The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Open accessAbstract
Theoretical and empirical research highlights the role of punishment in promoting collaborative efforts. However, both the emergence and the stability of costly punishment are problematic issues. It is not clear how punishers can invade a society of defectors by social learning or natural selection, or how second-order free-riders (who contribute to the joint effort but not to the sanctions) can be prevented from drifting into a coercion-based regime and subverting cooperation. Here we compare the prevailing model of peer-punishment with pool-punishment, which consists in committing resources, before the collaborative effort, to prepare sanctions against free-riders. Pool-punishment facilitates the sanctioning of second-order free-riders, because these are exposed even if everyone contributes to the common good. In the absence of such second-order punishment, peer-punishers do better than pool-punishers; but with second-order punishment, the situation is reversed. Efficiency is traded for stability. Neither other-regarding tendencies or preferences for reciprocity and equity, nor group selection or prescriptions from higher authorities, are necessary for the emergence and stability of rudimentary forms of sanctioning institutions regulating common pool resources and enforcing collaborative efforts.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Second, agents' behaviors may be affected by noise (such as imitation error and behavioral mutation) in the process of social learning [37, 38, 47], which is usually ignored by previous theoretical models.”
From Conditional investment strategy in evolutionary trust games with repeated group interactions (2022) · cites this paper as [37]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Ostrom, E. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763 · Cited by 20,653
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Field, B. C., & Elinor Ostrom, B. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146384 · Cited by 19,100
Altruistic punishment in humans
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002) · Nature · doi:10.1038/415137a · Cited by 5,616
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547 · cited 3×
“Adding second-order punishment may add to the cost of sanctioning, but as long as inequality (1) holds, the results are unaffected.”
BackgroundThe Major Transitions in Evolution
Smith, J. M., & Szathmáry, E. (1997) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198502944.001.0001 · Cited by 2,570
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
Herrmann, B., Thöni, C., & Gächter, S. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1153808 · Cited by 2,038
Costly Punishment Across Human Societies
Henrich, J., McElreath, R., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Cardenas, J. C., Gurven, M., Gwako, E., Henrich, N., et al. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1127333 · Cited by 1,771
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Dietz, N. D. T., Ostrom, E., & Stern, P. (2002) · National Academies Press eBooks · doi:10.17226/10287 · Cited by 1,520
Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on a square lattice
Szabó, G., & Tőke, C. (1997) · Physical review. E, Statistical physics, plasmas, fluids, and related interdisciplinary topics · doi:10.1103/physreve.58.69 · Cited by 1,507
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Kiyonari, T., Barclay, P., Wilson, M. & Daly, D. Second order punishment in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. Int. J. Psychol. 39, 329–334 (2004)
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Items 501–581 of 581
Sanctioning by Institution, Skepticism of Punisher and the Evolution of CooperationPreprint
Huhh, J.-S. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1736984
Modelo de Ising aplicado ao estudo da criminalidade
Júnior, J. E. D. L. (2014) · doi:10.11606/d.100.2014.tde-02042015-160340
Evolution of cooperation in evolutionary games for Sanitation Boards
Botta, R., Blanco, G. A., & Schaerer, C. E. (2014) · CLEI electronic journal · doi:10.19153/cleiej.17.2.6
Who should pay for the police?
Ball, P. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/news.2010.351
Climate Change Governance, Cooperation and Self-organization
Santos, F. C. (2016) · Conference on Artificial Life (ALIFE) · doi:10.7551/978-0-262-33936-0-ch008
2012 Landes Bioscience. Do not distribute. Could shame and honor save cooperation
Jacquet, J., Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., & Milinski, M. (2012)
Self-citationSolo pool-punishers defeat free-riders through individual learning in compulsory public goods games
Mitsuru, S. A. N. O., Nagasawa, K., & Nagao, M. (2014) · Journal of Human Environmental Studies · doi:10.4189/shes.12.181
Synergy between intention recognition and commitments in cooperation
Han, T. A., Santos, F. C., & Lenaerts, T. (2015)
Should Law Keep Pace with Society
Roithmayr, D., Isakov, A., & Rand, D. G. (2014)
Chapter 7 Institutional Moral Architecture: From Schools to Prisons
Wagner, P. A. (2011) · Advances in educational administration · doi:10.1108/s1479-3660(2011)0000012010
Competitions between social exclusions and rewards in the optional public goods game
Liu, L., Chen, X., & Wang, S. (2017) · Chinese Control Conference (CCC) · doi:10.23919/chicc.2017.8029160
5. Economic Determinants of Conflict and Fear
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.05
7. Regality Theory Applied to Ancient Cultures
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.07
