Cited by 85Game Theory and Voting SystemsEthics and Social Impacts of AIExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Human-centred mechanism design with Democratic AI

Open access
Koster, Raphael, Balaguer, Jan, Tacchetti, Andrea, Weinstein, Ari, Zhu, Tina, Hauser, Oliver, Williams, Duncan, Campbell-Gillingham, Lucy +3 more·2022·Nature Human Behaviour

Abstract

Building artificial intelligence (AI) that aligns with human values is an unsolved problem. Here we developed a human-in-the-loop research pipeline called Democratic AI, in which reinforcement learning is used to design a social mechanism that humans prefer by majority. A large group of humans played an online investment game that involved deciding whether to keep a monetary endowment or to share it with others for collective benefit. Shared revenue was returned to players under two different redistribution mechanisms, one designed by the AI and the other by humans. The AI discovered a mechanism that redressed initial wealth imbalance, sanctioned free riders and successfully won the majority vote. By optimizing for human preferences, Democratic AI offers a proof of concept for value-aligned policy innovation.

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  • In applying tools from AI research to study resource allocation, we are building upon earlier work, in which we used deep RL to maximise reported human preferences (votes) over a resource allocation policy in a linear public goods game.

    “In applying tools from AI research to study resource allocation, we are building upon earlier work, in which we used deep RL to maximise reported human preferences (votes) over a resource allocation policy in a linear public goods game24,25.”
  • In a different game without a common pool, a mixture of progressive redistribution and sanction is the recipe that encourages participants to vote for the mechanism.

    “In a different game without a common pool, this mixture of progressive redistribution and sanction is also the recipe that encourages participants to vote for the mechanism24.”
  • A number of interesting ideas are emerging, from voting on different algorithmic policymakers to using LLMs to summarize diverse human opinions and generate consensus statements.

    “A number of interesting ideas are emerging, from voting on different algorithmic policymakers 184 to using LLMs to summarize diverse human opinions 185 and generate consensus statements 153 .”

    From Machine culture (2023) · cites this paper as [185]

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. [10]Doshi-Velez, F. & Kim, B. Towards a rigorous science of interpretable machine learning. Preprint at https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08608 (2017). · arXiv
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Authors
Koster, R., Balaguer, J., Tacchetti, A., Weinstein, A., Zhu, T., Hauser, O., Williams, D., Campbell-Gillingham, L., Thacker, P., Botvinick, M., & Summerfield, C.
Affiliations
  • Google DeepMind (United Kingdom) (GB)
  • University of Exeter (GB)
  • University of Oxford (GB)
Corresponding author
Summerfield, Christopher
Venue
Nature Human Behaviour
Published
2022-07-04
Volume
6
Issue
10
Pages
1398-1407
ISSN
2397-3374 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4283789234
Cited by
84
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 22 · 2024: 22 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 5
FWCI
13.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Nature Human Behaviour (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • Open Research Exeter (University of Exeter) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Game Theory and Voting Systems
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Ethics and Social Impacts of AI
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Keywords
value alignment, human-in-the-loop, reinforcement learning, social mechanisms, majority voting, redistribution mechanisms, wealth inequality, free-riding, collective benefit
MeSH terms
Artificial Intelligence, Humans

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