Small groups and long memories promote cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists the question is often how group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, can emerge and persist in an evolving system. Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. We construct a coordinate system for memory-m strategies in iterated n-player games that permits us to characterize all cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that, especially when groups are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. We also explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory. We find that even when memory has a cost, longer-memory strategies often evolve, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation, even when the benefits for cooperation are low.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures




Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The influence of information on agent behavior is well-established through two mechanisms.First, agents make decisions under uncertainty, and information affects belief updates via Bayesian updating [32].Second, information enables social learning, where agents adopt observed successful strategies [28,29].”
From Adaptive Information Modulation: Designing Governance Mechanisms for Multi-Agent Artificial Intelligence Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [28]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“While information disclosure has been studied as a static design choice [28,29], and network structure has been recognized as influencing information flow, the use of dynamically adaptive, RL-driven information modulation as a standalone governance lever represents a novel paradigm.”
From Adaptive Information Modulation: Designing Governance Mechanisms for Multi-Agent Artificial Intelligence Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [28]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Field, B. C., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146384 · Cited by 18,859
Theory of games and economic behavior
(2019) · 100 Years of Math Milestones · doi:10.1090/mbk/121/32 · Cited by 16,632
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
THE MAJOR TRANSITIONS OF EVOLUTION
Leigh, E. G. (1995) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.1995.tb04464.x · Cited by 3,410
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
Hauert, C., & Doebeli, M. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02360 · Cited by 1,582
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations
Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., & Fudenberg, D. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02414 · Cited by 1,399
Evolutionary dynamics on graphs
Lieberman, E., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03204 · Cited by 1,337
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006).
- Sigmund, K. The calculus of selfishness Princeton series in theoretical and computational biology (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010).
Cited by
Prisoner’s dilemma game model Based on historical strategy information
Gou, Z., & Li, Y. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-26890-9 · Cited by 561
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity
Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9 · Cited by 184
“For a public goods game among memory-k players, Stewart and Plotkin have shown that a strategy only needs to resist four ‘extre-mal’ mutant strategies to qualify as a partner 78 .”
Memory- n strategies of direct reciprocity
Hilbe, C., Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1621239114 · Cited by 149
Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
McAvoy, A., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2020) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 73
Self-organizing Complex Networks: individual versus global rules
Mahmoodi, K., West, B. J., & Grigolini, P. (2017) · Frontiers in Physiology · doi:10.3389/fphys.2017.00478 · Cited by 61
“Our SOTC model based on the memory of the last two trades before making a decision about the degree of attention to the nearest neighbor may be related to the model of Stewart and Plotkin (2016).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialEvolving cooperation in multichannel games
Donahue, K., Hauser, O., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-17730-3 · Cited by 80
Evolutionary consequences of behavioral diversity
Stewart, A. J., Parsons, T. L., & Plotkin, J. B. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1608990113 · Cited by 56
Self-citationCoevolutionary dynamics of aspiration and strategy in spatial repeated public goods games
Wu, T., Fu, F., & Wang, L. (2018) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/aac687 · Cited by 55
Reiter, J. G., Hilbe, C., Rand, D. G., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8 · Cited by 50
The evolution of universal cooperation
Gross, J., Méder, Z. Z., Dreu, C. K. W. D., Romano, A., Molenmaker, W. E., & Hoenig, L. C. (2023) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.add8289 · Cited by 58
Memory-based prisoner’s dilemma game with conditional selection on networks
Ye, W., Feng, W., Chen, L., & Fan, S. (2017) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2017.02.035 · Cited by 46
Proper aspiration level promotes generous behavior in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
Rong, Z., Zhao, Q., Wu, Z.-X., Zhou, T., & Tse, C. K. (2016) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2016-70286-0 · Cited by 42
Evolution of cooperation through cumulative reciprocity
Li, J., Zhao, X., Li, B., Rossetti, C. S. L., Hilbe, C., & Xia, H. (2022) · Nature Computational Science · doi:10.1038/s43588-022-00334-w · Cited by 51
Memory-based conformity enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
Shu, F., Liu, Y., Liu, X., & Zhou, X. (2018) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2018.10.055 · Cited by 42
Memory-based stag hunt game on regular lattices
Dong, Y., Xu, H., & Fan, S. (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.12.025 · Cited by 41
Autocratic strategies for alternating games
McAvoy, A., & Hauert, C. (2016) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2016.09.004 · Cited by 45
“In contrast, in randomly-alternating games, the player who moves in each round is chosen stochastically: at each time step, X moves with probability ωX and Y moves with probability 1− ωX for some 0 6 ωX 6 1 (see Fig.”
