The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans
Open accessAbstract
Social sanctioning is widely considered a successful strategy to promote cooperation among humans. In situations in which individual and collective interests are at odds, incentives to free-ride induce individuals to refrain from contributing to public goods provision. Experimental evidence from public goods games shows that when endowed with sanctioning powers, conditional cooperators can discipline defectors, thus leading to greater levels of cooperation. However, extant evidence is based on peer punishment institutions, whereas in complex societies, systems of control are often centralized: for instance, we do not sanction our neighbors for driving too fast, the police do. Here we show the effect of centralized sanctioning and legitimate authority on cooperation. We designed an adaptation of the public goods game in which sanctioning power is given to a single monitor, and we experimentally manipulated the process by which the monitor is chosen. To increase the external validity of the study, we conducted lab-in-the-field experiments involving 1,543 Ugandan farmers from 50 producer cooperatives. This research provides evidence of the effectiveness of centralized sanctioning and demonstrates the causal effect of legitimacy on cooperation: participants are more responsive to the authority of an elected monitor than a randomly chosen monitor. Our essay contributes to the literature on the evolution of cooperation by introducing the idea of role differentiation. In complex societies, cooperative behavior is not only sustained by mechanisms of selection and reciprocity among peers, but also by the legitimacy that certain actors derive from their position in the social hierarchy.
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Cites
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Society-in-the-loop: programming the algorithmic social contract
Rahwan, I. (2018) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-017-9430-8 · Cited by 553
Punishment and cooperation in nature
Raihani, N. J., Thornton, A., & Bshary, R. (2012) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2011.12.004 · Cited by 289
Competition and cooperation among different punishing strategies in the spatial public goods game
Chen, X., Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.92.012819 · Cited by 285
The nature of followership: Evolutionary analysis and review
Bastardoz, N., & Van Vugt, M. (2019) · The Leadership Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.09.004 · Cited by 197
Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2013.02.008 · Cited by 173
Metadata
- Authors
- Baldassarri, D., & Grossman, G.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2011-06-20
- Volume
- 108
- Issue
- 27
- Pages
- 11023-11027
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W2121918787
- Cited by
- 330
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 42.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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