The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Abstract
Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms. 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation. In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole. Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves. Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear. Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection. The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory. Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations. However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“As for peer punishment, it is ineffective when the population is dominated by second-order free-riders, i.e., individuals who contribute to the public goods but do not punish free-riders40,41.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [41]
In the citing paper
“Fourth, their effectiveness is reduced when the population is dominated by either free-riders or second-order free-riders41.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [41]
In the citing paper
“A discriminating strategy, which defects in all rounds of the indirect reciprocity game if the recipient is known to have defected in the public goods game, can guarantee stable cooperation.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [75]
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,981
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,918
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior
(1999) · Ethology · doi:10.1046/j.1439-0310.1999.00372.x · Cited by 2,551
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Elinor Ostrom, B., Walker, J. M., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,066
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 1,992
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Self-citation
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action: Goods and the Theory of Groups (Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1971)
- Sugden, R. The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare (Blackwell, Oxford, 1986)
- Samuelson, L. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (Economic Learning and Social Evolution) (MIT Press, Cambridge, 1997)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 601–700 of 846
Cluster evolution in public goods game with fairness mechanism
Zhang, B., Cui, Z., & Yue, X. (2019) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.121796 · Cited by 4
Shibboleth: An agent-based model of signalling mimicry
Goodman, J., Caines, A., & Foley, R. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0289333 · Cited by 6
Evolutionary dynamics of friendship-driven reputation strategies
Gao, M., Li, Z., & Wu, T. (2023) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113987 · Cited by 4
Goodman, J. (2023) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-023-09936-8 · Cited by 4
Don’t blame the economists. It is an inverse problem!
Gómez‐Ramírez, J. (2013) · European Journal of Futures Research · doi:10.1007/s40309-013-0013-6 · Cited by 5
Larger groups may alleviate collective action problems
Hwang, S. (2021) · doi:10.7275/1066794 · Cited by 4
Zhang, Y., Ning, H., Wang, J., & Xia, C. (2017) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2017.10.001 · Cited by 4
Tosto, G. D., Giardini, F., & Conte, R. (2010) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-4-431-99781-8_12 · Cited by 4
Stucky, K., & Gardner, A. (2023) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2023.2215854 · Cited by 8
Evolving Economics: SynthesisPreprint
Stanton, A. A. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.943914 · Cited by 4
Galvin, M. A., Loughran, T., Simpson, S. S., & Cohen, M. A. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3012724 · Cited by 4
Human Cooperation, Evolution of
Mathew, S. (2015) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.81036-3 · Cited by 4
Wen, Y., He, Z., Shen, C., & Tanimoto, J. (2025) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013068 · Cited by 3
Past-performance-driven strategy updating promote cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Lu, S., & Wang, Y. (2024) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2024.129220 · Cited by 3
Evolutionary dynamics in spatial public goods games with environmental feedbacks
Ding, R., Wang, X., Zhao, J., Gu, C., Chen, W., & Huang, X. (2024) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0242366 · Cited by 4
Miyashita, Y., Hayano, M., & Sugawara, T. (2016) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-42691-4_15 · Cited by 3
Inequality leads to the evolution of intolerance in reputation-based populations
Martínez-Vaquero, L. A. (2023) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0135376 · Cited by 4
Obayashi, S., Inaba, M., Ohdaira, T., & Kiyonari, T. (2023) · Journal of Computational Social Science · doi:10.1007/s42001-023-00221-y · Cited by 5
Coordination Dynamics in Technology Adoption
Ogbo, N. B., & Han, T. A. (2024) · Advances in medical technologies and clinical practice book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-3226-9.ch016 · Cited by 3
Helping those who help others: The roles of indirect reciprocity and relatedness
Roberts, G. (2024) · Ethology · doi:10.1111/eth.13453 · Cited by 3
The Role of Altruism in Inter-firm Relationships: Long-term Value Creation in Business Networks
Cantù, C. L., & Ricciardi, F. (2011) · Cited by 3
Strategy preference promotes cooperation in spatial evolutionary games
Zhang, S., Zhang, Z., Wu, Y., Yan, M. G., & Li, Y. (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.09.068 · Cited by 3
Kurokawa, S. (2018) · Ecological Complexity · doi:10.1016/j.ecocom.2018.08.007 · Cited by 3
Will you cooperate in case the payoff can be guaranteed?
