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A cognitive profile of multi-sensory imagery, memory and dreaming in aphantasia

Open access

Abstract

For most people, visual imagery is an innate feature of many of our internal experiences, and appears to play a critical role in supporting core cognitive processes. Some individuals, however, lack the ability to voluntarily generate visual imagery altogether – a condition termed “aphantasia”. Recent research suggests that aphantasia is a condition defined by the absence of visual imagery, rather than a lack of metacognitive awareness of internal visual imagery. Here we further illustrate a cognitive “fingerprint” of aphantasia, demonstrating that compared to control participants with imagery ability, aphantasic individuals report decreased imagery in other sensory domains, although not all report a complete lack of multi-sensory imagery. They also report less vivid and phenomenologically rich autobiographical memories and imagined future scenarios, suggesting a constructive role for visual imagery in representing episodic events. Interestingly, aphantasic individuals report fewer and qualitatively impoverished dreams compared to controls. However, spatial abilities appear unaffected, and aphantasic individuals do not appear to be considerably protected against all forms of trauma symptomatology in response to stressful life events. Collectively, these data suggest that imagery may be a normative representational tool for wider cognitive processes, highlighting the large inter-individual variability that characterises our internal mental representations.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

In a large online questionnaire study, self-identified aphantasic individuals reported reduced imagery across visual and non-visual sensory domains, less vivid episodic memory and future prospection, fewer and qualitatively impoverished dreams, but largely preserved spatial abilities and no overall trauma-symptom protection. The authors conclude that visual imagery may be a normative representational tool for wider cognition, with substantial heterogeneity within aphantasia.

Key findings

  • Aphantasic participants (n = 267) scored far lower on the VVIQ than control group 1 (n = 203): 17.94 vs 58.12 (Mann-Whitney U = 427.5, p < 0.0002, r = 0.87, BF10 = 1.41e12), with 70% at the floor score of 16. They also reported reduced imagery in auditory, tactile, kinesthetic, taste, olfactory, and emotion domains on the QMI (all p < 0.0002, r = 0.65–0.78), but only 26.22% reported a complete lack of multi-sensory imagery altogether.
  • Aphantasic individuals reported lower episodic memory and future prospection: SAM Event Memory (U = 8,865, p < 0.0002, r = 0.58), EMIQ memory vividness (U = 2,186.5, p < 0.0002, r = 0.81), SAM Future Events (U = 7,469.5, p < 0.0002, r = 0.63), and SAM Factual Memory (U = 18,601.5, p < 0.0002, r = 0.27). Spatial abilities appeared largely unaffected: OSIQ spatial imagery was slightly lower (U = 24,462, p = 0.001, r = 0.15) but did not survive Bonferroni correction, and SAM Spatial Memory did not differ significantly (U = 24,720, p = 0.1, r = 0.08).
  • Trauma symptomatology was not globally reduced: total PCL-5 scores did not differ from control group 1 (U = 27,515, p = 0.776, r = 0.01, BF10 = 0.12). Some subcomponents showed differences—lower intrusions (U = 22,739, p = 0.002, r = 0.14, BF10 = 14.85), lower avoidance (U = 23,164.5, p = 0.006, r = 0.13, BF10 = 2.13), and greater negative cognition/mood (U = 30,960, p = 0.008, r = 0.12, BF10 = 12.99)—but none survived Bonferroni correction.
  • Aphantasic participants reported fewer night dreams (IPI: U = 15,828.5, p < 0.0002, r = 0.37, BF10 = 4.24e6) and less sensory dream content (SERS Sensory: U = 15,087.5, p < 0.0002, r = 0.38, BF10 = 5.46e6), plus lower dream lucidity (U = 19,473, p < 0.0002, r = 0.25, BF10 = 1902.01). They did not differ significantly from control group 1 on within-dream cognition or spatial complexity, though they scored higher on one cognitive item about time spent thinking during dreams (U = 34,401.5, p < 0.0002, BF10 = 3.53e3).

Methods

  • Online Qualtrics questionnaires (206 questions across eight questionnaires, presented in random order) compared self-identified aphantasic participants recruited from online community platforms with two control groups: MTurk participants matched on mean age (control group 1) and first-year undergraduate psychology students (control group 2). Final analyzed samples were 267 aphantasic, 203 control group 1, and 193 control group 2 in the replication analysis (the Method also reports n = 197 for control group 2 after cleaning).
  • Measures included the VVIQ, QMI, OSIQ, EMIQ, SAM, IPI, SERS, and PCL-5, covering multi-sensory imagery, episodic memory and future prospection, spatial abilities, mind-wandering and dreaming, and trauma response.
  • Main analyses used Mann-Whitney U tests in SPSS 25 with Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.0002 (0.05/206), effect sizes r, and supplementary Bayesian analyses in JASP with a Cauchy prior of 0.707.

