Small groups and long memories promote cooperation
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 45 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Complex social behaviors lie at the heart of many of the challenges facing evolutionary biology, sociology, economics, and beyond. For evolutionary biologists the question is often how group behaviors such as collective action, or decision making that accounts for memories of past experience, can emerge and persist in an evolving system. Evolutionary game theory provides a framework for formalizing these questions and admitting them to rigorous study. Here we develop such a framework to study the evolution of sustained collective action in multi-player public-goods games, in which players have arbitrarily long memories of prior rounds of play and can react to their experience in an arbitrary way. We construct a coordinate system for memory-m strategies in iterated n-player games that permits us to characterize all cooperative strategies that resist invasion by any mutant strategy, and stabilize cooperative behavior. We show that, especially when groups are small, longer-memory strategies make cooperation easier to evolve, by increasing the number of ways to stabilize cooperation. We also explore the co-evolution of behavior and memory. We find that even when memory has a cost, longer-memory strategies often evolve, which in turn drives the evolution of cooperation, even when the benefits for cooperation are low.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Figures




Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The influence of information on agent behavior is well-established through two mechanisms.First, agents make decisions under uncertainty, and information affects belief updates via Bayesian updating [32].Second, information enables social learning, where agents adopt observed successful strategies [28,29].”
From Adaptive Information Modulation: Designing Governance Mechanisms for Multi-Agent Artificial Intelligence Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [28]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“While information disclosure has been studied as a static design choice [28,29], and network structure has been recognized as influencing information flow, the use of dynamically adaptive, RL-driven information modulation as a standalone governance lever represents a novel paradigm.”
From Adaptive Information Modulation: Designing Governance Mechanisms for Multi-Agent Artificial Intelligence Systems (2026) · cites this paper as [28]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Field, B. C., & Ostrom, E. (1992) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3146384 · Cited by 18,859
Theory of games and economic behavior
(2019) · 100 Years of Math Milestones · doi:10.1090/mbk/121/32 · Cited by 16,632
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
THE MAJOR TRANSITIONS OF EVOLUTION
Leigh, E. G. (1995) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.1995.tb04464.x · Cited by 3,410
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1986) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911307 · Cited by 2,395
A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993) · Nature · doi:10.1038/364056a0 · Cited by 1,797
Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game
Hauert, C., & Doebeli, M. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02360 · Cited by 1,582
Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations
Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., & Fudenberg, D. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02414 · Cited by 1,399
Evolutionary dynamics on graphs
Lieberman, E., Hauert, C., & Nowak, M. A. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03204 · Cited by 1,337
Spontaneous giving and calculated greed
Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature11467 · Cited by 1,334
Rand, D. G., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.06.003 · Cited by 1,308
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent
Press, W. H., & Dyson, F. J. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1206569109 · Cited by 715
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (60th Anniversary Commemorative Edition)
von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (2007) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400829460 · Cited by 700
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation
Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A., & Pacheco, J. M. (2006) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.74.011909 · Cited by 604
Genetic Structure and Selection in Subdivided Populations
Rousset, F. (2004) · Cited by 554
Genetic Structure and Selection in Subdivided Populations (MPB-40)
Rousset, F. (2004) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400847242 · Cited by 437
Evolution of cooperation among tumor cells
Axelrod, R., Axelrod, D. E., & Pienta, K. J. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0606053103 · Cited by 436
Cordero, O. X., Ventouras, L.-A., DeLong, E. F., & Polz, M. F. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1213344109 · Cited by 341
Evolution of extortion in Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games
Hilbe, C., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1214834110 · Cited by 275
From extortion to generosity, evolution in the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1306246110 · Cited by 261
Self-citationInteractions between learning and evolution:
Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. (2004) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2004.04.002 · Cited by 241
Working memory constrains human cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Milinski, M., & Wedekind, C. (1998) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.95.23.13755 · Cited by 211
Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
Imhof, L. A., Fudenberg, D., & Nowak, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.03.027 · Cited by 203
Evolutionary instability of zero-determinant strategies demonstrates that winning is not everything
Adami, C., & Hintze, A. (2013) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms3193 · Cited by 199