Zhang, X., Chen, T., Chen, Q., & Xue-ya, L. (2019) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.109423 · Cited by 3
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108564922.011 · Cited by 3
Achieving multiple goals via voluntary efforts and motivation asymmetry
Bindewald, E., & Atallah, S. S. (2017) · Ecological Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2017.03.010 · Cited by 3
Understanding the research program
Henrich, J., & Chudek, M. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11001397 · Cited by 3
Welser, H. T. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05467-4_8 · Cited by 3
Reputation, volunteering, and trust: Minimizing reliance on taste-based explanations
Guttman, J. M., & Goette, L. F. (2015) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.10.003 · Cited by 3
Tanimoto, J. (2018) · Evolutionary economics and social complexity science · doi:10.1007/978-981-13-2769-8_2 · Cited by 3
Institutions Fostering Public Goods Provision
Fehr, E., Gächter, S., Milinski, M., & Rockenbach, B. (2010) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-13983-3_11 · Cited by 3
Simulations Show That Shame Drives Social Cohesion
Jaffé, K. (2006) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11874850_13 · Cited by 3
Refinement of defection strategies stabilizes cooperation
Dahanukar, N., & Watve, M. (2009) · NOT FOUND REPOSITORY (Indian Institute of Science Bangalore) · Cited by 3
Partner Selection Supports Reputation-Based Cooperation in a Public Goods GamePreprint
Vilone, D., Giardini, F., & Paolucci, M. (2014) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2515292 · Cited by 3
What’s the right thing to do? Increasing pro-sociality with simple moral nudgesPreprint
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & van de Pol, I. (2017) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/tdns5 · Cited by 5
Social Capabilities in Alzheimer's PatientsPreprint
Domènech, A. B. I., Nagel, R., Sanchez‐Andrés, J. V., & Morera, J. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1002885 · Cited by 3
The Evolution of Moral Cognition
Scott, T. J. (2009) · Open Access Victoria University of Wellington | Te Herenga Waka (Figshare) · doi:10.26686/wgtn.16972069.v1 · Cited by 3
Stabilizing unconditional cooperation
Pal, S., Lambert, M., & Nowak, M. A. (2025) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2024.0945 · Cited by 2
Why human societies adopt rigid moral rules: The efficiency–robustness trade-off
Lie-Panis, J., Fitouchi, L., Baumard, N., & André, J. (2026) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2535467123 · Cited by 3
The Reconsideration of the Altruistic Decision Based on the Notion of the Bounded Rationality
Ohdaira, T. (2014) · Journal of Information Processing · doi:10.2197/ipsjjip.22.186 · Cited by 2
The social benefits of “anti-social” punishment
Schläpfer, A. (2025) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2025.106655 · Cited by 2
Uitdehaag, J. C. M. (2009) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.06.009 · Cited by 2
Impact of multi-valued gossip computational methods on cooperation
Meng, X., Zhang, Y., & Sun, C. (2018) · Chinese Control Conference (CCC) · doi:10.23919/chicc.2018.8484093 · Cited by 2
Individuals reciprocate negative actions revealing negative upstream reciprocity
Umetani, R., Yamamoto, H., Goto, A., Okada, I., & Akiyama, E. (2023) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0288019 · Cited by 2
Self-organization in mobile populations promotes the evolution of altruistic punishment
Guo, T., He, Z., & Ши, Л. (2023) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2023.129282 · Cited by 2
Information-driven cooperation on adaptive cyber-physical systems
Yang, G., Wu, Y., & Cavaliere, M. (2023) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2023.128486 · Cited by 2
Wang, X., Song, C., & Yang, Z. (2025) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2025.129506 · Cited by 2
The role of selective extinction in promoting cooperation in a many demes model
Kroumi, D. (2025) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2025.112212 · Cited by 2
Berger, R. D., & Rauhut, H. (2014) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-01164-2_25 · Cited by 2
"Give me some sugar!": rhythm and structure of sharing in a Namibian community
Schnegg, M. (2006) · Social Science Open Access Repository (GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences) · Cited by 2
Social Factors and Preference Change
Campbell-Meiklejohn, D. K., & Frith, C. (2011) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-381431-9.00008-5 · Cited by 3
Adaptive Switching Behavioral Strategies for Effective Team Formation in Changing Environments
Hayano, M., Miyashita, Y., & Sugawara, T. (2017) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-53354-4_3 · Cited by 2
Cultural Traditions and the Treatment of Freeriders
Pomianek, C., Palmer, C. T., Wadley, R. L., & Coe, K. (2011) · Journal of International and Global Studies · doi:10.62608/2158-0669.1061 · Cited by 2
Can Conformity Bias Transcend Domain Specificity Under Social Dilemma Situations?
