 0.27.
- Welfare comparison (Table 2): unbiased decisions = $80.00 (100% of optimal); loss aversion with λ ≈ 3.5 = $68.00 (85%); risk aversion with σ ≈ 2.5 = $35.00 (44%); full bias = $22.50 (28%).
- Empirical evidence from Jansen et al. (2021), approximately 4,000 Mechanical Turk participants: grammar mean correct = 10.17 (SD = 3.40) vs mean expectation = 12.49 (SD = 3.91); logic mean correct = 9.45 (SD = 3.59) vs mean expectation = 10.86 (SD = 4.05). Regressing actual on expected performance gave grammar β = 0.25, 95% CI [0.22, 0.28], t = 16.26, p < .001; logic β = 0.18, 95% CI [0.15, 0.21], t = 11.24, p < .001. Reduced major axis slopes were 1.15 (grammar) and 1.13 (logic); 25.35% (grammar) and 35.42% (logic) underestimated their performance.
Methods
- Theoretical signaling model using perfect Bayesian equilibrium, single-crossing, continuous and discrete type distributions, and an extension with hidden loss aversion λ; numerical examples and simulations illustrate equilibrium and welfare comparisons.
- Empirical evidence is a secondary analysis of Jansen et al. (2021): about 4,000 Mechanical Turk participants completed 20 grammar and 20 logic multiple-choice questions and estimated their correct answers; forecast accuracy was not incentivized.
- Main empirical analysis regresses actual performance on expected performance via ordinary least squares, with reduced major axis regression and reliability corrections for measurement error; analysis script is openly available on OSF, and the study was not preregistered.
Limitations
- The paper states that evolutionary arguments are difficult to test, unambiguous natural experiments are often challenging, human adaptation is slow, and purposeful experiments on human evolution are neither feasible nor ethical; it also notes the “Just-So” criticism of evolutionary theorizing.
- The paper states that the framework does not yield unambiguous predictions for all relationships among key variables: the relation between overconfidence and ability need not be monotonic, unconditional predictions across groups are impossible, loss aversion need not be higher where overconfidence is greater, and no systematic correlation between loss aversion and overconfidence is predicted.
- Evident from the text: the empirical support is a secondary analysis of one non-incentivized forecasting dataset rather than a direct test of coevolution or loss aversion; the model relies on assumptions such as single crossing, hidden loss aversion, and a non-domain-specific λ, and the study was not preregistered.
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Claims the paper makes
7 Valid · 1 Not valid · 13 Not checked · 104 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“By contrast, men place greater weight on physical attractiveness in potential mates, a more visible trait that requires less signaling (Buss, 1989; Fisman et al., 2006).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Buss, 1989 matched to “Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolutionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures” (1989) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.4 reports that men valued physical attractiveness in potential mates more than women did across the 37 samples. Section 1.2 describes visible features of appearance as cues, but does not say that attractiveness requires less signaling than other traits. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Fisman et al., 2006 matched to “Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment” (2006) source
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“More broadly, research does not support a clear or systematic relationship between loss aversion and overcon fi dence across individuals (Dean & Ortoleva, 2019; Fischer & Grosch, 2025; Stango & Zinman, 2023).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Dean & Ortoleva, 2019 matched to “The empirical relationship between nonstandard economic behaviors” (2019) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In the Results (page unavailable), higher overplacement—a measure of overconfidence—is associated with lower mixed risk, but that association disappears after controlling for gender. The paper describes mixed risk as related to loss aversion; the cited passages do not establish the same result for its separate loss-aversion measure or for research more broadly. (LLM, conf=0.79)
- Could not verifycites Fischer & Grosch, 2025 matched to “Contract breach with overconfident expectations: Experimental evidence on reference-dependent preferences” (2025) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The online appendix reports measures of over-/underestimation and loss aversion (Additional Figures, pp. 10–11) and includes both in contract-breach regressions (Table X, p. 8). It does not report whether the two traits are systematically related across individuals. Searches for their correlation and individual-level relationship found no passage addressing that claim. (LLM, conf=0.70)
- Not matchedcites Stango & Zinman, 2023
An author–year citation the paper’s reference list doesn’t settle. We don’t search these by name.