Cooperation and control in multiplayer social dilemmas
Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1407887111 · Cited by 198
Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1208087109 · Cited by 187
Self-citationCollapse of cooperation in evolving games
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1408618111 · Cited by 169
Self-citationA solution to the collective action problem in between-group conflict with within-group inequality
Gavrilets, S., & Fortunato, L. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms4526 · Cited by 168
Hauert, C., & Schuster, H. G. (1997) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1997.0073 · Cited by 155
Zero-Determinant Strategies in Iterated Public Goods Game
Pan, L., Hao, D., Rong, Z., & Zhou, T. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep13096 · Cited by 149
Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated prisoner's dilemma
Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., & Sigmund, K. (2015) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005 · Cited by 136
Spatial dilemmas of diffusible public goods
Allen, B., Gore, J., & Nowak, M. A. (2013) · eLife · doi:10.7554/elife.01169 · Cited by 135
Cell–cell contacts confine public goods diffusion inside Pseudomonas aeruginosa clonal microcolonies
Julou, T., Mora, T., Guillon, L., Croquette, V., Schalk, I. J., Bensimon, D., & Desprat, N. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1301428110 · Cited by 126
Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance
Hilbe, C., Nowak, M. A., & Traulsen, A. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0077886 · Cited by 117
Extortion subdues human players but is finally punished in the prisoner’s dilemma
Hilbe, C., Röhl, T., & Milinski, M. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms4976 · Cited by 113
Collective action and the collaborative brain
Gavrilets, S. (2014) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2014.1067 · Cited by 99
Evolutionary performance of zero-determinant strategies in multiplayer games
Hilbe, C., Wu, B., Traulsen, A., & Nowak, M. A. (2015) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2015.03.032 · Cited by 94
Indirect reciprocity is sensitive to costs of information transfer
Suzuki, S., & Kimura, H. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01435 · Cited by 57
The Effect of Memory Size on the Evolutionary Stability of Strategies in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Li, J., & Kendall, G. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation · doi:10.1109/tevc.2013.2286492 · Cited by 55
Public Good Diffusion Limits Microbial Mutualism
Menon, R., & Korolev, K. S. (2015) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.114.168102 · Cited by 40
Spatial interactions and cooperation can change the speed of evolution of complex phenotypes
Komarova, N. L. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400828111 · Cited by 39
Stable Cooperative Solutions for the Iterated Prisoner's DilemmaPreprint
Akin, E. (2012) · arXiv (Cornell University) · Cited by 28
The Evolvability of Cooperation under Local and Non-Local Mutations
Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2015) · Games · doi:10.3390/g6030231 · Cited by 18
Self-citationThe Art of War: Beyond Memory-one Strategies in Population Games
Lee, C., Harper, M., & Fryer, D. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120625 · Cited by 15
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Nowak, M. A. Evolutionary dynamics: exploring the equations of life (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2006).
- Sigmund, K. The calculus of selfishness Princeton series in theoretical and computational biology (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2010).
Cited by
Prisoner’s dilemma game model Based on historical strategy information
Gou, Z., & Li, Y. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-26890-9 · Cited by 561
Evolution of cooperation in stochastic games
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0277-x · Cited by 277
Partners and rivals in direct reciprocity
Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0320-9 · Cited by 184
“For a public goods game among memory-k players, Stewart and Plotkin have shown that a strategy only needs to resist four ‘extre-mal’ mutant strategies to qualify as a partner 78 .”
Memory- n strategies of direct reciprocity
Hilbe, C., Martinez-Vaquero, L. A., Chatterjee, K., & Nowak, M. A. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1621239114 · Cited by 149
Social goods dilemmas in heterogeneous societies
McAvoy, A., Allen, B., & Nowak, M. A. (2020) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- Stewart, A. J., & Plotkin, J. B.
- Affiliations
- University of Pennsylvania (US)
- Corresponding author
- Stewart, Alexander J.
- Venue
- Scientific Reports
- Published
- 2016-06-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 26889-26889
- ISSN
- 2045-2322 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC4887980
- OpenAlex
- W2261291220
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 45
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 7 · 2018: 15 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 4
- FWCI
- 33.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- cc-by
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (tdm)
- creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 (vor)
- Locations
- Scientific Reports (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- St Andrews Research Repository (St Andrews Research Repository) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- David and Lucile Packard Foundation (W911NF-12-1-0552)
- U.S. Department of the Interior (D12AP00025)
- Royal Society
- Army Research Office (W911NF-12-1-0552, W911NF)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, repeated games, public goods game, multiplayer games, small group size, collective action, evolutionary stability
- MeSH terms
- Cooperative Behavior, Decision Making, Game Theory, Games, Experimental, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Memory, Models, Psychological, Models, Statistical, Sociobiology
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.