Natsumeda, M., Yokota, K., & Nakanishi, D. (2023) · Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science · doi:10.5178/lebs.2023.108 · Cited by 3
Mahoney, I., & Kearon, T. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-63172-1_4 · Cited by 2
Understanding the diversity and fluidity of human morality through evolutionary psychology.
Zhu, N., Lu, H. J., & Chang, L. (2020) · Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1037/ebs0000220 · Cited by 2
Function of hierarchy on Cooperation in large-scale human societies
Ozono, H. (2021) · Japanese Journal of Animal Psychology · doi:10.2502/janip.71.1.6 · Cited by 2
Standing Out, Fitting In, and the Consumption of the World
Roscoe, P. B., & Isenhour, C. (2021) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108874441.002 · Cited by 2
Can Reference to Others’ Behaviour Foster a Cooperative Group in Intergroup Conflict Situations?
Nakanishi, D., Yokota, K., Nakagawa, Y., & Igawa, J. (2022) · Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science · doi:10.5178/lebs.2022.92 · Cited by 2
Foresight, Punishment, and Cooperation
Gavrilets, S. (2022) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197631669.003.0006 · Cited by 2
Helbing, D. (2012) · Understanding complex systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-24004-1_8 · Cited by 2
Rockenbach, B. (2007) · Journal of Economics · doi:10.1007/s00712-006-0236-0 · Cited by 2
Justice Sensitivity, Moral Emotions, and Altruistic PunishmentPreprint
Lotz, S., Baumert, A., Fechtenhauer, D., Gresser, F., & Schlösser, T. M. (2010) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1612791 · Cited by 3
Aunger, R. V., & Greenland, K. (2014) · doi:10.7287/peerj.preprints.321v1 · Cited by 2
Competition and cooperation: Sociological studies in experimental game theory
Berger, J. L. (2015) · Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010568360 · Cited by 2
Still pedaling? The impact of Eastern enlargement on European Union decision-making
Hertz, R. (2010) · Repository for Publications and Research Data (ETH Zurich) · doi:10.3929/ethz-a-006320483 · Cited by 2
Okada, I., & Silva, H. D. (2024) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-024-67773-5 · Cited by 1
Shah, S. S. (2025) · Premier journal of environmental science. · doi:10.70389/pjes.100012 · Cited by 1
Catalyst strategy for the evolution of cooperation in indirect reciprocity
Quan, J., Feng, Y., Nie, J., & Wang, X. (2025) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2025.129379 · Cited by 2
The devil’s dung? Money as a mechanism of generalized reciprocity in human societies
Ferraciolli, E. C., Renzini, F., de Araújo, T. V., & Squazzoni, F. (2026) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/10434631261445825 · Cited by 1
Evolution of cooperation guided by the coexistence of imitation learning and reinforcement learning
Tang, W., Wang, G., & Xing, Z. (2025) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-025-11557-y · Cited by 1
Evolution of cooperative behavior in multi-level groups with multi-stage interactions
Quan, J., Huang, X., & Wang, X. (2026) · Applied Mathematical Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.apm.2026.116780 · Cited by 1
Hafenbrädl, S. (2026) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/09567976251398454 · Cited by 1
The impact of total game benefits redistribution on cooperative evolution
Wang, Y., Pan, Q., & He, M. (2026) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2026.131386 · Cited by 1
Social image in context: The role of social norms and social networks
Adloff, S., & Pondorfer, A. (2026) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107506 · Cited by 1
Reputation-based nonlinear investment promotes cooperation in networked N-player trust games
Jiang, X., & Jia, W. (2026) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0336959 · Cited by 4
Reputation, punishment and the enforcement of social norms
Jackson, D. F. (2026) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107737 · Cited by 1
Ohdaira, T. (2014) · Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical · doi:10.1088/1751-8113/47/27/275101 · Cited by 1
Hidden patterns of reciprocity