BackgroundAutocratic strategies for alternating games
McAvoy, A., & Hauert, C. (2017) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 37
Mutation enhances cooperation in direct reciprocity
Tkadlec, J., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2023) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2221080120 · Cited by 50
Five rules for friendly rivalry in direct reciprocity
Murase, Y., & Baek, S. K. (2020) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-020-73855-x · Cited by 36
“ims to equalize the payos except when it encounters naive cooperators. This observation shows a considerable amount of diversity even among evolutionary robust strategies, which is in agreement with Stewart and Plotkin (2016). 5. Summary and discussion To summarize, we have investigated the possibility to act as both…”
BackgroundResultPersistence paves the way for cooperation in evolutionary games
Huang, C., & Dai, Q. (2017) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/118/28002 · Cited by 36
Memory mechanism with weighting promotes cooperation in the evolutionary games
Shu, F., Li, M., & Liu, X. (2019) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.01.016 · Cited by 35
Liu, Y., Huang, C., & Dai, Q. (2018) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2018.02.027 · Cited by 32
Preferential selection based on degree difference in the spatial prisoner's dilemma games
Huang, C., Dai, Q., Cheng, H., & Li, H. (2017) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/120/18001 · Cited by 31
Liu, D., Huang, C., Dai, Q., & Li, H. (2019) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2019.01.041 · Cited by 29
Effects of directional migration for pursuit of profitable circumstances in evolutionary games
Zhang, L., Huang, C., Li, H., Dai, Q., & Yang, J. (2021) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2021.110709 · Cited by 32
Prisoner’s dilemma game on reputation-based weighted network
Chen, Y.-S., Yang, H.-X., Guo, W.-Z., & Liu, G. (2018) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2018.03.007 · Cited by 28
Conditional cooperation with longer memory
Glynatsi, N. E., Akin, E., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2024) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2420125121 · Cited by 36
Effects of time cost on the evolution of cooperation in snowdrift game
Jia, P., Jia, T., & Ya, L. (2019) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.05.030 · Cited by 26
Direct reciprocity between individuals that use different strategy spaces
Schmid, L., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2022) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1010149 · Cited by 35
“On the other hand, studies on the coevolution of behavior and memory on the same timescale in the context of multiplayer games suggest that when games are played by few individuals, longer memories can evolve more easily [35].”
BackgroundInfluentialThe effects of attribute persistence on cooperation in evolutionary games
Yang, K., Huang, C., Dai, Q., & Yang, J. (2018) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2018.08.018 · Cited by 24
Evolutionary instability of selfish learning in repeated games
McAvoy, A., Kates‐Harbeck, J., Chatterjee, K., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgac141 · Cited by 34
“If strategy updating is described by imitation, for example, players may end up defecting for a substantial amount of time (56).”
BackgroundShu, F., Liu, X., & Li, M. (2018) · Physics Letters A · doi:10.1016/j.physleta.2018.03.033 · Cited by 22
Evolutionary investors’ power-based game on networks
Xu, H., Tian, C., Xiao, X., & Fan, S. (2018) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2018.02.041 · Cited by 21
Evolutionary game dynamics of combining the payoff-driven and conformity-driven update rules
Lin, J., Huang, C., Dai, Q., & Yang, J. (2020) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2020.110146 · Cited by 20
Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations
Murase, Y., Hilbe, C., & Baek, S. K. (2022) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-23467-4 · Cited by 16
“Equation (24) indicates that the preference between two strategies is independent of N and M as long as the total population size MN is fixed.”
BackgroundReactive learning strategies for iterated games
McAvoy, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2019) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2018.0819 · Cited by 20
“They permit rich behavior in iterated play, such as punishment for exploitation and reward for cooperation [5, 13–18]; but, owing to their simple memory requirements, they are also straightforward to implement in practice and analyze mathematically.”
BackgroundFixation of strategies driven by switching probabilities in evolutionary games
Xu, Z., Zhang, J., Zhang, C., & Chen, Z. (2016) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/116/58002 · Cited by 15
Group reciprocity and the evolution of stereotyping
Stewart, A. J., & Raihani, N. (2023) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2022.1834 · Cited by 22
“And so player i can treat their interactions with a partner from a given stereotype group as a two-player, infinitely iterated, n + 1 choice game of the type studied in [34] and elsewhere.”