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Bateman (1948) provided empirical support for this distinction by showing that reproductive success increases more steeply with mating success in the less-investing sex, typically males.”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Bateman (1948) matched to “Intra-sexual selection in Drosophila” (1948) source
The Results report a stronger correlation between number of mates and fertility in male Drosophila than in females. The Discussion links males’ greater dependence on insemination frequency to primary sexual differentiation, consistent with the claim’s less-investing-sex framing. (LLM, conf=0.91)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In humans, female mate preferences tend to emphasize men ' s commitment and ability to acquire resources, traits that are partially hidden and therefore require signaling (Ronay et al., 2022; von Hippel &Trivers, 2011a).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Ronay et al., 2022 matched to “The Cocksure Conundrum: How Evolution Created a Gendered Currency of Corporate Overconfidence” (2022) source
In “Why are Overconfident People So Often Men?” (page unavailable), the paper says women’s competition for long-term mates focuses on men’s capacity to gain resources and assist with parental care—traits that are not directly observable. It also says overconfident claims can enhance perceptions of these traits, supporting the paraphrase about signaling them. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not matchedcites von Hippel & Trivers, 2011a
More than one paper fits this citation.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“Consistent with this view, numerous studies fi nd that women exhibit lower levels of overcon fi dence than men (Barber & Odean, 2001; Dean & Ortoleva, 2019; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007; Waldman, 1994).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Barber & Odean, 2001 matched to “Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment” (2001) source
- Could not verifycites Dean & Ortoleva, 2019 matched to “The empirical relationship between nonstandard economic behaviors” (2019) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results discuss overconfidence and gender, but do not report whether women are less overconfident than men. They report no overconfidence in the sample overall and identify gender differences in risk measures, not overconfidence (searched: gender, female, overconfidence, and overplacement). (LLM, conf=0.72)
- Supportedcites Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007 matched to “Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?” (2007) source
Section 8.1 (p. 37) explicitly reports that men were more overconfident than women about both piece-rate and tournament performance. The finding supports the cited claim in the context of beliefs about relative performance. (LLM, conf=0.93)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
61 more claims · 1 with their cited sources checked
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
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Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 · Cited by 7,678
The Neutral Theory of Molecular Evolution
Kimura, M. (1979) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican1179-98 · Cited by 7,666
Gender Differences in Preferences
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448 · Cited by 5,694
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Research works printed but not linked: 16
- Anderson, C., Brion, S., Moore, D. A., & Kennedy, J. A. (2012). A statusenhancement account of overcon fi dence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 103 -
- Grafen, A. (1984). Natural selection, kin selection and group selection. In J. R. Krebs & N. B. Davies (Eds.), Behavioural ecology (pp. 62 -84). Blackwell Scienti fi c Publications.
- G ü th, W., & Yaari, M. (1992). Explaining reciprocal behavior in simple strategic games: An evolutionary approach. In U. Witt (Ed.), Explaining forces and change: Approaches to evolutionary economics (pp. 23 -34). University of Michigan Press.
- Heller, Y. (2014). Overcon fi dence and diversi fi cation. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics , 6 (1), 134 -153. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6 .1.134 · doi:10.1257/mic.6
- Hume, D. (1896). A treatise of human nature . Clarendon Press.
- Hvide, H. K. (2002). Pragmatic beliefs and overcon fi dence. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , 48 (1), 15 -28. https://doi.org/10 .1016/s0167-2681(01)00221-9
- Mas-Colell, A., Whinston, M. D., & Green, J. R. (1995). Microeconomic theory (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press.
- Mijovi´ c-Prelec, D., & Prelec, D. (2010). Self-deception as self-signalling: A model and experimental evidence. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences , 365 (1538), 227 -240. https://doi.org/10 .1098/rstb.2009.0218
- P á l, C., & Papp, B. (2017). Evolution of complex adaptations in molecular systems. Nature Ecology & Evolution , 1 (8), 1084 -1092. https://doi.org/10 .1038/s41559-017-0228-1
- Rabin, M. (1998). Psychology and economics. Journal of Economic Literature , 36 (1), 11 -46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2564950
- Rayo, L., & Becker, G. S. (2007). Evolutionary ef fi ciency and happiness. Journal of Political Economy , 115 (2), 302 -337. https://doi.org/10.1086/ 516737
- Spence, M. (1974). Market signaling: Informational transfer in hiring and related screening processes . Harvard University Press.
- Trivers, R. (1985). Deceit and self-deception. In Social evolution (pp. 395 -420). Benjamin/Cummings.
- Trivers, R. L. (1972). Parental investment and sexual selection. In B. Campbell (Ed.), Sexual selection and the Descent of Man (pp. 136 -179). Aldine.
- Trivers, R. L. (1976). ' Foreword. ' In R. Dawkins (Ed.), The selfish gene (pp. 19 -20). Oxford University Press.
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Cited by
Artificial intelligence and behavioural finance biases: improving Lebanese investors decision-making
Chammaa, C., & Haddad, L. (2025) · Journal of Decision System · doi:10.1080/12460125.2025.2537076 · Cited by 4
The psychology of overconfidence: why excessive self-belief is often a successful strategy in life
Dawson, C., & de Meza, D. E. (2026) · doi:10.64628/ab.tacry3d57
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dawson, C., & de Meza, D.
- ORCID
- Dawson, Chris
- Venue
- Psychological Review
- Published
- 2026-07-20
- ISSN
- 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
- 1939-1471
- OpenAlex
- W4385837823
- Cited by
- 2
- References
- 66
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1
- FWCI
- 11.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Psychological Review (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- overconfidence, loss aversion, self-deception, signaling theory, evolutionary psychology, decision-making, perceived competence, cognitive biases, Kahneman
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