Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Citations
Cites
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Self-citationEvolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
Evolutionary Dynamics: Exploring the Equations of Life
NOWAK, M. A. (2006) · doi:10.2307/j.ctvjghw98 · Cited by 2,438
Self-citationA strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Self-citationTit for tat in heterogeneous populations
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1992) · Nature · doi:10.1038/355250a0 · Cited by 1,029
Self-citationSigmund, K. (2010) · doi:10.1515/9781400832255 · Cited by 570
Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection
Imhof, L. A., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2005) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0502589102 · Cited by 381
Self-citationSmall Groups and Long Memories Promote Cooperation
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2016) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep26889 · Cited by 78 · cited 2×
“For a public goods game among memory-k players, Stewart and Plotkin have shown that a strategy only needs to resist four ‘extre-mal’ mutant strategies to qualify as a partner 78 .”
Humans choose representatives who enforce cooperation in social dilemmas through extortion
Milinski, M., Hilbe, C., Semmann, D., Sommerfeld, R., & Marotzke, J. (2016) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms10915 · Cited by 62 · cited 1×
“A stylized behavioural experiment on climate change negotiations suggests that even if subjects themselves are not extor-tionate, they may vote for representatives who are 73 .”
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Cited by
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Self-citationA unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 · Cited by 161
Self-citationSocial goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
McAvoy, A., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-0881-2 · Cited by 94
Self-citationEarly exclusion leads to cyclical cooperation in repeated group interactions
Liu, L., Xiao, Z., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2022) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2021.0755 · Cited by 50
Cooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints
Park, P. S., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2 · Cited by 50
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Nature Human Behaviour
- Published
- 2018-03-19
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 469-477
- ISSN
- 2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2795724966
- Cited by
- 184
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 32.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.