BackgroundSelf-citationWealth Inequality and the Price of AnarchyPreprint
Gemici, K., Koutsoupias, E., Monnot, B., Papadimitriou, C. H., & Piliouras, G. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.4230/lipics.stacs.2019.31 · Cited by 12
Memory-driven Q-learning model for cooperation in snowdrift game with dynamic behavioral types
Li, X., Pi, B., Deng, L.-J., & Li, Q. (2025) · Applied Mathematical Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.apm.2025.116313 · Cited by 11
Limited memory optimizes cooperation in social dilemma experiments
Ma, S., Zhang, B., Cao, S., Liu, J. S., & Wang, W.-X. (2021) · Royal Society Open Science · doi:10.1098/rsos.210653 · Cited by 13
“On the one hand, evolutionary game studies based on direct reciprocity suggest that a longer memory can lead to a higher cooperation level in the repeated social dilemma game [40,44,45].”
BackgroundPaolo Grigolini, A. (2017) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2017.06.020 · Cited by 9
Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game
Murase, Y., & Baek, S. K. (2021) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1008217 · Cited by 11
“In the iterated PD game, if a single strategy acts as a partner and a rival simultaneously, it has important implications in evolutionary dynamics because it possesses evolutionary robustness regardless of the environmental conditions [21], in the sense that no mutant strategy can invade a population of this strategy…”
BackgroundGrouping promotes both partnership and rivalry with long memory in direct reciprocity
Murase, Y., & Baek, S. K. (2023) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1011228 · Cited by 10
“Indeed, a previous simulation study shows that memory length gets continuously longer without the cost of memory capacity [16].”
BackgroundResultInfluentialEvolution of reciprocity with limited payoff memory
Glynatsi, N. E., McAvoy, A., & Hilbe, C. (2024) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2023.2493 · Cited by 9
Unilateral incentive alignment in two-agent stochastic games
McAvoy, A., Madhushani, U., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., Barfuß, W., Su, Q., Leonard, N. E., & Plotkin, J. B. (2025) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2319927121 · Cited by 9
Self-citationDynamics of cooperation in concurrent games
Rossetti, C. S. L., Hauser, O., & Hilbe, C. (2025) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-025-56083-7 · Cited by 10
Mathieu, P., & Delahaye, J.-P. (2019) · Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory · doi:10.1016/j.simpat.2019.101946 · Cited by 6
Payoff equivalence and complete strategy spaces of direct reciprocity
LaPorte, P., Hilbe, C., Glynatsi, N. E., & Nowak, M. A. (2026) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2518486123 · Cited by 8
Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict
Stewart, A. J., Pilgrim, C., & Raihani, N. (2024) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2024.0295 · Cited by 4
Self-citationYamamoto, H., & Goto, A. (2024) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-024-73353-4 · Cited by 4
“While our experiments deal with memory-1 strategies, many theoretical studies have tested the effects of longer memories 47,48 .”
BackgroundTrust, Extended Memories and Social Media
Domenicucci, J. (2018) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-75759-9_7 · Cited by 6
On Robust Stability and Stabilization of Networked Evolutionary Games with Time Delays
An, Q., Guo, H., & Zheng, Y. (2022) · Mathematics · doi:10.3390/math10152695 · Cited by 4
Ji, J., Pan, Q., Zhu, W., & He, M. (2023) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2023.127902 · Cited by 4
Chen, Q., Ilami, S., Lore, N., & Heydari, B. (2026) · Journal of Mechanical Design · doi:10.1115/1.4070755 · Cited by 3
The dynamics of cooperation in asymmetric public goods games
Wang, X., Hilbe, C., & Zhang, B. (2026) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.2525760123 · Cited by 7
Inferring to cooperate: Evolutionary games with Bayesian inferential strategies
Patra, A., Sengupta, S., Paul, A., & Chakraborty, S. (2024) · New Journal of Physics · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/ad4e5e · Cited by 5
Emergence of oscillatory cooperation in a population with incomplete information
Zhang, J., Zhao, L., Zhang, J., Ma, L., Zheng, G., & Chen, L. (2023) · Physica A Statistical Mechanics and its Applications · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2023.128682 · Cited by 4
Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games
Hübner, V., Hilbe, C., Staab, M., Kleshnina, M., & Chatterjee, K. (2025) · Dynamic Games and Applications · doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5 · Cited by 5
The role of memory in transition from direct to indirect reciprocityPreprint
Hižak, J., Dmitrović, L. G., & Čubrilo, M. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1810.02536 · Cited by 4
Plasticity in evolutionary gamesPreprint
Dridi, S. (2019) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/509604 · Cited by 3
“In order to address this question, one useful way to think about frequency-dependent evolution is to use evolutionary game theory (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Sandholm, 2011).”
