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Cyber-physical defense in the quantum Era

Open access
Barbeau, Michel, Garcia-Alfaro, Joaquin · 2022 · Scientific Reports

Abstract

Networked-Control Systems (NCSs), a type of cyber-physical systems, consist of tightly integrated computing, communication and control technologies. While being very flexible environments, they are vulnerable to computing and networking attacks. Recent NCSs hacking incidents had major impact. They call for more research on cyber-physical security. Fears about the use of quantum computing to break current cryptosystems make matters worse. While the quantum threat motivated the creation of new disciplines to handle the issue, such as post-quantum cryptography, other fields have overlooked the existence of quantum-enabled adversaries. This is the case of cyber-physical defense research, a distinct but complementary discipline to cyber-physical protection. Cyber-physical defense refers to the capability to detect and react in response to cyber-physical attacks. Concretely, it involves the integration of mechanisms to identify adverse events and prepare response plans, during and after incidents occur. In this paper, we assume that the eventually available quantum computer will provide an advantage to adversaries against defenders, unless they also adopt this technology. We envision the necessity for a paradigm shift, where an increase of adversarial resources because of quantum supremacy does not translate into a higher likelihood of disruptions. Consistently with current system design practices in other areas, such as the use of artificial intelligence for the reinforcement of attack detection tools, we outline a vision for next generation cyber-physical defense layers leveraging ideas from quantum computing and machine learning. Through an example, we show that defenders of NCSs can learn and improve their strategies to anticipate and recover from attacks.

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Crossref · 10.1038/s41598-022-05690-1

Cites

49 of 49 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Figures

Figure 1 Attack success probability vs. adversary investment. We consider three adversarial scenarios. Classical (blue curve), where the resources of the adversary are lower than the resources of the defender. Balanced (black), where the resources of the defender are proportional to those of the adversary. Quantum (red), where the resources of the adversary are higher than those of the defender. Simulation code is available at the companion github repository, in the Matlab code folder19.
Figure 1 Attack success probability vs. adversary investment. We consider three adversarial scenarios. Classical (blue curve), where the resources of the adversary are lower than the resources of the defender. Balanced (black), where the resources of the defender are proportional to those of the adversary. Quantum (red), where the resources of the adversary are higher than those of the defender. Simulation code is available at the companion github repository, in the Matlab code folder19.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Adversarial model.
Figure 2 Adversarial model.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Three-qubit variational circuit layer W(Θ), where Θ is a three by three matrix of rotation angles.
Figure 3 Three-qubit variational circuit layer W(Θ), where Θ is a three by three matrix of rotation angles.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 (a) Discrete two-train configuration. (b) MDP representation of the agent in its world. Circles represent states. Arrows represent action-triggered transitions.
Figure 4 (a) Discrete two-train configuration. (b) MDP representation of the agent in its world. Circles represent states. Arrows represent action-triggered transitions.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 5 Q-values for actions a0 and a1, for values of probabilities p and q ranging from zero to one, in steps of 0.1.
Figure 5 Q-values for actions a0 and a1, for values of probabilities p and q ranging from zero to one, in steps of 0.1.CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 6 Single-qubit variational circuit W(Θ).
Figure 6 Single-qubit variational circuit W(Θ).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 7 (a) The adversary randomly alternates between take loop and take bypass, with equal probabilities. (b) The agent choices are leaked, e.g., due to the presence of an insider. With high probability, the adversary is mimicking the agent. (c) Evolution of the value of state zero. (d) Evolution of quantum variational circuit probabilities, with learning rate α equal to 0.01.
Figure 7 (a) The adversary randomly alternates between take loop and take bypass, with equal probabilities. (b) The agent choices are leaked, e.g., due to the presence of an insider. With high probability, the adversary is mimicking the agent. (c) Evolution of the value of state zero. (d) Evolution of quantum variational circuit probabilities, with learning rate α equal to 0.01.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Show all 53 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. McEliece, R. J. A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic. Codin. Thv. 4244, 114–116 (1978).
  2. Merkle, R. Secrecy, Authentication, and Public Key Systems. Computer Science Series (UMI Research Press, 1982).
  3. Schneier, B. Modelling security threats. Dr. Dobb’s Journal (1999).
  4. Chio, C. & Freeman, D. Machine Learning and Security: Protecting Systems with Data and Algorithms (O’Reilly Media, 2018).

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Barbeau, M., & Garcia-Alfaro, J.
Affiliations
Carleton University (CA)
Corresponding author
Barbeau, Michel
Venue
Scientific Reports
Published
2022-02-03
Volume
12
Issue
1
Pages
1905-1905
ISSN
2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4210315416
Cited by
22
References
53
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 1
FWCI
1.71
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
Locations
  • Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • HAL (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (cc-by)
Funders
  • European Commission (830892, H2020)
  • Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (830892)
  • Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
networked control systems, cyber-physical security, quantum computing threats, quantum advantage, attack detection, incident response, post-quantum cryptography, machine learning for intrusion detection

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Cyber-physical defense in the quantum Era. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1038/s41598-022-05690-1
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Barbeau, M., & Garcia-Alfaro, J. (2022). Cyber-physical defense in the quantum Era. Scientific Reports. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-05690-1

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