Syi (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.12.011 · Cited by 1
Una teoría darwinista de la coevolución gen-cultura
Boyd, R. T. (2012) · Empiria Revista de metodología de ciencias sociales · doi:10.5944/empiria.23.2012.769 · Cited by 1
Self-citationHepach, R. (2016) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-12053-5_5 · Cited by 1
Waring, T. M. (2012) · Cited by 1
Scaggs, S. A., Fulk, K. S., Glass, D. J., & Ziker, J. P. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-58993-0_10 · Cited by 1
Wargo, D. T., Baglini, N. A., & Nelson, K. A. (2008) · Forum on public policy · Cited by 1
Evolution of Social Behaviour in Animals and Humans
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M. (2018) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108564922.006 · Cited by 1
Cui, P.-B., Wu, Z.-X., & Zhou, T. (2022) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2022.127913 · Cited by 1
Wang, W., He, Z., Li, X., & Ши, Л. (2023) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/acb07d · Cited by 1
Persuasion in Medicine: How Medical Arguments Are Accepted
Velanovich, V. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-30371-5_4 · Cited by 1
Attachment, Cognitive Dissonance and Reciprocation in Intellectual Disability Care Provision
de Vries, J., & McGlinchey, E. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-27496-1_4 · Cited by 1
Rethinking climate agreements: self-enforcing strategies for emission reduction through sanctions
Lampert, A. (2024) · Environmental Research Letters · doi:10.1088/1748-9326/ad5a26 · Cited by 1
Focal Coordination and Language in Human Evolution
Myerson, R. B. (2024) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-024-09476-4 · Cited by 1
Shook, J. R. (2012) · Cellular origin, life in extreme habitats and astrobiology · doi:10.1007/978-94-007-4156-0_9 · Cited by 1
Research of Cooperation in Public Goods Game Based on Dynamic Network Topology Structure
Wang, X., Ma, Y., & Du, P. (2014) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-09265-2_66 · Cited by 1
The Analysis of Collusive Tendering Based on the Application of Spatial Game
Ohdaira, T., & Terano, T. (2011) · IEEJ Transactions on Electronics Information and Systems · doi:10.1541/ieejeiss.131.689 · Cited by 1
Reputation for Complex Societies
Giardini, F., Conte, R., & Paolucci, M. (2017) · Understanding complex systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-66948-9_18 · Cited by 2
How the integration of group and individual level selection affects the evolution of cooperation
Jahns, J., & Hintze, A. (2018) · Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE) · doi:10.1162/isal_a_00098 · Cited by 1
Antoci, A., & Zarri, L. (2015) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463115576138 · Cited by 1
Social Cohesion and Cooperation for Public Goods
Bruggeman, J., & Corten, R. (2021) · Connections · doi:10.21307/connections-2019.020 · Cited by 1
The evolution of strongly-held group identities through agent-based cooperation
Whitaker, R. M., Colombo, G. B., & Dunham, Y. C. (2021) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-021-91333-w · Cited by 2
Muthukrishna, M. (2021) · LSE Public Policy Review · doi:10.31389/lseppr.35 · Cited by 1
Metadata
- Authors
- Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Panchanathan, Karthik
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2004-11
- Volume
- 432
- Issue
- 7016
- Pages
- 499-502
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2053702612
- Semantic Scholar
- 418926b7819f2cec2334381ec3c58fb917836455
- Cited by
- 865
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 51 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 50 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 42 · 2012: 42
- FWCI
- 75.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, collective action, costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, reputation, exclusion, evolutionarily stable strategy, costly cooperation, conformity, signaling, group selection
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Group Processes, Humans, Models, Psychological, Mutation, Punishment, Research Design, Social Conformity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
