Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
Cited by 381

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity

Open access
Sommerfeld, Ralf D., Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen, Semmann, Dirk, Milinski, Manfred·2007·Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Abstract

Communication about social topics is abundant in human societies, and many functions have been attributed to such gossiping. One of these proposed functions is the management of reputations. Reputation by itself has been shown to have a strong influence on cooperation dynamics in games of indirect reciprocity, and this notion helps to explain the observed high level of cooperation in humans. Here we designed a game to test a widespread assumption that gossip functions as a vector for the transmission of social information. This empirical study (with 14 groups of nine students each) focuses on the composition of gossip, information transfer by gossip, and the behavior based on gossip information. We show that gossip has a strong influence on the resulting behavior even when participants have access to the original information (i.e., direct observation) as well as gossip about the same information. Thus, it is evident that gossip has a strong manipulative potential. Furthermore, gossip about cooperative individuals is more positive than gossip about uncooperative individuals, gossip comments transmit social information successfully, and cooperation levels are higher when people encounter positive compared with negative gossip.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1073/pnas.0704598104

Cites

48 of 48 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 48 references

Research works printed but not linked: 4

  1. N Emler Social Psych Section Newsletter 27, 23–37 (1992).
  2. N Emler Good Gossip, eds RF Goodman, B Ben-Ze'ev (Univ Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS), pp. 117–138 (1994).
  3. RF Goodman, B Ben-Ze'ev Good Gossip (Univ Kansas Press, Lawrence, KS, 1994).
  4. R Sugden The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 1986).

Cited by

See all 381

Metadata

Authors
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Semmann, D., & Milinski, M.
Venue
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Published
2007-10-30
Volume
104
Issue
44
Pages
17435-17440
ISSN
  • 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
  • 1091-6490
OpenAlex
W2084116113
Cited by
381
References
48
FWCI
33.87
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1073/pnas.0704598104
The paper
Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Semmann, D., & Milinski, M. (2007). Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0704598104

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.