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Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
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Theoretical and empirical research highlights the role of punishment in promoting collaborative efforts. However, both the emergence and the stability of costly punishment are problematic issues. It is not clear how punishers can invade a society of defectors by social learning or natural selection, or how second-order free-riders (who contribute to the joint effort but not to the sanctions) can be prevented from drifting into a coercion-based regime and subverting cooperation. Here we compare the prevailing model of peer-punishment with pool-punishment, which consists in committing resources, before the collaborative effort, to prepare sanctions against free-riders. Pool-punishment facilitates the sanctioning of second-order free-riders, because these are exposed even if everyone contributes to the common good. In the absence of such second-order punishment, peer-punishers do better than pool-punishers; but with second-order punishment, the situation is reversed. Efficiency is traded for stability. Neither other-regarding tendencies or preferences for reciprocity and equity, nor group selection or prescriptions from higher authorities, are necessary for the emergence and stability of rudimentary forms of sanctioning institutions regulating common pool resources and enforcing collaborative efforts.
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“Second, agents' behaviors may be affected by noise (such as imitation error and behavioral mutation) in the process of social learning [37, 38, 47], which is usually ignored by previous theoretical models.”
From Conditional investment strategy in evolutionary trust games with repeated group interactions (2022) · cites this paper as [37]
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Metadata
- Authors
- Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C.
- Affiliations
- University of Vienna (AT)
- Max Planck Society (DE)
- University of British Columbia (CA)
- Corresponding author
- Sigmund, Karl
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2010-07-14
- Volume
- 466
- Issue
- 7308
- Pages
- 861-863
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2012615693
- Cited by
- 580
- References
- 37
- Citations by year
- 2026: 28 · 2025: 35 · 2024: 46 · 2023: 40 · 2022: 33 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 35 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 38 · 2015: 31 · 2014: 37 · 2013: 44 · 2012: 39
- FWCI
- 129.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- pure.iiasa.ac.at
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- IIASA PURE (International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis) (submittedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Max Planck Institute for Plasma Physics (submittedVersion)
- MPG.PuRe (Max Planck Society) (submittedVersion)
- WU Research (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Economic Theory and Institutions
- Keywords
- social learning, peer punishment, cooperation, costly punishment, commons governance, sanctioning institutions, evolutionary game theory, common-pool resources, social contract, emergence of institutions, efficiency-stability trade-off, free-riding, reciprocity, equity preferences, group selection, self-government, public goods, evolution of cooperation
- MeSH terms
- Competitive Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Biological Evolution, Game Theory, Learning, Population Density, Punishment, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior, Time Factors
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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