(2016) · Archaeopress Publishing Ltd eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctvxrq1f9.12
3. Contributions from Other Theories
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.03
2. The Theory of Regal and Kungic Cultures
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.02
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.06
8. Statistical Testing of Regality Theory
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.08
4. Different Kinds of War in Human History
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.04
A switching strategy between costly punishment and exclusion for the evolution of cooperation
Liu, L., Chen, X., & Wang, S. (2017) · Chinese Automation Congress · doi:10.1109/cac.2017.8243472
Agent-Based Computer Modeling for Understanding Organizational Dynamics
Watabe, M., & Nakama, D. (2018) · Lecture notes on multidisciplinary industrial engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93351-1_20
Does the order of punishment matter? A comparison of pool punishment systemsPreprint
Ozono, H., Kamijo, Y., & Shimizu, K. (2017) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Simple Records Support Robust Indirect ReciprocityPreprint
Clark, D., Fudenberg, D., & Wolitzky, A. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.03918
Evolution of cooperation driven by individual disguise in the public goods game with pool punishment
Wang, Q., & Chen, X. (2019) · Journal of Physics Conference Series · doi:10.1088/1742-6596/1324/1/012027
Network Characteristics Control Social Dilemmas in a Public Good Game: A Mechanical FrameworkPreprint
Park, C. (2019) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1910.12022
Technochimp: An African Savannah Survivor Looking for Solutions in the Modern World
Dodds, W. (2019) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30410-2_11
Cimpeanu, T. (2020) · arXiv (Cornell University)
Social Hierarchies between Democracy and Autocracy
Toelstede, B. (2020) · Linköping studies in arts and science · doi:10.3384/diss.diva-171091
Sanctioning by Institution, Skepticism of Punisher and the Evolution of Cooperation∗Preprint
Huhh, J.-S. (2011)
Ozono, H., Kamijo, Y., & Shimizu, K. (2019) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Social physicsPreprint
Jusup, M., Holme, P., Kanazawa, K., Takayasu, M., Romić, I., Wang, Z., Geček, S., Lipić, T., Boris Podobnik, A., Wang, L., et al. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University)
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.01
Fog, A. (2017) · Open Book Publishers · doi:10.11647/obp.0128.09
Constraints on cooperation shape hierarchical vs distributed structure in human groupsPreprint
Zefferman, M. (2022) · doi:10.31219/osf.io/mkxbf
Evolutionary Formation of a Justified Predatory State Under the Movement of PeoplePreprint
Nakai, Y. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3285667
Qian, J., Zhang, T., Zhang, Y., Chai, Y., Sun, X., & Wang, Z. (2022) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2022.127723
Field Abandonment Problem in Rice Paddy Fields
Nakamaru, M. (2022) · Theoretical biology · doi:10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1_10
What Is “The Evolution of Cooperation“?
Nakamaru, M. (2022) · Theoretical biology · doi:10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1_1
Cooperation and Punishment in the Linear Division of Labor
Nakamaru, M. (2022) · Theoretical biology · doi:10.1007/978-981-19-4979-1_8
Social Norms and Agent Types: Bridging the Gap Between the Theoretical Models and Their Applications
Zachník, V. (2023) · Philosophy of the Social Sciences · doi:10.1177/00483931231181168 · Cited by 1
A Review on the Research Progress and Application of Collective Risk Dilemma
陈, 鸿. (2023) · Advances in Psychology · doi:10.12677/ap.2023.136313
Costly Rewards Sustain Public Cooperation with Imperfect MonitoringPreprint
Pan, J., Li, J., & Zhu, C. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4506276
Resource Bounded Agency in Public goods Games
Godara, P. (2023) · doi:10.53846/goediss-10018
Exploring Undermining Cooperation Effect of Punishment in Social Dilemma Contexts
Mizuno, K., & Shimizu, H. (2023) · Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science · doi:10.5178/lebs.2023.113
Cichoski, C. (2019) · Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations (Universidade de São Paulo) · doi:10.11606/t.106.2019.tde-27022024-084236
The Agent that Lied for MePreprint
Sarkadi, Ş., & Such, J. M. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4872541
Evolution of Cooperation in Structured Populations through Pool Exclusion Strategy
Hua, S., Xu, M., & Liu, L. (2024) · Chinese Control Conference (CCC) · doi:10.23919/ccc63176.2024.10662117
Self-Help Railroad Crossing Gate Guards in ResidentialPreprint
Hendri, D., Nurmina, N., & Sari, N. R. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5370329
On the fairness and cooperation among free-riders
Kishor, A. (2025) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2025.129724
The establishment of norms in the multivariate Illegal Strategy Metanorm Game model
Jin, X., Zhang, W., Fan, Z., Wang, C., & Wang, Z. (2025) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117204
Coevolution of Supervision and Cooperation Under Environmental Feedback in Public Good Games
Liang, H., Tao, S., Zhou, Z., & Cao, M. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems · doi:10.1109/tcss.2025.3624889
Seventy-five years later, the prisoner's dilemma narrative continues to impart new wisdom
