The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Indirect reciprocity can stabilize cooperation without the second-order free rider problem
Abstract
Models of large-scale human cooperation take two forms. 'Indirect reciprocity' occurs when individuals help others in order to uphold a reputation and so be included in future cooperation. In 'collective action', individuals engage in costly behaviour that benefits the group as a whole. Although the evolution of indirect reciprocity is theoretically plausible, there is no consensus about how collective action evolves. Evidence suggests that punishing free riders can maintain cooperation, but why individuals should engage in costly punishment is unclear. Solutions to this 'second-order free rider problem' include meta-punishment, mutation, conformism, signalling and group-selection. The threat of exclusion from indirect reciprocity can sustain collective action in the laboratory. Here, we show that such exclusion is evolutionarily stable, providing an incentive to engage in costly cooperation, while avoiding the second-order free rider problem because punishers can withhold help from free riders without damaging their reputations. However, we also show that such a strategy cannot invade a population in which indirect reciprocity is not linked to collective action, thus leaving unexplained how collective action arises.
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“As for peer punishment, it is ineffective when the population is dominated by second-order free-riders, i.e., individuals who contribute to the public goods but do not punish free-riders40,41.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [41]
In the citing paper
“Fourth, their effectiveness is reduced when the population is dominated by either free-riders or second-order free-riders41.”
From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [41]
In the citing paper
“A discriminating strategy, which defects in all rounds of the indirect reciprocity game if the recipient is known to have defected in the public goods game, can guarantee stable cooperation.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [75]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Panchanathan, K., & Boyd, R.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Los Angeles (US)
- Corresponding author
- Panchanathan, Karthik
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2004-11
- Volume
- 432
- Issue
- 7016
- Pages
- 499-502
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2053702612
- Semantic Scholar
- 418926b7819f2cec2334381ec3c58fb917836455
- Cited by
- 865
- References
- 31
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 28 · 2024: 32 · 2023: 51 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 37 · 2019: 32 · 2018: 72 · 2017: 50 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 41 · 2014: 45 · 2013: 42 · 2012: 42
- FWCI
- 75.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- indirect reciprocity, collective action, costly punishment, evolution of cooperation, reputation, exclusion, evolutionarily stable strategy, costly cooperation, conformity, signaling, group selection
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Group Processes, Humans, Models, Psychological, Mutation, Punishment, Research Design, Social Conformity
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