The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The collaborative roots of corruption
Open accessAbstract
Significance: Recent financial scandals highlight the devastating consequences of corruption. While much is known about individual immoral behavior, little is known about the collaborative roots of curruption. In a novel experimental paradigm, people could adhere to one of two competing moral norms: collaborate vs. be honest. Whereas collaborative settings may boost honesty due to increased observability, accountability, and reluctance to force others to become accomplices, we show that collaboration, particularly on equal terms, is inductive to the emergence of corruption. When partners' profits are not aligned, or when individuals complete a comparable task alone, corruption levels drop. These findings reveal a dark side of collaboration, suggesting that human cooperative tendencies, and not merely greed, take part in shaping corruption.
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Cited by
Abeler, J., Nosenzo, D., & Raymond, C. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2840132 · Cited by 840
Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies
Gächter, S., & Schulz, J. F. (2016) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature17160 · Cited by 551
Kajackaite, A., & Gneezy, U. (2017) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.015 · Cited by 278
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“This aligns with the concept of partners in crime in the context of collaborative unethical behavior, as prior work suggests [46, 99].”
Corruption risk in contracting markets: a network science perspective
Wachs, J., Fazekas, M., & Kertész, J. (2021) · International Journal of Data Science and Analytics · doi:10.1007/s41060-019-00204-1 · Cited by 73
Metadata
- Authors
- Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2015-08-10
- Volume
- 112
- Issue
- 34
- Pages
- 10651-10656
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- OpenAlex
- W1899296302
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 82.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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