MethodEvolutionary dynamics of reactive partner strategy in stochastic games
Zhang, J., Yang, Y., Rong, Z., & Wu, Z.-X. (2026) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2026.118131 · Cited by 4
An experimental manipulation of divisibility in the public good game
Battiston, P., Gamba, S., Rizzolli, M., & Rotondi, V. (2025) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107300 · Cited by 2
Large language models instantiate evolutionarily robust strategies of cooperation
Pal, S., Mallela, A., Pracher, L., Wei, C., Fu, F., Schnell, S., & Nowak, M. A. (2026) · PNAS Nexus · doi:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgag210 · Cited by 1
Self-organized Task Allocation in a Swarm of E-puck Robots
Li, Q., Yang, X., Zhu, Y., & Zhang, J. (2017) · Lecture notes in electrical engineering · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-6445-6_17 · Cited by 1
Coveting neighbors’ wisdom promotes cooperation in structured populations
Ran, Y., Hu, K., Du, C., Geng, Y., & Ши, Л. (2019) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.03.023 · Cited by 1
Long homogeneous payoff records with the latest strategy promotes the cooperation
Mo, F., & Han, W. (2024) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2024.128786 · Cited by 1
Kumawat, B., & Bhat, R. (2021) · BMC Ecology and Evolution · doi:10.1186/s12862-021-01782-0 · Cited by 2
“…under an evolutionary game theory framework suggests that small population sizes, consisting of participants that can memorize strategies and interaction outcomes, evolve to cooperate easier than memory-less populations by storing these outcomes and using them to guide future interactions [5].”
BackgroundEvolutionary (in)stability of selfish learning in repeated gamesPreprint
McAvoy, A., Kates‐Harbeck, J., Chatterjee, K., & Hilbe, C. (2021) · arXiv (Cornell University) · Cited by 1
Decision Making in Multi-agent Systems Based on the Evolutionary Game with Switching Probabilities
Xu, Z., Zhang, J., Li, Q., & Chen, Z. (2017) · Lecture notes in electrical engineering · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-6496-8_12
Mahmoodi, K. (2018) · University of North Texas Digital Library (University of North Texas) · doi:10.12794/metadc1248467
Kumawat, B., & Bhat, R. (2020) · bioRxiv (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory) · doi:10.1101/2020.08.27.269829
Beyond the prisoner’s dilemma: Cooperation in repeated three-action games
Zhang, F., Chen, F., Zhou, L., & Wang, L. (2025) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2025.117747 · Cited by 1
Kumawat, B., & Bhat, R. (2021) · Figshare · doi:10.6084/m9.figshare.14385453
Human-like AI algorithm for playing Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Nikolić, O., Kuzmanović, M., & Pamucar, D. S. (2026) · Applied Soft Computing · doi:10.1016/j.asoc.2026.115181
Evolutionary game dynamics under adaptive coordination
Zhang, F., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2026) · Science China Information Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11432-025-4945-7
Emergence of contagious cooperation in community-structured networks
Anonymous, Quijano, N., & Giraldo, L. F. (2026) · Physical review. E · doi:10.1103/81gf-mlhm
Metadata
- Authors
- Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Corresponding author
- Stewart, Alexander J.
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2016-06-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 26889-26889
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4887980
- OpenAlex
- W2261291220
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 33.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- David and Lucile Packard Foundation (W911NF-12-1-0552)
- U.S. Department of the Interior (D12AP00025)
- Royal Society
- Army Research Office (W911NF-12-1-0552, W911NF)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, repeated games, public goods game, multiplayer games, small group size, collective action, evolutionary stability
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Decision Making, Game Theory, Games, Experimental, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Memory, Models, Psychological, Models, Statistical, Sociobiology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.