Johnson, T., & Salahshour, M. (2025) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/ae20bb
Evolution of cooperation through incomplete punishment under dynamic resource constraints
Li, J., Xia, H., & Hashimoto, T. (2026) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117825
Egoismus aus psychologischer Sicht. Psychologischer Egoismus
Burger, H. M., & Leder, J. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-658-48132-2_26
Duong, M. H., Durbac, C. M., & Han, T. A. (2026) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00696-6
The evolution of cooperation in the division of labor on generalized networks with a single output
Nirjhor, M. S. A., Liu, F., & Nakamaru, M. (2026) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2026.112408
The evolution of trust under institutional moral hazard
Chiba-Okabe, H., & Plotkin, J. B. (2026) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2530718123 · Cited by 2
Wang, Y., Xiang, H., Cheng, H., & Meng, X. (2026) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2026.118624
Deploying Ammunition with UAV Swarms Based on Multistrategy Public Goods Game
Liu, X., Xu, B., Yu, M., Bai, T., & Sun, X. (2026) · Lecture notes in electrical engineering · doi:10.1007/978-981-95-4897-2_85
Reputation-gated funding sustains cooperation: A spatial production game with selective investment
Chen, Q., Yu, H., Kang, H., Shen, Y., & Sun, X. (2026) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0339653
Lu, Y., Gong, N., Zhang, Y., Du, C., & Park, J. (2026) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2026.130252
Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in spatial public goods games under limited-memory deterrence
Zhang, L., Xia, K., & Gao, S. (2026) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2026.131894
Effect of stochastic nonlinear punishment in public goods game
Lv, S., Li, J., & Mi, J. (2026) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2026.118888
Social welfare optimisation under institutional reward and punishment
Nguyen, V. A., Huynh, V. K., Bui, H. L., Ha, H. A., Le, Q. D., Nguyen, T. D., Nguyen, N. N., Song, Z., Duong, M. H., Trang, L. H., et al. (2026) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2026.130268
Dual-Timescale Trust and Bottom-Up Reputation for Improved Cooperation in Decentralized MARLPreprint
Javaherian, M., Kokkinogenis, Z., & Aguiar, A. P. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7328910
Institutional incentives as geometric operators in multiplayer evolutionary games
Ke, X., Yu, H., & Meng, F. (2026) · Nonlinear Dynamics · doi:10.1007/s11071-026-13018-1
Evolutionary dynamics of involution game incorporating the loner strategy
Pang, G., Zhang, L., & Huang, C. (2026) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2026.132005
Wang, J., Liu, H., Liu, L., & 茹国庆 (2026) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2026.132049
Reputation-regulated punishment promotes cooperation in spatial public goods games on hypergraphs
Zhang, Y., Zheng, Z., Zhang, X., & Ma, J. (2026) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2026.119205
Zealots can both promote and undermine cooperation in the generalized optional public goods game
Dong, Y., Li, S., & Ши, Л. (2026) · Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/5.0352497
Wang, J., Wenxin, L. I. U., & Zhang, J. (2026) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2026.132198
Adaptive reward–punishment mechanism with Q-learning in spatial public goods games
Kong, C., Wang, Y., & Zhou, Z. (2026) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2026.132089
Institutional Drift: An Evolutionary Model of Corruption and Bureaucratic Efficiency
Yolusever, A. (2026) · Equinox Journal of Economics Business and Political Studies · doi:10.48064/equinox.1844265
Commitment and compensation in the coevolution of cooperation and corruptionPreprint
Sun, H., Li, Y., Shi, J., Liu, J., Tao, D., & Gao, L. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7634741
Beliefs, intentions, power : essays on dynamic decision problems
Méder, Z. Z. (2015) · Research Publications (Maastricht University) · doi:10.26481/dis.20150605zm
Fehl, K. (2011) · eDiss (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen) · doi:10.53846/goediss-499
Metadata
- Authors
- Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Vienna (AT)
- Max Planck Society (DE)
- University of British Columbia (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Sigmund, Karl
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2010-07-14
- Volume
- 466
- Issue
- 7308
- Pages
- 861-863
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2012615693
- Cited by
- 580
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 35 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 38 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 39
- FWCI
- 129.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- pure.iiasa.ac.at
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- WU Research (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- social learning, peer punishment, cooperation, costly punishment, commons governance, sanctioning institutions, evolutionary game theory, common-pool resources, social contract, emergence of institutions, efficiency-stability trade-off, free-riding, reciprocity, equity preferences, group selection, self-government, public goods, evolution of cooperation
- MeSH terms
- Competitive Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Learning, Population Density, Punishment, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior, Time Factors
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
