Cited by 217Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsDeception detection and forensic psychology

Deception and self-deception

Open access
Schwardmann, Peter, van der Weele, Joël·2019·Nature Human Behaviour

Abstract

There is ample evidence that the average person thinks he or she is more skilful, more beautiful and kinder than others 1,2 and that such overconfidence may result in substantial personal and social costs 3-8. To explain the prevalence of overconfidence, social scientists usually point to its affective benefits, such as those stemming from a good self-image or reduced anxiety about an uncertain future 9-13. An alternative theory, first advanced by evolutionary biologist Robert Trivers 14-16, posits that people self-deceive into higher confidence to more effectively persuade or deceive others. Here we conduct two experiments (combined n = 688) to test this strategic self-deception hypothesis. After performing a cognitively challenging task, half of our subjects are informed that they can earn money if, during a short face-to-face interaction, they convince others of their superior performance. We find that the privately elicited beliefs of the group that was informed of the profitable deception opportunity exhibit significantly more overconfidence than the beliefs of the control group. To test whether higher confidence ultimately pays off, we experimentally manipulate the confidence of the subjects by means of a noisy feedback signal. We find that this exogenous shift in confidence makes subjects more persuasive in subsequent face-to-face interactions. Overconfidence emerges from these results as the product of an adaptive cognitive technology with important social benefits, rather than some deficiency or bias.

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  • Espousing the group's beliefs serves as a form of self-persuasion, further convincing people that the views they endorse must be correct, while moving further away from intellectual humility.

    “Espousing the group's beliefs serves as a form of self- persuasion, further convincing people that the views they endorse must be correct, while moving further away from intellectual humility 86-88 .”

    From Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility (2022) · cites this paper as [86]

    The Abstract reports that a motive to persuade others increased participants’ privately held confidence about their own performance, supporting a link between social persuasion and self-deception. It does not show that espousing a group’s beliefs makes people more convinced those beliefs are correct, or address intellectual humility. (LLM, conf=0.84)

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1 of the 44 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Baumeister, R. F. in The Handbook of Social Psychology (eds Gilbert, D. et al.) (McGraw-Hill, 1998).
  2. Zuckerman, M., DePaulo, B. M. & Rosenthal, R. in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology Vol. 14 (ed. Berkowitz, L.) 1-59 (Academic, 1981).

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Authors
Schwardmann, P., & van der Weele, J.
Affiliations
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München (DE)
Corresponding author
Schwardmann, Peter
Venue
Nature Human Behaviour
Published
2019-07-29
Volume
3
Issue
10
Pages
1055-1061
ISSN
2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3121342465
Cited by
215
References
44
Citations by year
2026: 25 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 34 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1
FWCI
42.39
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Nature Human Behaviour (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • UvA-DARE (University of Amsterdam) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Econstor (Econstor) (submittedVersion)
  • Open access LMU (Ludwid Maxmilian's Universitat Munchen) (submittedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Universitätsbibliothek der LMU
Funders
Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (452-17-004)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Deception detection and forensic psychology
Keywords
overconfidence, self-deception, persuasion, deception, belief updating, noisy feedback, self-image, cognitive biases, adaptive cognition
MeSH terms
Female, Humans, Deception, Male, Self Concept, Young Adult

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