The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Confirmation bias in the utilization of others’ opinion strength
Abstract
Humans tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgments. This confirmation bias has significant impact on domains ranging from politics to science and education. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this fundamental characteristic of belief formation. Here we report a mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. Specifically, we provide evidence for a failure to use the strength of others' disconfirming opinions to alter confidence in judgments, but adequate use when opinions are confirmatory. This bias is related to reduced neural sensitivity to the strength of others' opinions in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex when opinions are disconfirming. Our results demonstrate that existing judgments alter the neural representation of information strength, leaving the individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement.
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“It is also because subjects who are highly confident about their political beliefs are more likely to be able to convince other people of them too (Kappes et al. 2020).”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Kappes et al. 2020
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“Since the latter are shaping social reality via their impact on behavior and are more effective in doing so the more convinced people are about them (Kappes et al. 2020)”
From What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? (2022) · cites this paper as Kappes et al. 2020
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Cites
(2013) · Cited by 44,563
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Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.3.624 · Cited by 7,351
Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs
Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00214.x · Cited by 4,344
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.4.679 · Cited by 4,027
Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: an update
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003 · Cited by 3,623
The New Synthesis in Moral Psychology
Haidt, J. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1137651 · Cited by 2,504
Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory
Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000968 · Cited by 2,254
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
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The integration of negative affect, pain and cognitive control in the cingulate cortex
Shackman, A. J., Salomons, T. V., Slagter, H. A., Fox, A. S., Winter, J. J., & Davidson, R. J. (2011) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2994 · Cited by 2,082
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How people decide what they want to know
Sharot, T., & Sunstein, C. R. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-019-0793-1 · Cited by 386
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Salaverría, R., Buslón, N., Pan, F. L., León, B., López‐Goñi, I., & Ilundain, M. C. E. (2020) · El Profesional de la Informacion · doi:10.3145/epi.2020.may.15 · Cited by 334
Confidence drives a neural confirmation bias
Rollwage, M., Loosen, A. M., Hauser, T. U., Moran, R., Dolan, R. J., & Fleming, S. M. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-16278-6 · Cited by 213
What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias?
Peters, U. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1 · Cited by 236
Individual differences in information-seeking
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Metadata
- Authors
- Kappes, A., Harvey, A. H., Lohrenz, T., Montague, P. R., & Sharot, T.
- Affiliations
- University of London (GB)
- Museum of Science and Industry (US)
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging (GB)
- University College London (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Kappes, Andreas
- Sharot, Tali
- Venue
- Nature Neuroscience
- Published
- 2019-12-16
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 130-137
- ISSN
- 1097-6256 (ISSN-L)
- 1546-1726
- OpenAlex
- W2994999940
- Cited by
- 186
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 17 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 30 · 2023: 42 · 2022: 35 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 10
- FWCI
- 15.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Nature Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- City Research Online (City University London) (acceptedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (Principal Research Fellowship)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social and Intergroup Psychology
- Keywords
- confirmation bias, belief updating, confidence in judgments, belief formation
- MeSH terms
- Adolescent, Attitude, Female, Humans, Judgment, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Prefrontal Cortex, Young Adult
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