Limitations

  • Stated by the authors: neither control group was perfectly matched demographically—control group 1 had a lower proportion of females (35%) than the aphantasic sample (48%), while control group 2 was younger (mean age 19.33 vs 33.97 years) and had more females (73%). Self-report outcomes may be influenced by response bias or demand characteristics and need objective validation. The PCL-5 does not assess responses to specific traumatic events or imagery-based re-experiencing well, and self-report cannot objectively separate remembering from visual representation in episodic memory.
  • Evident from the text: the design is cross-sectional and questionnaire-only, so it cannot establish causality or objective cognitive performance. The sample was predominantly English-first-language (83%), White/Caucasian (88%), and mostly from the United States, limiting generalizability. The conservative Bonferroni correction may miss small effects, and several group differences were supported only by Bayesian evidence or did not survive correction.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1038/s41598-020-65705-7

Cites

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Figures

Figure 1 Summary of self-reported cognition questionnaires for individuals with aphantasia (red, n = 267) and control group 1 participants with visual imagery (blue, n = 203). Violin plots of median-centred scale scores with median (bold line), lower and upper quartiles (thin lines) and kernel density-smoothed frequency distribution (shaded area) coloured by group. Each pair of violin plots represents transformed raw data (see Data Transformation, Method). Stars to the right of group plot segments indicate Mann-Whitney test significance at threshold p < 0.0002.
Figure 1 Summary of self-reported cognition questionnaires for individuals with aphantasia (red, n = 267) and control group 1 participants with visual imagery (blue, n = 203). Violin plots of median-centred scale scores with median (bold line), lower and upper quartiles (thin lines) and kernel density-smoothed frequency distribution (shaded area) coloured by group. Each pair of violin plots represents transformed raw data (see Data Transformation, Method). Stars to the right of group plot segments indicate Mann-Whitney test significance at threshold p < 0.0002.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Group differences in visual imagery ability on scale sub-components. Radar plots for (a) multi-sensory imagery; (b) trauma response; and (c) dreaming scales (SC. = Spatial Complexity; PSP. = Perspective; LUC. = Lucidity). Concentric dashed circles represent raw scale scores for each scale (e.g. a; 1–7 Likert-type), with lowest possible item scores falling on innermost solid circle and highest possible item scores falling on outermost coloured circle; radial dashed lines denote item grouping for scale sub-components (e.g. c; Intrusions, Avoidance, Negative Cognition and Mood, Arousal and Reactivity); central coloured lines (red = aphantasia group, blue = control group 1) represent raw total group scores on individual scale items, with translucent shading denoting standard-deviation.
Figure 2 Group differences in visual imagery ability on scale sub-components. Radar plots for (a) multi-sensory imagery; (b) trauma response; and (c) dreaming scales (SC. = Spatial Complexity; PSP. = Perspective; LUC. = Lucidity). Concentric dashed circles represent raw scale scores for each scale (e.g. a; 1–7 Likert-type), with lowest possible item scores falling on innermost solid circle and highest possible item scores falling on outermost coloured circle; radial dashed lines denote item grouping for scale sub-components (e.g. c; Intrusions, Avoidance, Negative Cognition and Mood, Arousal and Reactivity); central coloured lines (red = aphantasia group, blue = control group 1) represent raw total group scores on individual scale items, with translucent shading denoting standard-deviation.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Metadata

Authors
Dawes, A. J., Keogh, R., Andrillon, T., & Pearson, J.
Affiliations
UNSW Sydney (AU)
Corresponding author
Dawes, Alexei J.
Venue
Scientific Reports
Published
2020-06-22
Volume
10
Issue
1
Pages
10022-10022
ISSN
2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W3036039130
Cited by
357
References
32
Citations by year
2026: 88 · 2025: 50 · 2024: 67 · 2023: 83 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 26 · 2020: 8
FWCI
18.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Monash University Research Portal (Monash University) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
Funders
  • Australian Government
  • International Brain Research Organization
  • Australian Research Council (DP140101560)
  • National Health and Medical Research Council (1049596, 1046198, 1085404)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
Keywords
aphantasia, visual imagery, multisensory imagery, autobiographical memory, dream vividness, spatial ability, trauma symptoms, interindividual variability, mental representation, metacognition
MeSH terms
Adolescent, Adult, Aged, Cognition, Cognition Disorders, Dreams, Female, Humans, Imagination, Male, Memory, Middle Aged, Surveys and Questionnaires, Stress Disorders, Post-Traumatic, Case-Control Studies, Young Adult

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Dawes, A. J., Keogh, R., Andrillon, T., & Pearson, J. (2020). A cognitive profile of multi-sensory imagery, memory and dreaming in aphantasia. Scientific Reports. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-65705-7

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