Rationally inattentive intertemporal choice
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Discounting of future rewards is traditionally interpreted as evidence for an intrinsic preference in favor of sooner rewards. However, temporal discounting can also arise from internal uncertainty in value representations of future events, if one assumes that noisy mental simulations of the future are rationally combined with prior beliefs. Here, we further develop this idea by considering how simulation noise may be adaptively modulated by task demands, based on principles of rational inattention. We show how the optimal allocation of mental effort can give rise to the magnitude effect in intertemporal choice. In a re-analysis of two prior data sets, and in another experiment, we reveal several behavioral signatures of this theoretical account, tying choice stochasticity to the magnitude effect. We conclude that some aspects of temporal discounting may result from a cognitively plausible adaptive response to the costs of information processing.
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Citations
Cites
Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting
Laibson, D. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555253 · Cited by 6,122
Bayesian t tests for accepting and rejecting the null hypothesis
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Heroin addicts have higher discount rates for delayed rewards than non-drug-using controls.
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“For example, discounting is attenuated when people are asked to imagine spending future rewards [1], when they imagine future outcomes in greater detail [2], and when episodic tags are provided to facilitate such imagination [3].”
BackgroundD’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2004) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.07.007 · Cited by 792
Lateral prefrontal cortex and self-control in intertemporal choice
Figner, B., Knoch, D., Johnson, E. J., Krosch, A. R., Lisanby, S. H., Fehr, E., & Weber, E. U. (2010) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.2516 · Cited by 706 · cited 1×
“From a neuroscientific perspective, the exertion of cognitive control is known to rely on a network of regions in prefrontal cortex, which some studies have linked directly to temporal discounting [32, 1].”
BackgroundA neural mechanism mediating the impact of episodic prospection on farsighted decisions
Benoit, R. G., Gilbert, S. J., & Burgess, P. W. (2011) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.6559-10.2011 · Cited by 422
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“For example, Bickel and colleagues have found that discount rates are highly correlated across real and hypothetical rewards [13], as are their neural responses [38].”
BackgroundDopamine enhances willingness to exert effort for reward in Parkinson's disease
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“Our interpretation of dopamine in terms of sensitivity is consistent with other work on Parkinson’s patients showing that high levels of dopamine produce greater reward sensitivity [32, 33].”
Result
Cited by
Resource-rational decision making
Bhui, R., Lai, L., & Gershman, S. J. (2021) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2021.02.015 · Cited by 168
Self-citationBulley, A., Lempert, K. M., Conwell, C., Irish, M., & Schacter, D. L. (2022) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B · doi:10.1098/rstb.2021.0338 · Cited by 33
“It has also been suggested recently that a higher order meta-cognitive process may allocate more mental effort towards decisions that involve more available reward [32,61].”
BackgroundInfluentialGenerative artificial intelligence (GenAI) use and dependence: an approach from Behavioral economics
Robayo-Pinzon, O., Rojas-Berrio, S., Camargo, J. E., & Foxall, G. R. (2025) · Frontiers in Public Health · doi:10.3389/fpubh.2025.1634121 · Cited by 19
Metadata
- Authors
- Gershman, S. J., & Bhui, R.
- Venue
- Nature Communications
- Published
- 2020-07-03
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 3365-3365
- ISSN
- 2041-1723 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3038842983
- Cited by
- 65
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 6.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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