Memory- n strategies of direct reciprocity
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Significance: Direct reciprocity is one of the fundamental mechanisms for cooperation. It is based on the idea that individuals are more likely to cooperate if they can expect their beneficiaries to remember and to return their cooperative acts in future. Previous computational models, however, often had to restrict the number of past rounds subjects can memorize. Herein we suggest an alternative approach. We propose general properties that robust cooperative strategies ought to have. Then we characterize all memory- n strategies that meet these properties, and we show that such strategies naturally emerge across different evolutionary scenarios. Our results are applicable to general social dilemmas of arbitrary size. For some dilemmas, longer memory is all it takes for cooperation to evolve.
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Cites
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Self-citationRand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Self-citationTit for tat in heterogeneous populations
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Small Groups and Long Memories Promote Cooperation
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Cited by
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Self-citationSocial norm complexity and past reputations in the evolution of cooperation
Santos, F. P., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature25763 · Cited by 259
A unified framework of direct and indirect reciprocity
Schmid, L., Chatterjee, K., Hilbe, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2021) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-021-01114-8 · Cited by 161
Self-citationCooperation in alternating interactions with memory constraints
Park, P. S., Nowak, M. A., & Hilbe, C. (2022) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-022-28336-2 · Cited by 50
Self-citationSignalling boosts the evolution of cooperation in repeated group interactions
Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Santos, F. C., & Trianni, V. (2020) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2020.0635 · Cited by 11
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hilbe, C., Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2017-04-18
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 18
- Pages
- 4715-4720
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2606734491
- Cited by
- 149
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 30.05
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- Hilbe, C., Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2017). Memory- n strategies of direct reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1621239114
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